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THE STATE OF "STATE ACTION" ANTITRUST
IMMUNITY A PROGRESS REPORT
John E. Lopatka*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The state action doctrine is an implied exemption from the federal
antitrust laws for activities that involve states. When the Supreme Court
first explicitly recognized the doctrine over forty years ago, the exemption
was understood to immunize conduct of a state that would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws.' The Court inferred the exemption from the
concept of federalism-Congress did not intend to subject sovereign
states to the strictures of federal antitrust policy Eventually, the Court
recognized that federalism required an exemption for private conduct
appropriately authorized by a state, but even thirty-three years after the
doctrine was established, four Justices resisted this conclusion.'
The history of the state action doctrine provides a classic study of
the evolution of a legal principle. From a scholarly perspective, we are
at an enviable point in time to observe this process. The doctrine has
not developed in a consistent manner. Some changes have been progressive, others regressive. We now have a substantial body of precedent
to analyze, but significant aspects of the doctrine remain unrefined. The
Supreme Court has demonstrated special interest in the exemption during
the past twelve years, and we can expect the Court to continue to force
the doctrine along its evolutionary path. To predict the course of that
development and to recommend desirable changes is the challenge.
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J.D., 1977, University of Chicago.
i. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307 (1943), discussed infra at
notes 16-90 and accompanying text.
2. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 590-91, 96 S. Ct. 3110, 311718 (1976) (plurality opinion) (Parker did not hold that private actions authorized by the
state are immune), discussed infra at notes 134-214 and accompanying text.
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Many articles have been written on the state action doctrine.3 Because
the doctrine is evolving, many of these articles have become obsolete
to the extent they described the current state of the exemption. Some
articles have addressed primarily the question of why certain activities
should be immune under the state action exemption. 4 I have argued
elsewhere that Congress did not intend to subject the actions of politically-accountable governmental entities to antitrust strictures in part
because the application of those laws to these public bodies would
disserve the economic objective of antitrust policy I This article surveys
the reasons for state action immunity, but focuses on a different issue:
what changes must be made in the interpretation of the principle and
in the mechanical application of the exemption to concrete fact patterns
in order to serve the purpose of the doctnne?
The article begins with a brief description of the proper interpretation
of the doctrine.6 The next section offers reasons for the description
proposed, while tracing the exemption's actual development. Part IV

summarizes the status of the doctrine and examines whether any changes
in its interpretation and application are desirable. Finally, the article

explores and resolves a few outstanding issues in state action dogma.
II.

PROPOSED APPROACH

This article will present a unified theory of state action immunity
Most, though not all, of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area are
consistent with the proposed analysis, though the rationales offered by
the Court are often inconsistent. This section will sketch the theory,

3. See, e.g., Richards, Exploring the Far Reaches of the State Action Exemption:
Implications for Federalism, 57 St. John's L. Rev. 274 (1983); Burling, Lee & Quarles,
"State Action" Antitrust Immunity-A Doctrine in Search of Defimtion, 1982 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 809 (1982); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action" after Lafayette, 95
Harv L. Rev. 435 (1981); Morgan, Antitrust and State Regulation: Standards of Immunity
After Midcal, 35 Ark. L. Rev. 453 (1981); Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the Regulatory
Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal
Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 1099 (1981); Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State
Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 693 (1974). For a superb
exposition of the doctrine in a treatise, see 1 P Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law §§
207-18 (1978) & §§ 212.1-212.7 (Supp. 1982).
4. The finest recent investigation of the foundations of state action is Easterbrook,
Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23 (1983). See also Wiley,
A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1986).
5. See Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic
Approach, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 23, 52-77 (1984).
6. Not only has the doctrine evolved, but my interpretation of its proper construction
has evolved as well. The interested reader is invited to compare this article with Lopatka,
id. at 52-54, and Lopatka, The Electric Utility Price Squeeze as an Antitrust Cause of
Action, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 563, 620-22 (1984).
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while the next section will add detail by analyzing specific cases decided
by the Court.
The ultimate principle that should govern all claims of state action
immumty is the following: Immumty should be granted if the state
intended to engage in or permit the conduct that constitutes the restraint
challenged. The Court has steadfastly maintained that the foundation
of state action immunity is federalism. 7 A conflict between state and
federal policies sufficient to trigger concerns of federalism arises whenever the state desires to allow conduct that would violate a federal
mandate. Therefore, a sufficient justification for a grant of immunity
arises whenever the state intends to authorize or permit conduct constituting a restraint of trade. There is no justification for withholding
immunity unless the state demands conduct that would be unlawful.
An express statement of intent, of course, would be direct proof
of the ultimate issue. Normally, however, intent is inferred from actions.
Therefore, the standard can be rephrased as follows: Immunity should
be granted if the state acts in such a way that the conduct constituting
the challenged trade restraint was a likely consequence. Conversely,
immunity should not be granted if the conduct constituting the challenged
restraint was not a likely consequence of state action.8
Several implications of this principle bear emphasis. What conduct
constitutes a restraint of trade is a separate question. Generally, a private
party commits a civil antitrust violation by engaging in conduct that
has an anticompetitive effect on a market or with the purpose to produce
such an effect. 9 Apart from state action immunity, a state also might
engage in conduct that violates the antitrust laws. Of course, some of
a state's conduct has no counterpart in the private sector, and determining whether it would constitute an unlawful restraint of trade is not

7 See, e.g., Parker 317 U.S. at 351, 63 S. Ct. at 313; Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2015 (1975); City of. Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412, 98 S. Ct. 1123, 1136 (1978); California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 103-04, 100 S. Ct. 937
942 (1980); Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (1984); Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 1726 (1985) [hereinafter referred to

as SMCRC].
8. "Likely consequence" means that the state's manner of conduct had at least a
50 percent probability of resulting in the conduct challenged as a restraint, measured at
the time the state engaged in that course of conduct. A theoretically more precise determination of the necessary probability of the resulting action could be offered, but that
analysis is not important here. This article is proposing a standard for implementation
in practice and no standard requiring an assessment of probability finer than 50 percent
would be workable in real cases.
9. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 n.22,
98 S. Ct. 2864, 2878 n.22 (1978) ("the general rule [is) that either purpose or effect will
support [civil antitrust] liability").
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always easy But certainly, a state can take action that has an anticompetitive effect. If a state acts in that way, however, it should be
immune under the operative standard suggested. Thus, if the state's own
conduct constitutes the challenged of trade restraint, that conduct cer-

tainly will have been the "likely consequence" of the state's action.
Indeed, the test becomes a tautology
The principle also applies when the conduct of a private party is
challenged as an antitrust violation. If the state acted in such a way
that the challenged conduct of the private party was a likely consequence,
immunity should be granted in favor of the private party A grant of
immunity requires a causal relationship flowing from the conduct of
the state to the challenged actions of the private party However, the
probability that the anticompetitive conduct will occur need not approach
certainty For instance, if a state permitted the conduct, rather than
required it, the probability that it would occur would be smaller. Nevertheless, the conduct would be a likely consequence and the private party
would be granted immunity Thus, if the state explicitly provides that
raisin growers may fix prices, subsequent price-fixing by the producers
is a likely consequence and, therefore, the producers should be granted
immunity Conversely, if a state's corporation laws permit stock acquisitions, an anticompetitive merger of two firms would not be a likely
consequence, and, therefore, the firms should not be immune.
The principle is phrased in terms of the way in which a state acts
to make it clear that immunity can arise from state inaction as well as
action. The ultimate question for a grant of immunity is whether the
state intended to authorize or engage in the challenged conduct. Intent
can be inferred from action and inaction. The burden of persuasion on
the issue of the state's intent, however, should fall on the proponent
of immunity Simple reliance upon state inaction, in many actual cases,
may be insufficient to meet that burden.
The standard refers to the "conduct constituting" a challenged
restraint of trade to avoid the confusion that would be engendered by
referring to the state's intent to authorize a "restraint." "Restraint"
refers to conduct that has (or is intended to have) an anticompetitive
effect and should not be interpreted to mean the anticompetitive effect.
For state action immunity, it is not necessary that the state legislature
intended that the effect result. It need not even have been aware at the
time it authorized the challenged conduct that the effect would occur
The state need only intend to authorize the conduct challenged. The
reason for this standard is that to open the door in state action cases
to claims that the state did not realize what it was doing, or was
mistaken in its beliefs, would be exceptionally costly-the direct costs
of litigating the claims would be immense, and the indirect costs created
by a federal court inquiring into the "mental" processes of a state
would be substantial. State governments are capable of realizing and
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rectifying their own errors. Further, if immunity is not vitiated even
when the state government is unaware that the conduct it engages in
or authorizes will have an anticompetitive effect, a fortiori, immunity
is not vitiated when the state is aware of the effect, but is motivated
only in part or not at all by a desire to achieve that effect.
None of this means, however, that the rest of the country must
pay, in the form of injury to consumer welfare, for a state's mistaken
conferral of immunity Whether or not the state errs in extending immunity, a restraint engaged in or authorized by a state should be
preempted under the Commerce Clause if an insubstantial proportion
of the damage to consumer welfare caused by the restraint falls on the
state's own residents.' 0 Whether the state law bringing about the restraint
is preempted or not, however, has nothing to do with whether the state
accurately or inaccurately predicted the consequences of its actions. If
a state acted mistakenly and immunity is granted, the state's residents
will suffer as consumers, but they should not expect the federal government to spare them the consequences of their own imprudent political
choices. "
If a state acts in such a way that the conduct constituting the
restraint challenged is not a likely consequence, state action immunity
should be withheld. There are two typical models that fall within this
category In the first model, the state authorizes a broad class of
activities, a private anticompetitive act falls within the class, but the
state did not intend to authorize the anticompetitive act. A state that

i0. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause not only is a source of
power for Congress to pass laws that preempt, under the Supremacy Clause, inconsistent
local governmental actions; it also, by its own force, preempts local governmental actions
that impose an excessive burden on the national economy. Justice Blackmun recognized
this in a state action immunity case, noting that "a state action that interferes with
competition not only among its own citizens but also among the States is already subject
[to] the Commerce Clause." Cantor 428 U.S. at 612, 96 S. Ct. at 3128 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). For an excellent summary of the application of the Commerce Clause to
state anticompetitive activities, see I P Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 220b.
See also J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 266-75 (2d ed. 1983).
The test for Commerce Clause preemption proposed in the text is based on EvansvilleVanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 92 S. Ct. 1349 (1972),
where the Court held that a municipality did not run afoul of the Commerce Clause by
charging a tax of one dollar per commercial airline passenger for enplaning at the municipal
airport. For a fuller exposition of the text proposed, see Lopatka, supra note 5. at 7072.
11. The antitrust laws should be construed to serve the single purpose of allocative
efficiency, or consumer welfare. The issue of whether the laws should be interpreted to
serve additional goals as well has generated passionate debate over the years. See, e.g.,
I P Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at §§ 109-09b; Blake & Jones, Toward a ThreeDimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 422 (1965). Nevertheless, the arguments
for restricting the objective to consumer welfare are compelling. See I P Areeda & D.
Turner, supra note 3, at §§ 103-05; R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War
with Itself 81 (1978); R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 8, 18-20 (1976).
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authorizes stock acquisitions in its corporation laws, but that does not
intend to authorize anticompetitive mergers, is an example of this model.
In the second model, a private party undertakes an anticompetitive act
that is not even within a broad category of activity authorized by the
state, or perhaps, is even prohibited by the state. Obviously, no state
action immunity should be found.
If a private act causes an anticompetitive effect only in combination
with a state act, the private act may nevertheless constitute an illegal
restraint. If the private act was undertaken with intent to produce an
anticompetitive effect, it would constitute a civil antitrust violation regardless of effect. 12 Further, it is probably enough for an antitrust
violation that a private act constitutes one of two or more necessary
conditions for an anticompetitive effect.' 3 If there is no causal connection
running from the state act to the private act, the private restraint will
not be immune under the state action doctrine. However, the private
act might still be immune from antitrust attack under the Noerr-Pen4
nington doctrine.'
Thus, when private conduct is challenged as an antitrust violation
and the conduct was not the probable consequence of any state act,
the state action doctrine will not afford immunity to the private party
One way the private party might still be able to avoid liability is through
Noerr-Penningtonimmunity Another possible way to escape liability is
through a pre-trial motion to dismiss on the merits, on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action. If the private party's
conduct was not undertaken to achieve an anticompetitive effect, and
such an anticompetitive effect was not the probable consequence of any
action undertaken, no conduct of the private party could be accurately
characterized as a restraint, and the complaint should be dismissed.' 5
The "state," for purposes of the state action doctnne, should at
least include all constitutional branches of government and agencies
economically disinterested in those subject to their jurisdiction. Thus,

12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
13. For example, the participation of several firms in a price-fixing conspiracy might
be necessary conditions to produce an anticompetitive effect. Even though no one firm
could have driven up the price, each firm would be liable.
14. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine takes its name from two cases: Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 81 S. Ct. 899 (1961), and UMW
v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct. 1585 (1965). In general, the doctrine provides
that private attempts to secure anticompetitive actions from governmental entities, at least
to the extent that the entities are acting in a policy-making rather than ministerial capacity,
cannot form the basis of antitrust liability. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971) (the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine only protects private conduct designed to influence government policy). See
generally I P Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at §§ 201-06.
15. See infra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
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if a state supreme court or public utilities commission intends to authorize
the conduct challenged, immunity should attach. To withhold immunity
when an agency, as opposed, for instance, to the legislature, expresses
state intent would improperly intrude into internal state affairs and
create an incentive to operate state government inefficiently The Court
has refused to allow interested state agencies to represent the state for
purposes of immunity because of understandable suspicions about the
motives of these bodies. The way in which a state conducts its business,
however, is an inappropriate matter for federal intervention. Further,
distinguishing between interested and disinterested agencies may not be
worth the effort. For these reasons, even if state policy is expressed by
an interested agency, it should acquire immunity, and if the policy harms
public welfare, the state will be forced to bear the injury or correct its
mistake. If the harm is disproportionately imposed out-of-state, the
policy should be preempted under the Commerce Clause, but such a
policy should be preempted no matter which state body expressed it.

III.
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE

Parker v Brown

The state action exemption from the antitrust laws is generally
regarded to have originated in Parker v Brown.16 Indeed, the exemption
is often referred to as the "Parker doctrine. ' 'i 7 In Parker, California

16. 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307 (1943).
17 Actually, as Justice Stewart pointed out in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 615 n.3, 96 S.
Ct. at 3129 n.3 (Stewart, J.,dissenting), the antecedent of the doctrine is Olson v. Smith,
195 U.S. 332, 25 S. Ct. 52 (1904). In Olsen, marine pilots licensed by Texas sued a pilot
for operating without a license. Id. at 338, 25 S. Ct. at 52. The defendant claimed, inter
alia, that the state statutes requiring a license to perform pilotage services and fixing
pilotage fees were void because in conflict with the antitrust laws. Id. at 339, 25 S. Ct.
at 52-53. The Supreme Court rejected the argument.
The contention that because the commissioned pilots have a monopoly of the
business, and by combination among themselves exclude all others from rendering
pilotage services, is also but a denial of the authority of the State to regulate,
since if the State has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and
commission, those who are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no
monopoly or combination in a legal sense can arise from the fact that the duly
authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to perform the duties devolving
upon them by law. When the propositions just referred to are considered in
their ultimate aspects they amount simply to the contention, not that the Texas
laws are void for want of power, but that they are unwise. If an analysis of
those laws justified such conclusion-which we do not at all imply is the casethe remedy is in Congress, in whom the ultimate authority on the subject is
vested, and cannot be judicially afforded by denying the power of the State to
exercise its authority over a subject concerning which it has plenary power until
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had enacted an Agricultural Prorate Act "to conserve the agricultural
wealth of the State of California, and to prevent economic waste in
the marketing of agricultural products or crops produced in the state.
" sThe Act authorized the creation of an Agricultural Prorate Advisory
Commission, which consisted of the state Director of Agriculture, as a
member ex-officio, and eight other members appointed by the Governor
and confirmed by the Senate.' 9 The Court recited only one statutory
requirement for membership-a member had to take the oath of office.20
In fact, the statute specified that six of the eight appointed members
of the Commission had to be producers of agricultural commodities,
though no two could be producers of the same commodity, one member
had to represent the interests of consumers, and one had to be a handler
of agricultural products. 2
Congress has seen fit to act in the premises.
Id. at 344-45, 25 S.Ct. at 54-55 (emphasis added). It is curious that the Court referred
to a "combination" of licensed pilots to exclude all others, since the defendant did not
seem to allege a conspiracy of pilots. Rather, the defendants' theory appeared to be that
the state laws requiring a license had the necessary consequence of limiting entry and
were, therefore, in conflict with the Sherman Act. Perhaps the Court felt obliged to
assume an allegation of a combination in order to treat the claim as a potential Sherman
Act Section 1 violation, since the violation of that statute requires a plurality of actors.
It is not obvious, however, why the defendant could not have been understood to allege
a Section 2 violation, which would have obviated the need for a combination. In any
event, there is no doubt that a government license can be an effective entry barrier, that
a licensing scheme can injure consumer welfare, and that the scheme need not be a
product of a conspiracy among licensees. See generally R. Bork, supra note 11, at 34764 (1978). A licensing system may be as close to a self-executing governmental restraint,
i.e., a restraint that does not involve private anticompetitive conduct, as exists in the real
world. Because the state itself engaged in the conduct that constituted the challenged
restraint, immunity was warranted.
18. 1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 1.See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 344, 63 S.Ct.
at 307 (1943). The predecessor of the 1939 Act was enacted in 1933. 1933 Cal. Stats.
ch. 754. The onginal Act was amended nine times prior to the decision in Parker- 1935
Cal. Stats. chs. 471, 743; 1938 Cal. Stats. Extra Sess. ch. 6; 1939 Cal. Stats. chs. 363,
548, 894; 1941 Cal. Stats. chs. 603, 1150, 1186.
19. Parker 317 U.S. at 346, 63 S. Ct. at 311.
20. Id., 63 S.Ct. at 311.
21. The provision in full stated:
Six of the appointive members of said commission shall be engaged at the time
of their appointment in the production of agricultural commodities as their
principal occupation, but no two of these shall be appointed as representing
the same commodity. One of said appointive members shall be neither a producer
nor a handler of agricultural commodities but shall be appointed to represent
consumers generally. One appointive member shall be an experienced commercial
handler of agricultural products.
1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 3. Though the statute did not explicitly specify whether
members served in a full-time or part-time capacity, it appears that members were expected
to continue working in their prior occupations. The statute provided for compensation
of only $10 per day for each day spent on official business, plus reimbursement for
traveling expenses. 1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 4.
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The statute provided that producers of a commodity could petition
the Commission for the establishment of a proration zone and prorated
marketing program.2 If the Commission, after hearing, found that certain statutorily-prescribed economic conditions were satisfied, the Commission could grant the petition.2 3 Once granted, the Director, with
approval of the Commission, was required to appoint a Program Committee composed primarily of producers. 24 The Program Committee formulated a proration marketing program and submitted it for approval
to the Commission. 21 If the Commission approved the program, and
65% of the affected producers and owners of 51% of the producing
factors assented to it, the program was instituted. 26 The Program Committee was then authorized to appoint, subject to the approval of the
director, an agent to admimster the program under the direction of the
Program Committee. 7 The Program Committee's exercise of power was
2
subject to the general supervision of the Director.
The statute authorized the Program Committee to "determine the
method, manner, and extent of proration." 2 9 It specified that the proration plan could create surplus and stabilizing pools of commodities,
that the contents of the surplus pools could not be marketed in direct
competition with other parts of the crop, and that the contents of the
stabilizing pool could be disposed of as the Program Committee directed.'0 Under the plan adopted in Parker, growers were required to

22. Parker 317 U.S. at 346, 63 S. Ct. at 311.
23. Id., 63 S.Ct. at 311. Specifically, the Commission was required to find, inter
alia:
(2)That the economic stability of the agricultural industry concerned is being
imperiled by market conditions prevailing or liable to prevail as to the variety
or kind of commodity sought to be prorated or is being imperiled by the
existence or imminence of a seasonal or annual surplus; and
(3) That agricultural waste [defined in § 2(b) of the Act] is occurring or is
about to occur; and
(4) That the institution of a program of prorated marketing will conserve the
agricultural wealth of the state and will prevent threatened economic waste; and
(5) That the institution of a proration program will advance, the public welfare
without discnmnation against any producer; and
(6) That the institution and operation of a proration program will not result
in unreasonable profits to the producers and that the commodity named in the
petition can not be marketed at a reasonable profit to producers otherwise than
by means of such a program.
1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 10.
24. Parker 317 U.S. at 346, 63 S.Ct. at 311.
25. Id. at 347, 63 S. Ct. at 311-12.
26. Id. 63 S.Ct. at 311-12.
27 Id. See also 1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 16.
28. 1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 22.
29. 1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 18.
30. 1939 Cal. Stats. ch. 894, § 19.
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place 70% of their raisins in either a surplus or a stabilization pool,
and could sell only 30% of their standard raisins through ordinary
commercial channels."
The obvious purpose of the Prorate Act, and the plan adopted in
Parker pursuant to it, was to raise the price of agricultural commodities.
The program was successful. The plaintiff alleged that the pre-season
price of the 1940 raisin crop before the program became effective was
$45 per ton and that immediately after the plan took effect the price
rose to $55 per ton or higher.3 2 The plaintiff, a producer and packer
of raisins, brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the 1940 raisin
proration program against "the State Director of Agriculture, Raisin
Proration Zone No. 1, the members of the State Agricultural Prorate
Advisory Commission and of the Program Committee for Zone No. 1,
and others charged by the statute with the admimstration of the Prorate
Act." 33 In the district court, the plaintiff did not argue that the program
conflicted with the Sherman Act, but claimed that it interfered with his
constitutional right to engage in interstate commerce.3 4 The district court
held that enforcement of the program was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause, and the original argument in the Supreme Court was
limited to that issue." Before the Court issued a decision, it held in
Georgia v Evans3 6 that a state could be a "person" entitled to bring
an antitrust suit.3 7 It therefore set Parker for reargument and requested
the parties, as well as the Solicitor General, "to discuss the questions
whether the state statute involved is rendered invalid by the action of
Congress in passing the Sherman Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
as amended, or any other Act of Congress." 3 8
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court upheld the Prorate Act
and its operation against challenges based on the Sherman Act,39 Agricultural Adjustment Act, 40 and Commerce Clause. 4' Exactly what the
Court held on the antitrust issue, however, has been disputed. Justice
Stevens has argued that the Court held only that state officials themselves, acting pursuant to express legislative command, do not violate
the Sherman Act, even though comparable actions by private parties

31.
32.
33.
34.

Parker 317 U.S. at 348, 63 S.Ct. at 312.
Id.at 349, 63 S.Ct. at 312-13.
Id. at 344, 63 S.Ct. at 310.
See Cantor 428 U.S. at 586, 96 S. Ct. at 3115 (plurality opinion of Stevens,

35.
36.
37
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id., 96 S.Ct. at 3115.
316 U.S. 159, 62 S. Ct. 972 (1942).
Cantor 428 U.S. at 587 96 S. Ct. at 3110 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.).
Id. at 587 n.16, 96 S.Ct. at 3116 n.16.
Parker 317 U.S. at 352, 63 S.Ct. at 313.
Id. at 358, 63 S. Ct. at 317
Id. at 368, 63 S.Ct. at 322.

J.).
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would be illegal; the Court did not hold that private parties engaging
in otherwise illegal restraints are immune from liability when they act
pursuant to state law 42 Justice Stewart, however, has countered that
the Parker Court held that the state statute was not preempted by the
Sherman Act and presumably, therefore, all parties effecting a restraint
created by a statute are exempt from prosecution under the antitrust
43
laws .
It is clear that the Court found an implied exemption from the
antitrust laws for actions undertaken by state representatives that can
be attributed to the state, and perhaps for action of others somehow
authorized by a state. Because federal law contains no express exemption
from the antitrust laws for state action, any exemption had to be
implied. 44 The Court used federalism as the source from which to infer
the exemption.4 5 The Court began with the sweeping observation that

42. Cantor 428 U.S. at 589-90, 96 S. Ct. at 3117 Justice Stevens, in this part of
the opinion, represented the views of a total of four justices. Justice Stevens states that
the plaintiff in Parker sued only state officials, so that the Court was not confronted
with the issue of immunity for private parties. Id. at 585, 63 S. Ct at 3115. But the
Court in Parker stated that the defendants included "Raisin Proration Zone No. I" and
members of the Program Committee. Parker 317 U.S. at 344, 63 S. Ct. at 310. It is
not clear at all how the zone itself could have been a defendant. But more importantly,
the Court's view of the status of the Committee members is uncertain. Justice Stevens
Inay be assuming that the Committee members, as well as the Commission members,
constituted state officials. But it is not clear that the Parker Court so viewed them, and
the Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 791, 95 S. Ct. at 2015, explicitly
held that a mere designation of a private party as a state official does not automatically
turn that party's actions into official actions of the state for purposes of state action
immunity. See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. In short, Justice Stevens's
contention that only state officials were defendants in Parker is disputable.
43. Cantor 428 U.S. at 621-22, 96 S. Ct. at 3132-33 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. Parker 317 U.S. at 351, 63 S. Ct. at 313 ("The Sherman Act makes no mention
of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or
official action directed by a state.") Compare, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a) (1982) (express
antitrust exemption for certain activities of railroads); 49 U.S.C. § 10706(b) (1982) (express
antitrust exemption for certain activities of motor carriers): Clayton Act 6 6. 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1982) ("Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticulture organizations.
").
45. I have argued that sole reliance on federalism for the basis of state action immunity
is misplaced, that there is a positive economic reason to conclude that Congress intended
to withhold application of the antitrust laws to governmental activities. Much of what
governments do may interfere with competitive markets but promote competition, or may
displace competition in instances of market failure. Some of what they do may be designed
to sacrifice efficiency for some other value, or to generate monopoly profits for the public
fisc or other purposes. In all cases, the government's actions: 1) serve the purpose of
the antitrust laws and should be encouraged; 2) trade off consumer welfare for some
other value in a manner for which a politically-accountable government is created and
thus should be allowed; or 3) decrease efficiency in a way that is not politically-accountable
but can be corrected by methods other than the antitrust laws. See Lopatka, supra note
5, at 52-72. See also Easterbrook, supra note 4.
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in "a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract
from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
''
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
In effect, the Court said that where application of a federal law would
impinge upon state sovereignty, the presumption is that the law does
not apply 47 The Court found no indication in the terms of the Sherman
Act or its legislative history that Congress intended the Act to apply

to states and, therefore, inferred an exemption for state action."
If the court is to immunize state action, it is crucial to identify
exactly what or who constitutes the state. After all, a state is not a
human being. In Parker, the Court appeared to view the state as the
legislature, and the immumzed action as the enactment of the prorate
law The Court said, "Here the state command to the Commission and
to the program committee of the CaliforniaProrateAct is not rendered

unlawful by the Sherman Act.

049

The Court also said, "We find

nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents
from activities directed by its legislature.'"0 Yet the Court hinted that

46. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351, 63 S. Ct. at 313.
47 The presumption that the antitrust laws do not apply when they conflict with
state laws is the reverse of the presumption that is used when the antitrust laws conflict
with some other federal statute. In the latter context, the Court is fond of reciting that
repeal of the antitrust laws is not favored and is to be implied "only if necessary" to
make the conflicting federal statute work, and then only to the minimum extent necessary.
See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S. Ct. 1246, 1257
(1963); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198, 60 S. Ct. 182, 188 (1939);
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 457, 65 S. Ct. 716, 726 (1945); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51, 83 S.Ct. 1715, 1734-35 (1963);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682, 95 S. Ct. 2598, 2611 (1975). The
axiom sounds straightforward, but its meaning is ambiguous and its utility as a guide in
reaching decisions is limited. See 1.P Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 224(d).
At least one member of the Supreme Court attempted to extend the pro-antitrust presumption applicable to conflicts with federal laws to conflicts with state laws. SMCRC,
105 S. Ct. at 1736 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). The majority of the Court unequivocally
rejected the attempt. Id. at 1727 n.21 For a discussion of SMCRC, see infra notes 42462 and accompanying text.
48. Parker 317 U.S. at 351, 63 S. Ct. at 313. In later cases, the Court noted that
though the Parker Court relied upon Congressional silence to infer immunity, there are
"statements in the legislative history that affirmatively express a desire not 'to invade the
legislative authority of the several States.
"' SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1726 n.19. See
Cantor 428 U.S. at 632, 96 S. Ct. at 3137 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The legislative
history reveals very clearly that Congress' perception of the limitations of its power under
the Commerce Clause was coupled with an intent not to intrude upon the authority of
the several States to regulate 'domestic' commerce.").
49. Parker 317 U.S. at 352, 63 S. Ct. at 314.
50. Id. at 350-51, 63 S. Ct. at 313.
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the Advisory Commission might have constituted the state. The Court
said, "Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by
producers, and a prorate program, approved by the Commission, must
also be approved by referendum by producers, it is the state, acting
through the Commission, which adopts the program and which enforces
it with penal sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy ""'
In any event, the Court never suggested that the Program Committee
constituted the state. It should be noted that the Committee was predominantly composed of raisin growers." Thus, if the idea of a prorate
program had been solely that of the Committee, the program would
not have been immune. The status of the Commission is less clear.
Suppose, for example, the California legislature had established an agricultural advisory commission whose sole mandate was to regulate agricultural activities in order to promote the public welfare, and the
commission had instituted the prorate program. Would the program
have been immune? What the Court's answer would have been is arguable. The answer might have been affected by the composition of the
commission. I argue later that an anticompetitive policy established by
an agency with no direct financial interest in the subject of its regulation,
a "legitimate" agency, is treated differently by the Court for state action
purposes than a policy adopted by an interested, or "illegitimate" agency 11
But here, the statute dictated an agency membership representing diverse
interests, and the status of such an agency is questionable. 4 Indisputably,
however, the prorate program in Parker was contemplated by the state
legislature. In the words of later cases, the prorate program was a
"clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" policy of the California
legislature. 5 The statute was quite explicit as to the operation of the
program, defining surplus and stabilization pools and dictating the way
in which commodities placed in each could be marketed. 6 The statute
left the mechanics of programs applicable to specific commodities to be
hammered out by program committees, with the assent of affected
producers and the approval of the Advisory Commission. But there can

51. Id. at 352, 63 S. Ct. at 314. The Court went on to say, "The state itself exercises
its legislative authority in making the regulation and in prescribing the conditions of its
applications." Id., 63 S. Ct. at 314. This reference to legislative activity is ambiguous.
It may refer either to the legislature's enactment of the prorate law, or the Advisory
Commission's quasi-legislative approval of a prorate plan which acquired the force of
administrative regulations.
52. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 21.
55. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105,
100 S.Ct. at 943.
56. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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be no doubt that the legislature contemplated and authorized a pricefixing device."
The Court never said that its decision depended on the fact that
the price-fixing of the Program Committee was overseen by the Director
and the rest of the Advisory Commission. The Court in a later case
suggested that without this supervision, immunity might not have been
conferred. 5" Perhaps the Parker Court viewed the continuing scrutiny
of the Commission as an adequate substitute for the direct legislative
specification of the prices to be charged or the quantities to be sold,
and perhaps that kind of state involvement was important to the Court.5 9
In another case, however, the Court implied that the existence of continuing oversight was irrelevant to the result in Parker60 Surely the
Parker Court could have been explicit if it viewed supervision as integral
to immunity In any event, it is clear that if continuing oversight was
relevant to the Court, the Advisory Commission must have been deemed
qualified to provide it, since no one else, and certainly not the legislature,
was supervising the Committee's activities. One interpretation of Parker,
although not the only interpretation, is that state action immunity requires a clear statement of an anticompetitive policy and continuing
supervision of the restraint, but that the statement must be made by
the state legislature, whereas the program may be supervised by a state
agency composed at least partially of members financially interested in
the subject of their regulation. This suggested dichotomy of the state
a
for purposes of articulating an anticompetitive policy and supervising
6
restraint is made clearer, though not explicit, in a later case. '
Another implication of Parker, and one which later courts tended62
to overlook, is that the price-fixing was not compelled by the state.

57 The legislature did not go quite as far as the Texas legislature had gone in Olsen
v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 25 S. Ct. 52 (1904), where the legislature both limited the supply
of pilots by requiring licenses and set the fees for pilotage services. See supra note 17
But in both cases, the legislature certainly contemplated and authorized the challenged
restraint.
58. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 104,
100 S. Ct. at 942 (discussing Parker the Court said, "Without such oversight, the result
could have been different.")
59. As pninted out earlier, Parker was preceded by Olsen v. Smith. See supra note
17 There, the State of Texas not only limited the supply of marine pilots, but also
specified maximum prices in the statute. Olson, 195 U.S. at 339-40, 25 S. Ct. at 52-53.
60. Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1995-96 (1984) (in Parker the relevant conduct
was that of the state legislature, and in such a case, the issue of state supervision need
not be addressed). The decision in Roniwin represented a four Justice majority view, with
three Justices dissenting and two Justices not participating.
61. See SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1730, discussed infra at notes 424-62 and accompanying
text.
62. As discussed infra at notes 121-25 and accompanying text, the Court in Goldfarb,
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True, once a prorate, program was adopted, all growers and handlers
63
had to adhere to its terms, which were enforced by criminal punishment.
But the statute did not require growers to petition for and formulate
prorate programs. It simply permitted them to do so, and established

state machinery to administer and enforce any program adopted. Though
pnce-fixing was clearly intended by the legislature, it was permitted, not

required. 64
As has already been noted, it is debatable whether the court intended
to confer immunity on private parties as well as state officials. 65 Much
of this confusion was generated by the Court's ambiguous language.
The Court said, "The Sherman Act
gives no hint that it was
66
intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state."
The Court might have intended the phrase "official action directed by
a state" as a synonym for "state action" and simply neglected to insert

a comma after the conjunction "or." More likely, the Court intended
"official action directed by a state" as a distinct alternative to "state
action," in which case the Court must have intended that immunity
extend beyond state action. Even so, the meaning of "official" is not
clear. The term might. refer to an individual holding a state office, such
as a governor. But then the distinction between state action and official
action blurs, in that the state normally acts through its officers. "State"
may refer exclusively to the legislature, in which case a distinction can
be maintained between the state and state officials. But the scope of

421 U.S. at 791, 95 S. Ct. at 2015, said that state action immunity is unavailable to
private parties unless their conduct is "compelled by direction of the State acting as a
sovereign" and cited Parker Id. at 790. Of course, some have argued that the Parker
Court never onsidered the issue of immunity for private parties, as opposed to the state
itself, so that the Goldfarb statement would not be inconsistent with Parker See supra
notes 42-43 and -accompanying text. But the better view is that the ParkerCourt's intention
was not so limited, and certainly the Goldfarb Court itself thought it was applying Parker
Lower courts after Goldfarb were in a quandary as to the meaning and continuing efficacy
of this compulsion test as an independent requirement. See 1 P Areeda & D. Turner,
supra note 3, at § 215b; id. at § 212.5 (Supp. 1982) ("The role of compulsion in Parker
analysis continues to bedevil both courts and commentators."). Much of the confusion
was eliminated in 1985 by SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1728-29, where the Court held that
compulsion is not a prerequsite to a finding of state action immunity. In fact, had the
Goldfarb Court more carefully considered the Parker decision, it never would have
sgggsted that state compulsion was necessary. Justice Blackmun apparently recogized
this point. in Cantor, .428 U.S. 579,,96 S: Ct. 3110, where he noted that the scheme in
P ttr "was iniutud -by thl private actors at the invitation of a general statute." Id. at
609.(Blackman, J., concurring).
,,6I" Parker,'3*1 U.S. at 347, 63 S. Ct. at 311,12.
6K.-Compare SACRC, .105 S. Ct. at 1727-30, where state statutes and regulations
exr1ftly permitted' but-did not compel collective ratemaking by motor carriers.
K,. See atpsa notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
66. Parker, 317U.S. at 35 ,'63 S. Ct. at 313. (emphasis added).
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officials would remain indistinct. It could be limited to a certain class

of state representatives or encompass all persons designated by a state
to perform some function. In its broader sense, official would mean
something little different from a private party, yet the Court subsequently
has resisted construing the mere designation of private individuals as
state officials as altering their status for state action purposes.6 7 What
the Court meant is just not clear 6s
However murky the Court's view of private conduct authorized by
a state may be, two explicit limitations on state action immunity noted
by the Court are more obscure. The Court said, "[W]e have no question
of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private
agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade. 6 9 In fact,
the prorate program required an agreement among growers, which the
state, through the Advisory Commission, approved and enforced. This
participation was apparently not the kind of state participation in a
private combination the Court had in mind. Further, the Prorate Act
might well have been adopted at the behest of farmers acting in concert,
and it is doubtful that the Court would have deemed such state involvement in a private enterprise sufficient to strip the state of immunity 70 Ultimately, most state action cases involve a "blend of private
and public decisionmakmg." 7 1 If participation by the state in a restraint
that involves private action is sufficient to vitiate antitrust immunity,
immunity will be as prevalent as walruses in Texas. This cannot be what
the Court intended. Indeed, if the Court had intended this, it would

67 See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791, 95 S. Ct. at 2015 (even though a state bar
association was designated an official state agency, it was treated as a group of private
individuals for state action purposes).
68. The Court also said, "We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or
in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature." Parker 317 U.S. at 350-51, 63 S. Ct.
at 313. This statement is also ambiguous. "Agents" may be used in a non-technical sense
to refer to anyone authorized by a legislature to do something or in a more restricted
sense. If the prepositional phrase "from activities directed by its legislature" modifies
"state" as well as "officers" and "agents" as it appears to do, then "state" must refer
to something other than officers, agents, or the legislature.
69. Id. at 351-52, 63 S. Ct. at 313.
70. In the scenario posed, the farmers presumably would be immune from antitrust
attack under the Noerr-Pennngton doctrine, a doctrine separate from but related to the
state action doctrine, which holds that agreements among private parties to obtain anticompetitive policies from governmental entities do not constitute antitrust violations. See
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, and UMW v. Pennington, supra
note 14 and accompanying text. If the private parties are immune, presumably the state
would be immune as well. But the Noerr-Pennngton doctrine had not been established
at the time of Parker and almost certainly the Court would have found the state immune
whether or not a Noerr-Pennington doctrine had existed.
71. Cantor 428 U.S. at 592, 96 S. Ct. at 3118.
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have reached the opposite result in Parker But if the mixture of public
and private involvement in a restraint is represented by a continuum,
locating the point at which the private conduct is so dominant that the
state itself loses immunity promises to be a task at least vexatious and
at most impossible. 72 If the Court meant to exclude immunity for a
particular kind of state action, rather than for a restraint in which the
relative amount of state conduct is minimal, it gave no guidance as to
the character of that conduct."

The second limitation is even more problematic. The Court said,
"True, a state does not give immumty to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful.' ' 74 This dictum has been oft-repeated by the Court 7" and was
relied upon by it in its next state action decision.76 But what does it

mean? In fact, California authorized raisin growers to fix prices, and
the Court held that the state thereby conferred immunity for what
otherwise would have been an antitrust violation. The Court must have
meant something by its statement that would not precisely contradict
what it held.
Perhaps the Court's statement should be read quite literally If a
state passed a law that provided, "citizens of the State of Superior are
hereby authorized to violate the antitrust laws," or, "actions that violate
the antitrust laws are hereby declared to be lawful," no immunity would
arise. The difference between that kind of law and the Califorma Prorate
Act is the clarity with which the state authorizes the restraint challenged.
In the case of the hypothetical law, the legislature did not act in such
a way that conduct constituting the challenged restraint was a likely
consequence. By contrast, the California legislature undoubtedly envi-

72. Notice that the implication of the Court's statement is that the state itself may
not be immune from antitrust attack if it participates in a private combination, not that
the private actors alone will be exposed to liability. Compare, e.g., Cantor 428 U.S.
579, 96 S.Ct. 3110 (1976), where the issue was state action immunity for a private utility,
when the restraint also involved action by the state.
73. The Court included a "cf." citation to Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 313
U.S. 450, 61 S.Ct. 1064 (1941). Parker 317 U.S. at 352, 63 S.Ct. at 313. The reference
is less than enlightening. The Court there held that a city could cooperate with a railroad
to violate the anti-rate discrimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. Union
Pacific R.R., 313 U.S. 450, 466-68, 61 S.Ct. 1064. In contrast to Parker the Court
there held, in effect, that a governmental entity is never immune from liability under the
Interstate Commerce Act if its conduct constitutes a violation.
74. Parker 317 U.S. at 351, 63 S. Ct. at 314.
75. See, e.g., Cantor 428 U.S. at 602, 96 S.Ct at 3123; California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 104, 100 S.Ct. at 942; Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 1716 (1985).
76. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386, 71 S.Ct. 745,
746 (1951), discussed infra at notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
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sioned and intended to promote price fixing by raisin growers. Price
fixing was a probable consequence of its law
The case that the Court cited for the proposition lends some support
for this interpretation. 7 In the famous case of Northern Securities Co.
v United States,78 railroads attempting to effect, in the Court's view,
an anticompetitive merger through a holding company defended on the
ground that the holding company was not prohibited from acquiring
the stock of the railroads by its charter, which was issued pursuant to
state law 79The federal government, the railroads contended, was forbidden by the Tenth Amendment from invading the rights of the state
by prohibiting an act that was permissible under the state charter.' The
Court correctly responded: "We cannot conceive how it is possible for
anyone to seriously contend for such a proposition."'" The state did
not intend to engage in or permit anticompetitive mergers when it
authorized in its corporation laws the acquisition of stock. As the Court
said:
It is proper to say in passing that nothing in the record tends
to show that the State of New Jersey had any reason to suspect
that those who took advantage of its liberal incorporation laws
had in view, when organizing the Securities Company, to destroy
competition between two great railway carriers engaged in interstate commerce in distant States of the Union.Y
If a state authorizes a class of activities, such as stock acquisition,, only
a small percentage of which would violate federal antitrust laws, there
is little reason to conclude that the state contemplated or intended to
approve the tainted sub-class. The argument for immunity is commensurately weak.
Another interpretation of the Parker dictum is that the Court intended to distinguish between anticompetitive conduct merely authorized
by a state and such conduct authorized and thereafter supervised by a
state. According to this interpretation, the former is not immunized;
the latter is.83 I argue that supervision should not be required for state
action immunity, and reject this interpretation.8 4 Besides, there is little
basis for this construction in the opinion. Nevertheless, the interpretation

77 See Parker 317 U.S. at 351, 63 S.Ct. at 314.
78. 193 U.S. 197 24 S.Ct. 436 (1904).
79. Id. at 332, 24 S.Ct. at 454. For a fascinating discussion of what was actually
going on in Northern Securities, see D. Dewey, Monopoly. in Economics and Law 21415 (1959).
80. Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 344, 24 S. Ct. at 436.
81. Id.at 345, 24 S.Ct. at 460.
82. Id., 24 S.Ct. at 460.
83. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 294, 306-11 and accompanying text.
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is one way to reconcile the dictum in Parker with its holding, and 85it
is the interpretation the Supreme Court now gives to the statement.
That the Court recognized in Parker that an antitrust exemption
for state action exists is gratifying. The imprecision with which it defined
the doctrine is frustrating, though understandable. After all, the Court,
for the most part, was making its first venture into a perplexing area.
What is truly disturbing, however, is the result of the case - the Court
allowed California raisin growers to fix prices even though ninety to
ninety-five percent of their crops were consumed out of state. 6 California
was not politically accountable to the group injured by the restraint it
established. If a significant proportion of the allocative inefficiency
produced by the restraint had been suffered by California consumers,
the federal government could fairly have left the whole matter to the
political process. California citizens could have sanctioned the program,
voted against it, or left the state. 7 But if a state restrains competition
in such a way that the major proportion of the attendant burden is
imposed on non-residents, the action should be preempted by the Commerce Clause so long as the burden substantially exceeds any benefits
produced by the restraint.88 There is no need to invalidate the action

under the Sherman Act. The Commerce Clause not only is a source of
power for Congress to pass laws that preempt inconsistent laws of
subordinate governments through the Supremacy Clause; it also, by its

own force, limits actions of subordinate governments that impose an
excessive burden on the national economy. s9 The Court considered a

85. SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1729 n.23.
86. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 345, 63 S. Ct. at 310.
87. See J. Due & A. Friedlander, Government Finance: Economics of the Public
Sector 46-51 (7th ed. 1981); W. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Government
18-24 (1970); W. Neenan, Urban Public Economics 59-67 (1981); Tiebout, A Pure Theory
of Local Expenditures, 65 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 416-24 (1956). See generally J. Buchanan,
Public Finance in Democratic Process (1967); A. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
(1970).
88. For a more thorough discussion of this point, see supra note 10 and accompanying
text; Lopatka, supra note 5, at 70-72.
89. For an excellent summary of the application of the Commerce Clause to state
anticompetitive activities, see I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 220b. See
generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young, Constitutional Law 266-75 (2d ed. 1983).
Judge Easterbrook has argued that when a state act imposes a burden on parties to
which the state is not politically accountable, the act should be preempted by the Sherman
Act. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 45-46. Though we both would preempt the state
act, I prefer to use the mechanism of the Commerce Clause. The proper test for determining
whether conduct violates the Sherman Act is whether it injures consumer welfare. It
focuses upon the fact that allocative efficiency is impaired, not upon the identity of the
consumers injured. The Commerce Clause, on the other hand, does focus upon the location
of the economic incidents of governmental action. Professors Areeda and Turner appear
to be in accord with my view, asserting that use of the Commerce Clause and other non-
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Commerce Clause challenge in Parker, but, unfortunately, rejected it. 90
B.

Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.

The Court firmly established the state action doctrine in Parker,
and did so in an unlikely case-one in which the state action really
injured out-of-state consumers. The opinion raised many questions,
though, and after waiting eight years to address the issue again, the
Court reached a decision that was more confusing than illuminating. In
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,91Louisiana had passed
a law that permitted sellers to agree upon resale prices and also required
retailers who were not parties to an agreement to adhere to the prices
specified in the agreement. 92 At the time, the Miller-Tydings Act provided
that the Sherman Act did not "render illegal, contracts or agreement
prescribing minimum prices for the resale" of certain commodities when
"contracts or agreements of the description are lawful as applied to
intrastate transactions" under local law. 93 The respondent distributors
entered into contracts with retailers under which the retailers agreed to
adhere to a minimum resale price schedule. 94 They brought suit to enjoin
the petitioner, a retailer who refused to sign a contract, from selling at
less than the minimum prices specified in the schedule. 9
The distributors had two available arguments. One was that the
Miller-Tydings Act authorized enforcement of the resale price maintenance scheme. The Court responded by pointing out two differences
between the Miller-Tydings Act and the state statute. The federal statute
only authorized agreements prescribing minimum resale prices, whereas
the Louisiana law purported to authorize agreements as to minimum or
maximum resale prices. 96 Clearly, however, the more significant difference to the Court was that the Miller-Tydings Act sanctioned the enforcement of vertical price-fixing agreements only against the parties to
the agreements, whereas the state statute purported to allow a party to

antitrust remedies for anticompetitive state conduct is superior to the imposition of antitrust
liability. I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 220(e). See also Cantor, 428 U.S.
at 612, 96 S. Ct. at 3128 (Blackmun, J.,concurring) ("[A] state action that interferes
with competition not only among its own citizens but also among the States is already
subject under the Commerce Clause to much the same searching review of state justifications as is proposed here (for review under the Sherman Act)").
90. Parker, 317 U.S. at 359-68, 63 S.Ct. at 317-22.
91. 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951).
92. Id. at 386-87, 71 S.Ct. at 746-47.
93. Miller-Tydings Act, Ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed by the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, §2, 89 Stat. 801 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §1 (1982)).
94. Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 385, 71 S.Ct. at 745.
95. Id. at 385-86, 71 S. Ct. at 746.
96. Id. at 388, 71 S.Ct. at 747.
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such an agreement to force a non-party to adhere to its terms. 97 Therefore, the distributors' attempt to force the non-signing retailer to sell
at stipulated prices was not exempt from the Sherman Act by virtue of
the Miller-Tydings Act.
The second argument available to the distributors was that, wholly
apart from the Miller-Tydings Act, the Sherman Act did not apply to
their actions because of the state action exemption. The State of Louisiana authorized distributors to impose resale prices on their retailers,
and argued that like the action of the price-fixing raisin growers in Parker,
the distributors' actions should be immune from antitrust attack. The
Court's apparent response to this argument was curt and echoed the Parker
dictum on state authorization without citing the prior case: "The fact
that the state authorizes the price-fixing does not, of course, give immunity to the scheme, absent approval by Congress.''9 ' In fact, California had authorized raisin growers to fix prices in Parkerand thereby gave
immunity to the scheme even though Congress had not approved it. The
Court there held that despite the absence of any affirmative approval,
Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to apply.
What was different in Schwegmann? Recall that one possible construction of the Parkerdictum focused upon the specificity of the state
action. 99 If the state did not act in such a way that the conduct constituting the particular restraint challenged was a likely consequence, the
restraint would not be immunized. In Schwegmann, however, the state
apparently intended to authorize suppliers to force retailers to comply
with price schedules even if the retailers had not agreed to the prices. 1' °
Louisiana clearly did act in a way that had a high probability of
producing the challenged restraint.
Perhaps the holding of Schwegmann is that state action immunity
will be denied unless the restraint is not only intended by the state, but
is actively supervised by the state.10 Louisiana did not undertake to

97. Id. 71 S. Ct. at 747.
98. Id. at 386, 71 S. Ct. at 746.
99. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
100. The Court quoted the relevant provision of the statute:
Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provision of section 1 [§9809.1] of this act, whether the person so advertising,
offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair
competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby.
Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 387 n.2, 71 S. Ct. at 747 n.2.
.101. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. This is the position taken by
Professors Areeda and Turner. See I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 213a.
This argument, however, is not easily reconcilable with Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S.Ct.
1989, 1996 (1984), where the Court said that active state supervision is irrelevant to state
action immunity when the operative, injury-producing conduct is that of the state itself,
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supervise the resale price maintenance scheme. Or perhaps the Court
intended to distinguish between narrow and broad scale state authorized
restraints. 0

2

A state law authorizing farmers to fix prices in order to

improve the lot of a depressed agricultural industry is one thing, especially where the objectives of the statute are clearly set forth; a state
law authorizing the imposition of resale prices by suppliers of a broad
range of commodities, where the purpose of the act is obscure, is
another. 03 The distinction though, is not obvious.
Yet another interpretation of Schwegmann, and a rather ingenious, if not compelling
one, was suggested by Justice Stewart.' 4 Perhaps the Court interpreted
the Miller-Tydings Act as an express antitrust exemption created by
Congress in 1937 for some kinds of state laws. By expressly exempting
certain conduct, the Congress of 1937, by implication, must have intended that different but related conduct would not be exempt. Therefore, even though the state-sanctioned restraint in Schwegmann would
have enjoyed an implied exemption from the Sherman Act, as enacted
by the Congress of 1890, the Congress of 1937, by negative inference,
eliminated that exemption.
In the end, the rationale and originally-intended limits of Schwegmann remain mysterious. I believe the case was wrongly decided. Where
the state clearly expresses a policy authorizing the challenged restraint,
the state and attendant private parties should be immune from antitrust
attack. The state action might still be preempted by the Commerce
Clause, if an insignificant proportion of the harm caused by the restraint

rather than of private parties. See the discussion infra at notes 353-70 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, this is the Court's current understanding of Schwegmann. In SMCRC,
105 S. Ct. at 1729 n.23, the Court stated:
Contrary to the Government's arguments, our holding here does not suggest
that a State may "give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it" (citing Parker and Schwegmann). A clearly
articulated permissive policy will satisfy the first prong of the Midcal test. The
second prong, (state supervision), however, prevents States from "casting ...
a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing
arrangement" (citing MidcaO).
102. One commentator has written, "Perhaps we should understand Schwegmann as
merely a refusal to extend Parker to general efforts by state legislatures to create wholesale
exemptions from antitrust law, as distinct from more narrowly targeted efforts to supress
competition in favor of state regulatory objectives." Robinson, The Sherman Act as a
Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 Sup. Ct.
Econ. Rev. 131, 133 (1983) (footnote omitted).
103. The preamble of the Louisiana statute merely provided: "An Act to protect
trademark owners distributors and the public against injurious and uneconomic practices
in the distribution of articles of standard quality under a distinguished trademark, brand
or name." 1936 La. Acts No. 13.
104. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 637 n.25, 639, 96 S. Ct. at 3140 n.25 (1976) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
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is imposed on state residents. But here, the law would not be preempted
because the injury to consumer welfare, if any, was likely to befall
Louisiana residents. Schwegmann exists as a precedent, however, and
therefore should be interpreted to do as little evil as possible. I would
adopt the interpretation that Schwegmann withholds immunity from
broad-scale attempts to displace the antitrust laws and take an expansive
view of what constitutes a "narrow" restraint. But the Court, at least
in dicta, has adopted a broader interpretation. The Court now appears
to adhere to the construction that the defect in Schwegmann was the
failure of the state to supervise the authorized restraint. 05
Because of the posture of the case, the Schwegmann Court was
spared an unpleasant confrontation with one of the implications of its
decision. The distributors in the case were seeking an injunction to force
the retailer to comply with price schedules. The retailer, however, might
have sued the distributors for treble damages alleging an antitrust violation. Presumably, the retailer would have won. The Court said that
the interstate marketing arrangement challenged would "draw civil and
criminal penalties" unless an antitrust exemption applied and then found
that no such exemption existed. °6 Yet the effect of that conclusion is
that distributors engaging in conduct specifically authorized by state law
are held liable for civil damages and perhaps criminal punishment for
that conduct. Such a result somehow offends the conscience.' °7 As long
as the plaintiff in a state action case requests only equitable relief, or

105. See supra note 101. 1 once suggested that Schwegmann might no longer be good
law. Lopatka, supra note 5, at 38. At that time, Hoover, 104 S. Ct. 1989, was the latest
Supreme Court state action decision and neither the majority nor dissenting opinion cited
Schwegmann. The Court's more recent statement in SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1729 n.23,
suggests that the conduct in Schwegmann was not immunized because of the absence of
state supervision. This implies that state authorized but unsupervised restraints will continue
to be unprotected and that Schwegmann retains some vitality.
106. Schwegmann, 341 U.S. at 386, 71 S. Ct. at 746.
107. One answer to this issue is that it is not unfair to require parties to desist from
engaging in conduct authorized by a state, or even to disobey state commands, where
the relevant conduct would violate federal law. Professors Areeda and Turner apparently
ascribe to this view. See I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 215bl. They argue
that compulsion by a foreign government might excuse conduct that would otherwise
violate the antitrust laws, because it would be unreasonable to subject innocent private
parties to inconsistent sovereign directives. This justification, however, does not apply to
conduct compelled by state governments, they contend, because, under the Constitution
state laws conflicting with federal statutes are invalid. This argument might be persuasive
if federal law always preempted inconsistent state law. However, because "federal law
may expressly or ... impliedly give way to state law," id., they admit, as they must,
that federal law does not always prevail. It seems equally unfair to force innocent private
parties to predict when a court will hold that federal law impliedly gives way to state
law as it is to force them to choose between the inconsistent directives of national
sovereigns, especially when the determinants of implied deference are as esoteric as they
are for state action immunity.
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the court denies state action immunity to private parties because the
state did not in fact intend to authorize the challenged conduct, the
bitter after-taste of a seemingly unjust damage judgment is avoided. But
where, as in Schwegmann, the Court holds that private parties are not
protected by the state action doctrine from liability for conduct clearly
authorized by the state because of some defect, for state action purposes,
in the authorization or subsequent supervision, the potential inequity of
a damage judgment is inescapable. Though the Court has tended to
ignore this issue, a few Justices made a stab at addressing it in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., discussed later.1'8
C.

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar

After Schwegmann, the Court waited 24 years to again consider the
state action doctrine, then proceeded to decide an average of almost
one state action case per year through 1985.109 In Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,110 the state and county bar associations established a pricefixing scheme for attorneys. All practicing attorneys in Virginia were
required to belong to the State Bar."' The State Bar, an administrative

108. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 598-603, 96 S. Ct. at 3121-24 (representing opinion of four
Justices) (it is not unfair to hold private parties liable for damages when they could not
have reasonably believed their actions to be immune); id. at 614 n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 3129
n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (a defense against damages should be allowed on the basis
of fairness whenever the conduct on which such damages would be based was required
by state law). Cantor is the only Supreme Court state action case in which the plantiff
sought antitrust damages and the Court held the defendant's conduct unprotected, despite
the existence of an arguably clear state authorization. In Cantor, the plaintiff sought
damages based on the defendant utility's free light-bulb program, which had been approved
by the state public utilities commission. However, though the program was embodied in
a tariff filed with the state agency, and which the agency could have disallowed, it can
be argued that the agency did not affirmatively intend to authorize the program. See
infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. In Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S. Ct. 2004
(1975), the plaintiff sought treble damages and the Court held the state action exemption
unavailable, but the attorney price-fixing challenged there was not clearly authorized by
the state. Id. at 790, 95 S. Ct. at 2015. Similarly, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978), a utility asserted an antitrust
counterclaim against various cities requesting damages relating to the operation of the
cities' electric utility systems and the Court rejected a state action defense. But there,
too, the cities' activities apparently were not clearly authorized by the state.
109. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S. Ct. 2004; Cantor, 428 U.S. 579, 96 S. Ct.
3110; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); City of
Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389, 98 S. Ct. 1123; New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96, 99 S. Ct. 403 (1978); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980); Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982); Hoover, 104 S. Ct. 1989; Town of Hallie
v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. 1721.
110. 421 U.S. 773, 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
111. Id. at 776, 95 S. Ct. at 2007.
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agency of the State Supreme Court," 2 issued reports condoning fee
schedules and practical opinions indicating that an attorney who habitually disregards fee schedules is presumed to be guilty of misconduct
and subject to disciplinary action." 3 In response, the County Bar, a
voluntary association and not a state agency, 1 4 adopted a minimum fee
schedule and advised attorneys that regularly charging lower fees would
constitute an ethical violation.1' 5
In an antitrust action brought by consumers for injunctive relief
and damages against the state and county bars, ' 6 the State Bar argued
that it was implementing the policy of the state supreme court.' ' That
court had adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility, which suggested that fee schedules "provide some guidance on the subject of
reasonable fees," and that the customary fee in a locality was one of
eight factors to be considered in avoiding an excessive fee.' The court
also had stated in a rule that, in setting fees, it was "proper for a
lawyer to consider a schedule of minimum fees adopted by a Bar
Association."' '9 The rule further provided, however, "[Blut no lawyer
should permit himself to be controlled (by a fee schedule) or20 to follow
it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.'
The Court held that the State Bar did not enjoy state action immunity
"because it cannot fairly be said that the State of Virginia through its
Supreme Court Rules required the anticompetitive activities" challenged.' 2' The Court acknowledged that the state court rules mentioned
fee schedules, but noted that the rules did not "direct" the state bar22
to supply schedules or "require" the type of price floor which arose.'
The Court continued, "It is not enough that ...anticompetitive conduct
is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be
' 23
compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign.'
The Court's reference to compulsion was unfortunate. It created a
doubt as to the kind of state policy, or the strength with which a state
must desire anticompetitive activities, that is necessary to win immunity.
The doubt lingered until 1985, when the Court held that compulsion is

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id., 95 S. Ct. at 2007.
Id. at 776-78, 95 S.Ct. at 2007-08.
Id. at 790, 95 S. Ct. at 2015.
Id. at 777 n.4, 95 S. Ct. at 2008 n.4.
Id. at 778, 95 S. Ct. at 2008.

117. Id.at 790, 95 S.Ct. at 2015.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.at 789 n.19, 95 S.Ct. at 2014 n.19.
Id., 95 S. Ct. at 2014 n.19.
Id., 95 S. Ct. at 2014 n.19.
Id.at 790, 95 S. Ct. at 2015.
Id.,95 S. Ct. at 2015.
Id.at 791, 95 S. Ct. at 2015.
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not a prerequisite for state action immunity.'24 The Goldfarb Court
could have said merely that the state did not intend to engage in or
permit the conduct that constituted the restraint challenged and had not
acted in such a way that price-fixing was a likely consequence. The
state supreme court apparently contemplated fee schedules, but did not
authorize their use as a price-fixing mechanism. As the Court itself
recognized, "[The state supreme] court has adopted ethical codes which
deal in part with fees, and far from exercising state power to authorize
binding price-fixing, explicitly directed lawyers not 'to be controlled' by
25
fee schedules.',
One clear implication of the Court's opinion is that the state supreme
court may embody the state for purposes of enunciating an anticompetitive policy. Had the court compelled adherence to fee schedules, the
result might have been different. 26 Interestingly enough, however, the
reason the court may embody the state is less clear. The Court, citing
a Virginia statute, said, "Through its legislature Virginia has authorized
its highest court to regulate the practice of law."'' 27 The implication is
that the state legislature is the sole source of state power, but can
delegate that power to the state supreme court, which then embodies
the state for state action purposes. The Court also commented, however,
that "[in addition, the Supreme Court of Virginia, has inherent power
to regulate the practice of law in that State."' 2 8 If "inherent power"
is enough to turn an entity into the state for state action purposes,
then presumably the state supreme court as well as the legislature and
perhaps the governor each constitute the state when acting within its
sphere of constitutional authority as an independent branch of government. If this is true, neither the supreme court nor the executive needs
a delegation of authority from the legislature. If the sole ultimate source
of power is the legislature, however, then a delegation of authority from
the legislature is required for any other entity to act for the state, but

124. See SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1729.
125. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789, 95 S. Ct. at 2014.
126. It is true, of course, that the Goldfarb Court said that state compulsion was a
"threshold inquiry", and that the Court "need not inquire further into the state-action
question" because the threshold test was not met; the Court never said that had it been
met, state action immunity would have followed, or immunity would have followed if it
and further requirements had been fulfilled. Id. at 790, 95 S. Ct. at 2015. See also
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 600, 96 S.Ct. at 3110. Nevertheless, the tenor of the Court's opinion
suggests that immunity was possible. Specifically, the Court today would likely hold that
if the state court compelled adherence to price schedules and thereafter supervised the
activity, the participants would enjoy immunity. Indeed, compulsion, as distinct from a
clearly articulated state policy, would not even be required. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
127. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 789, 95 S. Ct. at 2014.
128. Id. at 789 n.18, 95 S. Ct. at 2014 n.18.
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presumably any state agency, not simply the supreme court or governor,
could become the legislature's delegatee. In later cases, the Court reaffirmed the proposition that the state supreme court embodies the state
for state action purposes without explicitly discussing the source of the
court's power. 29 The Court has explicitly avoided opining on the status
of the governor. 3 0 Although the state supreme court did not compel
price-fixing, the State Bar had a potentially stronger argument for immunity-it was the state. If the bar constituted the state for state action
purposes, it would not matter that the state supreme court provided no
explicit authorization for the bar's price-f'xing activities. The argument
was not frivolous. The state legislature had authorized the supreme court
to organize and govern the Virginia State Bar, and the supreme court
had created the agency. The Supreme Court responded tersely to this
implicit argument: "The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for
some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it
to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members."''
The implications of the Court's statement bear some examination.
An affirmative policy in favor of attorney price-fixing was articulated
neither by the state legislature nor by the state supreme court. Yet the
Court might be understood to have implied that the supreme court could
have articulated such a policy, and thereby would have immunized those
who implemented it, because the legislature delegated authority to the
court to regulate the practice of law. If the legislature, in effect, could
delegate the authority to express an anticompetitive policy to the supreme
court, why was the supreme court unable to sub-delegate that authority
to the state bar? Even if the Supreme Court thought that the source
of the state court's ability to speak for the state was its inherent power,
why was the court unable to delegate that authority to the agency? The
answers, I believe, as far as the court was concerned, stem from the
fact that the members of this state agency had a direct economic interest
in the subject of its regulation. An anticompetitive policy that would
benefit Virginia lawyers would benefit the state bar. As the Court's
statement suggests, allowing the state bar effectively to adopt a policy
of attorney price-fixing would allow "it to foster anticompetitive practices
for the benefit of its members." The Court does not hold, however,
that state agencies are invariably unqualified to articulate an anticompetitive policy sufficient for state action purposes. A state agency with
no direct financial interest in the subject of its control, with no clear

129. See Hoover, 104 S.Ct. at 1995; Bates, 433 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 2697.
130. See Hoover, 104 S. Ct. at 1995 n.17 ("This case does not present the issue
whether a Governor of a State stands in the same position as the state legislature and
supreme court for purposes of the state action doctrine."). This issue is discussed infra
at note 500-03 and accompanying text.
131. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791, 95 S.Ct. at 2015.
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incentive to act to its advantage at the expense of the public welfare,
can stand in the position of the state. For the sake of convenience, I
label the interested, Goldfarb-type agency an "illegitimate" agency, and
32
the disinterested one a "legitimate" agency, for state action purposes.'
Once the Court's view of the status of the state bar was clear, the
county bar was doomed. Because neither the state legislature nor supreme
court had articulated a policy in favor of attorney price-fixing, their
actions did not immunize either the statt or county bar.'33 If the state
bar, as an official state agency, could independently have articulated an
anticompetitive policy sufficient to immunize itself, then the county bar
might have been able to claim derivative immunity, given that its actions
appear to have been instigated by the state bar. But when the Court
held that the state bar, in effect, occupied the position of any group
of private parties, then the county bar could acquire no immunity from
its state counterpart.
D.

Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.

The Court next confronted the state action doctrine in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 3 4 and the opinions written in that case remain the
most thorough exposition of the alternative ideological approaches to
the issue that the Court has offered. Edison, a private electric utility,
adopted a program in 1886, prior to the time Michigan began to regulate
public utilities, of providing light-bulbs to customers at no charge in
addition to its rates for basic services.' 35 Shortly after Michigan instituted
public utility regulation, Edison embodied the light-bulb program as a
term of service in tariffs, which were filed with and approved by the
Michigan Public Service Commission.' 3 6 Thereafter, each time the regulatory agency approved a change in rates, it ordered the new rates to
be embodied in tariffs filed with the Commission, and those tariffs
contained the light-bulb program as a term of service. Thus, for the
most part, the agency's approval of the program was implicit. 1 No
state statute explicitly mentioned the program.'
On one occasion, how-

132. Though some members of the Court are apparently sympathetic to this approach,
see City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 431, 98 S. Ct. at 1146 (Stewart, J., dissenting), other
members have resisted this distinction. Id. at 411 n.41, 98 S. Ct. at 1136 n.41. For a
discussion of this aspect of City of Lafayette, see infra notes 261-64 and accompanying
text.
133. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790, 98 S. Ct. at 2015 (neither the legislature nor supreme
court required the anticompetitive activities of either respondent).
134. 428 U.S. 579, 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
135. Id. at 583, 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
136. Id., 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
137. Id., 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
138. Id. at 584, 96 S. Ct. at 3114-15.
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ever, Edison proposed to eliminate the program for large commercial
customers as part of a general reduction in rates to those customers.
The Commission approved the elimination of the program for these
customers and, in the same proceeding, authorized rates for other customers that again included the light-bulb program. 3 9 A utility is required
by state law to provide the service at the rates specified in a tariff as
long as the tariff is in effect; it cannot change its rates or services
4
without first filing a new tariff and obtaining Commission approval.' 0
The Michigan Public Service Commission was created in 1939 to
replace the Public Utilities Commission.' 4' The statute creating the Public
Service Commission provided:
[N]o member of said commission shall be pecuniarily interested
in any public utility or public service subject to the jurisdiction
and control of the commission ....
No commission member
shall be retained or employed by any public utility or public
service subject to the jurisdiction and control of the commission
during the time he is acting as such commissioner, and for 6
4 2
months thereafter.
The statute conferred broad power on the commission to regulate utilities,
stating:
[The Commission] is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction
to regulate all rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service and all other matters pertaining to the formation, operation or direction of such public utilities. It is
further granted the power and jurisdiction to hear and pass upon
all matters pertaining to or necessary or incident to such regulation of all public utilities, including electric light and power
companies.... ,4
In an antitrust class action for damages and injunctive relief brought
by a retail merchant of light-bulbs against Edison alone, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis
of state action immunity.'" The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment, ' 4,
and the Supreme Court reversed, with four Justices writing opinions.4
In an opinion representing the view of four members of the Court,
Justice Stevens asserted that Parker had held only that state officials

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 583, 96 S. Ct. at 3114.
Id. at 582-83, 585, 96 S. Ct. at 3113-15.
Mich. Comp. Law Preamble, § 460.1.
Mich. Comp. Law Preamble, § 460.1.
Mich. Comp. Law Preamble, § 460.6.
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 392 F. Supp. 1110, 1112 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975).
428 U.S. 579, 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
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acting pursuant to express legislative command are immune from antitrust
attack; the Court there did not decide whether private actors could be
immunized by state action. 47 A majority of the Court disagreed with
this interpretation. 48 Of course, Justice Stevens's interpretation would
not have resolved Cantor anyway, since he was arguing merely that
Parker had not decided the issue posed in Cantor. But his view allowed
him to dismiss the argument that it would be inappropriate or unfair
to impose treble damage liability on the utility for engaging in conduct
it assumed was immune from antitrust attack. 49 If Parker did not hold
that private parties could be immunized by state action, Edison could
not have reasonably believed that its action was exempt from the antitrust
laws, and it would not be unfair to impose damage liability on the
utility.'5 0 Again, apparently only four Justices ascribed to this position.' 5'
In a section of the opinion joined by five members of the Court,
Justice Stevens reasoned tlat it would be neither unjust nor contrary
to Congressional intent to impose antitrust liability on Edison.' In his
discussion of fairness, Justice Stevens offered an insight into state action
cases that bears emphasis, however disputable his application of that
insight was in Cantor. He pointed out that typically, state action cases
"involve a blend of private and public decisionmaking."'" He assumed,

147. Id.at 589, 96 S. Ct. at 3117.
148. See id.,
at 603-04, 96 S.Ct. at 3123 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id.at 613 n.5
96 S. Ct. at 3128 n.5 (Blackmun, J.,concurring); id.at 622, 96 S.Ct. at 3132 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 599, 96 S. Ct. at 3121-22. See also supra notes 106-08 and accompanying
text.
150. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 601, 96 S. Ct. at 3122-23. Justice Stevens also had to
reconcile Goldfarb, where the defendants consisted of the County Bar, which was unquestionably a private entity, Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 779, 95 S.Ct. at 2009, and the State
Bar, which was treated as a private entity, id. at 791, 95 S.Ct. at 2015. Though the
Court denied immunity for want of a state command, it seemed to suggest that immunization of the private parties by state action was possible. Justice Stevens responded that
by referring to state compulsion as a threshold inquiry, the Court was carefully avoiding
the implication that immunity was necessarily possible. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 600, 96 S.
Ct. at 3122.
151. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 603, 96 S.Ct. at 3124 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Three
Justices dissented and specifically rejected Justice Stevens's reading of Parker. Id. at 614,
618, 96 S.Ct. at 3129-31 (Stewart, J.,dissenting). Justice Blackmun did not explicitly
refuse to concur in this part of Justice Stevens's opinion, but he explicitly rejected Justice
Stevens's reading of Parker. Id. at 613 n.5, 96 S. Ct. at 3128 n.5 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). And he opined that "a defense against damages (should be allowed) wherever
the conduct on which such damages would be based was required by state law. Such a
rule would . . . eliminate what seems to me the extremely unfair possibility that during
a particular period ... the regulatee could be required by state law to conform to a
course of conduct for which he was all the while accumulating treble-damages liability
under federal law." Id. at 614 n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 3129 n.6 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
152. Id. at 592-98, 96 S.Ct. at 3118-21.
153. Id. at 592, 96 S.Ct. at 3118.
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arguendo, that if a private party did nothing more than obey a state
command, if, in other words, the decisionmaking was predominately
public, it would be unfair to impose antitrust liability.'
If, however,
the private party exercises "sufficient freedom of choice to enable the
Court to conclude that he should be held responsible for the consequences
of his decision," liability may justly be imposed.' In Cantor, imposing
liability on Edison was not unjust because "the option to have, or not
to have, [a light-bulb program was] primarily respondent's, not the
56
Commission's"1
The degree of responsibility the private party bears for an anticompetitive restraint also relates to the majority's view of Congressional
intent, though its discussion of this issue lacks clarity. Justice Stevens
appears to say that Congress did not intend to exempt private participants
in restraints that also involve the state unless two conditions are met:
the state really intends that private parties engage in conduct that would
violate the antitrust laws, and the state's reason for ordering the conduct
is sufficiently meritorious that it should prevail over the federal mandate.
The concern appears to be both with the fact of the state command,
in other words, that the state intended to order conduct inconsistent
with the antitrust laws, and the policy behind, or reason for that order.
Justice Stevens pointed out that "merely because certain conduct may
be subject both to state regulation and to the federal antitrust laws does
not necessarily mean that it must satisfy inconsistent standards. . ..',,57
This point, which amounts to a truism, relates to the fact of a conflict
between state and federal mandates. Justice Stevens continued:
[S]econd, even assuming inconsistency, we could not accept the
view that the federal interest must inevitably be subordinated to
the State's; and finally, even if we were to assume that Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to apply to areas of the economy
primarily regulated by a State, that assumption would .not foreclose the enforcement of the antitrust laws in an essentially
unregulated area such as the market for electric light bulbs.,,,
Though Justice Stevens suggests these two later observations are separate
points, they are really one assertion, and it relates to the policy behind
the state command.1'9
The majority's concern with a real conflict between state and federal
commands is not frivolous. True, the utility was required by state law

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 592, 594-95, 96 S. Ct. at 3118-20.
Id.at 593, 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
Id.at 594, 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
Id. at 595, 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
Id., 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
See id. at 631, 96 S. Ct. at 3137 (Stewart, J.,dissenting) (the plurality's second

point is "merely a restatement of the third rationale").
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to continue the light-bulb program as long as the relevant tariffs were
effective. But the decision to have the program might still have been
primarily the utility's. Suppose the State of Superior adopted the following policy: a utility engages in many practices, and with limited
resources, we choose not to investigate and reach an independent judgment on the merits of each of them. However, we require the utility
to embody all of their practices in tariffs and file them with the state
regulatory commission, and we require the utility to comply with those
tariffs. The requirement that the practices be described and open to
public inspection will promote public awareness, facilitate objections by
persons injured by them, and enable the state to concentrate its limited
resources on those practices that generate the most controversy. The
requirement that the utility adhere to the tariffs will prevent discrimination, a traditional objective of utility regulation. Given this kind of
structure, to claim that a particular anticompetitive practice is intended
by the state would be dubious.
Of course, the state's participation in Cantor was greater than in
the hypothetical, but the Court hinted that Cantor was close to the level
of participation in the hypothetical. The Court said, "Neither the Michigan Legislature, nor the Commission, has ever made any specific investigation of the desirability of a lamp-exchange program. . . ."160 It
noted that Edison was the only Michigan utility that had the program,
and, therefore, "infer[red] that the State's policy is neutral on the
question whether a utility should, or should not, have such a program."' 16 The Court claimed that there was "no statute, Commission
rule, or policy which would prevent respondent from abandoning the
program merely by filing a new tariff."' 6 2 And it concluded, "[Tihere
can be no doubt that the option to have, or not to have, such a program
' 63
is primarily respondent's, not the Commission's."'
The majority's concern with the fact of a real conflict between
federal and state mandates certainly relates to the ultimate question in
state action cases: Did the state intend to engage in or permit the
conduct that constitutes the restraint challenged?' Some of the Court's
observations suggest that the state did not intend to permit the lightbulb program. To the extent the Court goes beyond that, and suggests
that the state must not only intend to permit a practice, but must
affirmatively desire it as well, the majority goes too far. If a state
intends to authorize a specific practice, there is no theoretical need

160. Id. at 584, 96 S. Ct. at 3115.
161. Id.at 585, 96 S.Ct. at 3115.
162. Id., 96 S.Ct. at 3115.
163. Id. at 594, 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
164. Of course, where the restraint challenged constitutes a prohibition of certain
conduct, the relevant question is whether the state contempleted and prohibited the activity.
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stemming from the basis of the state action doctrine to require any
particular level of state affection for the practice, and to attempt to
gauge the depth of the state's interest will usually prove difficult and
often futile.
The majority gave little attention in Cantor to evidence that the
state did intend to authorize the program. Edison had proposed to drop
the program as applied to large commercial customers and the utilities
commission allegedly undertook a substantial investigation of the proposal. It approved the termination of the program as to these customers,
but continued to allow the operation of the program as to other customers. This is significant evidence that the commission was aware of
and affirmatively intended to authorize the program's continuance.
Further, because the only practical method of discerning intent is
to infer it from actions, the operative standard for proving intent is
whether the state acted in such way that the conduct constituting the
restraint was a likely consequence. If a state creates a regulatory structure
that requires tariffs specifying rates and services to be filed with an
agency, confers power on the agency to reject or revise tariffs, and
requires utilities to adhere to filed tariffs, the agency's approval of a
tariff, whether it takes the form of an explicit assent or a failure to
reject, would make the activity specified in the proposal a likely consequence, even if the agency never actually considered the tariff's content.
In other words, the agency, like the Superior Regulatory Commission
hypothesized above, would have taken action the probable consequences
of which it did not intend. If immunity is withheld in such circumstances,
however, the mental processes of state decisionmakers will become a
contestable issue in state action cases. The direct and indirect costs of
litigating the quality of state deliberative processes, including the cost
of unseemly federal interventionism, would not be justified, especially
because there should be very few instances in which a state does not
intend the probable consequences of its actions. To put this point in a
different way, an irrebutable presumption that the state intends to permit
private anticompetitive conduct that is the probable consequence of the
state's actions is efficient, even though there may be instances in which
165
the presumption is incorrect.

165. In Cantor, the activity challenged was the operation of the light-bulb program,
and that activity should have been held immune under the state action doctrine, because,

within the context of regulatory procedure, it was the likely consequence of the agency's
action, even if perhaps the agency did not intend to authorize it. The plaintiff might
have challenged the utility's submission to the agency of the tariff embodying the program.
That act was in no way caused by an act of the state, and, therefore, was not protected
state action. That conduct, however, was almost certainly immune under the NoerrPennington doctrine. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 624, 96 S. Ct. at 3133 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
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The requirement for immunity specified in later cases by the Court,
that the restraint challenged be the "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" policy of the state,'6 is another standard for assessing a
state's intent. This standard appears on its face to require a more explicit
authorization by the state of private anticompetitive activity than that
the state have acted in such a way as to make the private conduct ai
likely consequence. 167 The clear state policy standard suffers the same
potential flaw as the likely consequence standard-a state might express
a clear policy in favor of an activity that it did not intend to authorize.

For instance, an overworked state utilities commission might routinely
ask regulated firms to draft orders affirmatively authorizing service
offered by them, and issue those orders verbatim as commission directives
without considering their contents. The clear policy test, therefore, does
not eliminate the potential of the likely consequence standard to be
68
overinclusive as an indicator of the state's intent.

The clear policy test, however, creates a risk of underinclusion much
greater than any created by the likely consequence test. Suppose that
the state law requires a utility to file tariffs describing service proposed

(the utility's act of proposing a tariff could not give rise to antitrust liability under Noerr).
The reason this conclusion is at all uncertain, however, is that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine seems to be based on the assumption that a governmental entity will actually
consider a private proposal for an anticompetitive policy and make a reasoned decision
to adopt it. The evidence in Cantor might have been construed to prove that the Michigan
Public Service Commission never actually considered the light-bulb program. Whether
requesting an anticompetitive policy in such a way that the governmental entity is not
likely to evaluate the merits of the proposal before adoption should constitute abuse of
governmental process and, thereby, vitiate Noerr-Pennington immunity is a question that
deserves separate attention. At the very least, misuse would seem to require some threshold
amount of effort on the part of the private party to make it likely that the government
entity would not consider the proposal before adoption. In other words, a kind of fraud
would be required for misuse; if the agency routinely operated carelessly, the private party
would not have misused the process. In Cantor, there was little evidence that Edison
engaged in any misuse. Further, to allow Noerr-Pennington immunity to be affected by
whether a governmental body actually evaluated an anticompetitive proposal when it had
an opportunity and a legal interest in doing so would invite the same kind of inquiry
into state deliberative processes that allowing a plaintiff to prove that a state did not
intend the probable consequences of its actions would invite. In neither context is the
cost of that kind of inquiry justified.
166.

See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n, 445 U.S. 97, 105, 100 S. Ct.

937, 943 (the challenged private restraint must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" as state policy).
167. The Court's latest explanation of the clear state policy standard suggests that the
test may not require a more affirmative expression of state intent than the likely consequence test. See infra notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
168. Because the likely consequence standard is broader than the clear state policy
standard, and state actions satisfying the broader standard should create an irrebuttable
presumption of state intent, a fortiori, the existence of a clear state policy should create
an irrebuttable presumption of state intent.
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and provides that the tariffs will become effective if not rejected by
the agency. The agency's failure to reject a tariff might indeed represent
a careful deliberation and an affirmative decision to authorize the service,
yet the agency's conduct would not satisfy the clear state policy standard.
The conduct would, however, satisfy the likely consequence test of
proving state intent.
There may be situations, of course, in which the agency's mere
failure to exercise its power to prohibit private activities does not constitute a course of conduct the probable consequence of which is the
private restraint. For example, if a regulatory agency simply takes no
action with respect to the activities of firms within its jurisdiction, that
kind of failure to act would not increase the probability of any particular
private activity, and immunity would be improper. But if a particular
activity, claimed to be an antitrust violation, is specifically brought to
the attention of the agency, and the agency conducts an investigation
into it and permits it to continue, the activity should be held immune
and would be held immune under the likely consequence standard, even
though the agency would not have affirmatively articulated a policy in
favor of it.169
The Court in Cantor was not only skeptical that there was a clash

of state and federal policies, but also said that even if the policies did
conflict, the state policy might not prevail.' 70 Its discussion of this point,
however, was vague. Justice Stevens pointed out that a traditional reason
for state regulation of electric power is to cure the market defect of a

natural monopoly.' 7 ' Because light-bulb distribution is not a natural
monopoly, a state could regulate electricity in furtherance of this conventional utility regulation objective without regulating light-bulb distribution. 7 2 Though this much is clear, it is not clear exactly what
Justice Stevens infers from this. He might be saying that these observations further demonstrate, along with the sparse record of state involvement, that the light-bulb program was not the policy of the state,
but the idea of the utility. Since the only apparent state objective is
the regulation of natural monopoly service, and light-bulb distribution
is not a natural monopoly, the induction is that the state did not intend
to establish the light-bulb program, and, therefore, there is not conflict
between federal and state policies.
The alternative interpretation is that Justice Stevens believed the
state did intend to foster the light-bulb program, but because the natural

169. The economic analysis suggested here of potential evidentiary tests of state intent
is developed further at infra notes 295-311 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
171. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 595-96, 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
172. See id. at 596, 96 S. Ct. at 3120.
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monopoly justification for regulation was absent, the state's reason for
the program, whatever it was, was not sufficient to immunize the program in the face of a conflict with the federal antitrust laws. This
interpretation, of course, would be far more intrusive into the affairs
of a state than the former interpretation. Apparently Chief Justice
Burger, and certainly Justice Blackmun would require an investigation
into the content of state policy. Chief Justice Burger described Cantor
as a "situation where the State, in addition to requiring a public utility
'to meet regulatory criteria insofar as it is exercising its natural monopoly
powers,' . . . also purports, without any independent regulatory purpose,
173
to control the utility's activities in separate, competitive markets."'
The Chief Justice concluded, "To find a 'state action' exemption on
the basis of Michigan's undifferentiated sanction of this'ancillary practice
could serve no federal or state policy.' ' 74 These passages suggest that
Chief Justice Burger might not grant state action immunity unless the
state is regulating a natural monopoly. This would be consistent with
one interpretation of Justice Stevens's opinion. A more literal reading
of these sentences, however, suggests that a state objective other than
natural monopoly regulation could support immunity, but that no such
objective existed in Cantor. The Chief Justice said that Michigan acted
"without any independent regulatory purpose" and that antitrust immunity would "serve no ... state policy."
The Chief Justice's inability to discern a state purpose for the lightbulb program is curious. Neither the state legislature nor utilities commission articulated a purpose, and perhaps Chief Justice Burger was
serving notice that if a state seeks antitrust immunity, it must provide
an express justification for its actions. But the utility itself offered a
rationale for the program, and even without the utility's assistance, a
substantial justification could have been inferred. 17 By providing lightbulbs at costs, the utility lowered the price of electricity consumption
and thereby stimulated demand. If the utility had excess capacity, the
increased output would lower the average cost, and hence, the average
price, of electricity. This may or may not in fact have been the purpose
of the program. But it is a legitimate theoretical purpose, and the Court
typically does not disdain apparent justifications. If the Chief Justice
did perceive this to be the real purpose, it is difficult to understand
why this policy should be deemed any less worthy than limiting entry
and regulating the price of kilowatt hours of electricity. In a broad
sense, the light-bulb program would be a component of natural monopoly
regulation.

173. Id. at 604, 96 S. Ct. at 3124.
174. Id. at 605, 96 S. Ct. at 3124.
175. Id. at 583, 96 S. Ct. at 3114 ("The purpose of the program, according to
respondent's executives, is to increase the consumption of electricity.").
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If the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens did intend to hold that only

narrowly-defined state regulation of natural monopolies is a sufficient
justification for antitrust immunity, they created a serious conflict with
Parker. Raisin production is not a natural monopoly, yet the Court
held that California's regulatory scheme was immune from antitrust
6
challenge.1
Justice Stevens' and Chief Justice Burger's concerns with the purpose

of state action are somewhat ambiguous. Justice Blackmun's concern,
however, is unmistakable. He argued that immunity cannot turn upon
whether the state program is mandatory or permissive, was initiated by
the private party or the state, or was affirmatively articulated by the
state.' 77 Rather, Justice Blackmun advocated a rule of reason approach
under which state-sanctioned anticompetitive activity is pre-empted if its
potential harms outweigh its benefits.17 1 Specifically, Justice Blackmun
would withhold immunity unless the state-sanctioned practice is necessary
to serve a legitimate state purpose. He stated that he would take a
lenient approach to assessing the legitimacy of the state policy, and
where the state's "justifications are at all substantial . . . , would be
reluctant to find the restraint unreasonable."' 7 9 In particular, he cited
the protection of health or safety as legitimate state policies, and said
that he would find an especially strong justification "if the State in
effect has substituted itself for the forces of competition, and regulates
private activity to the same ends sought to be achieved by the Sherman
Act. Thus, an anticompetitive scheme which the State institutes on the
plausible ground that it will improve the performance of the market in
fostering efficient resource allocation and low prices can scarcely be
assailed." 180

Justice Blackmun, then would deem adequate a state policy to
displace competition with regulation, protect public health, or protect

176. See id. at 631-32, 96 S. Ct. at 3137 (Stewart, J.,dissenting) ("Raisin production
is not a 'natural monopoly.' If the limits of the state-action exemption from the Sherman
Act are congruent with the boundaries of 'natural monopoly' power, then Parker was
wrongly decided.") One argument that Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger could
have made is that only regulation designed to cure market failure is sufficient for immunity,
and even though raisin production is not a natural monopoly, it exhibits a separate kind
of market defect. Justice Blackmun did raise the point. See id. at 613 n.5, 96 S. Ct. at
3128 n.5 (Blackmun, J.,concurring). There is little indication in the Parker opinion,
however, that any such consideration motivated the Court. And though Justice Blackmun
disdained reliance on a state's articulation of a policy, see id. at 610, 96 S.Ct. at 3127
(Blackmun, J.,concurring), most any state regulation can be justified as a response to
some real or imagined market defect.
177. Id. at 609-10, 96 S.Ct. at 3126-27.
178. Id. at 610, 96 S.Ct. at 3127.
179. Id. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 3127.
180. Id., 96 S. Ct. at 3127.
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public safety. Of course, Michigan had displaced competition in the
light-bulb market with regulation designed to achieve the ends of competition. The price of light-bulbs, included in electric service rates, was
held to cost, and that is the end to which competition works. Apparently,
Justice Blackmun objects to regulation of markets that are not natural
monopolies or otherwise defective.' But every real-life market diverges
to some extent from a model of pure competition. How extreme does
the divergence have to be to justify, in the mind of a judge, state
intervention? Agricultural prices might fluctuate wildly sometimes, but
so might the prices of personal computers and gasoline. 8 2 Automobile
dealers are smaller than car manufacturers, as television retailers are
usually smaller than producers. Does this discrepancy in size create a
market defect sufficient to justify a state in preventing manufacturers
from increasing intra-brand competition?' The market "failure" is slight
at best. For decades, states have been regulating markets that could be
competitive, such as ambulance service and taxi cabs. Is this permissible?
And will states lose their authority to regulate natural monopolies when
the industries lose their natural monopoly characteristics, as apparently
will happen to local telephone service?'8
To deem regulation of competitive markets justifiable where undertaken to promote public health or safety hardly creates a meaningful
test. Every product and service can be seen to affect health or safety
somehow. Would the light-bulb program in Cantorhave been permissible
if the public service commission had justified it on the ground that
light-bulbs sometimes explode and encouraging distribution through a
single source results in a higher average quality of bulbs in use? If so,
the problem in Cantor was simply the state's failure to articulate the
right reason. But Justice Blackmun himself rejected reliance on affirmative articulation of a policy as a determinant for immunity, noting that
it would "lead to perverse results."'"" In short, a judicial inquiry into

181. See id. at 613, 96 S. Ct. at 3128 ("For all that,appears, light-bulb marketing,
unlike electric power production, is not a natural monopoly, nor does it implicate health
or safety, nor is it beset with problems of instability or other flaws in the competitive
market.").
182. See id. at 613 n.5, 96 S. Ct. at 3128 n.5 (The decision in Parker was justifiable
because "[wlildly fluctuating agricultural prices are a prime candidate for some collective
scheme that interrupts free competition in order to bring badly needed stability.")
183. In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 99 S. Ct. 403
(1978), discussed infra at notes 265-81 and accompanying text, California justified a
program that allowed an existing automobile dealer to prevent its manufacturer from
locating new franchises in its area on the ground that manufacturers have more bargaining
power than dealers. Id; at 100-01, 99 S. Ct. at 407. The Court held the program to be
immune state action. Id. at 109, 99 S. Ct. at 411-12.
184. See generally, Noll, The Future of Telecommunications Regulation, in Telecommunications Regulation Today and Tomorrow 42-48 (E. Noam ed. 1983).
185. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 610, 96 S. Ct. at 3127 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
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the content of state policy will either be an unwarranted intervention
into local matters, producing erratic and unprincipled results, or become
an insubstantial formality.
Judged by his standards, Justice Blackmun found Cantor easy to
decide. The state justification for the light-bulb program was the promotion of electric power use. That policy, according to Justice Blackmun,
might no longer have been a "plausible public goal," and even if it
remained a permissible policy, the light-bulb program was not necessary
to serve it.186 Similarly, if the goal was to provide cheaper and better
light-bulbs to consumers, the program was not necessary.' 7 The utility
could have offered light-bulbs at cost, without forcing consumers to
purchase light-bulbs by including their cost in electric rates. To require
an inquiry into the content of state policy for state action purposes, as
would Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Burger, and particularly Justice
Blackmun, is misguided, and it is this aspect of their opinions to which
Justice Stewart in dissent most strongly objected. He observed:
[Tihe Court is adopting an interpretation of the Sherman Act
which will allow the federal judiciary to substitute its judgment
for that of state legislatures and administrative agencies with
respect to whether particular anticompetitive regulatory provisions are "sufficiently central" . . . to a judicial conception of
the proper scope of state utility regulation.'
Justice Stewart concluded:
In adopting this freewheeling approach to the language of the
Sherman Act the Court creates a statutory simulacrum of the
substantive due process doctrine I thought had been put to rest
long ago. . . . For the Court's approach contemplates the selective interdiction of those anticompetitive state regulatory measures that are deemed not "central" to the limited range of
regulatory goals considered "imperative" by the federal judiciary. 1s9
In part, Justice Blackmun responded to Justice Stewart's concern
about the difficulty of assessing the merits of a state policy by pointing
out that the judiciary already was obliged to undertake that task under
the Commerce Clause when the actions of a state affect residents of
other states. He said, "[A] state action that interferes with competition
not only among its own citizens but also among the States is already
subject under the Commerce Clause to much the same searching review

186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.,
Id.
Id.

at 613, 96
96 S. Ct.
at 630, 96
at 640, 96

S. Ct. at 3128.
at 3128.
S. Ct. at 3136 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
S. Ct. at 3141 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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of state justifications as is proposed here."' 9 What Justice Blackmun
did not explain is why it is necessary or appropriate to use a federal
policy to prevent a state from taking action "that interferes with competition ... only among its own citizens." For, as Justice Blackmun's

statement implies, that is the only context in which Sherman Act preemption would be necessary. In every other context, state action can be
preempted under the Commerce Clause alone.' 9
Whether or not the state policy behind an anticompetitive program
should affect antitrust immunity, of course, is technically an issue of
Congressional intent. Unfortunately, the legislative history on this issue
is ambiguous. Indisputably, the Congress of 1890 did not believe that
its power under the Commerce Clause was broad enough to extend to
most activities undertaken or authorized by states.' 92 But the Court held
that Congress intended the limits of the Sherman Act to expand with
the limits of the commerce power, and only when the scope of the
commerce power increased to embrace the activities of states did the
question of state action immunity arise.' 93 It is difficult to infer from
this Congressional desire alone what the 1890 Congress would have
intended with respect to state action had it foreseen the possibility of
applying the statute to state activities. Justice Stewart, however, also
divined from legislative history a Congressional intent "not to intrude
upon the authority of the several States to regulate 'domestic' commerce." '94 Therefore, Justice Stewart concluded that Congress did not
intend the Sherman Act to apply to state activities, regardless of their
justifications, and that intent was unaffected by Congress's perception
of its Commerce Clause power.19 Justice Blackmun, however, found
nothing in the legislative history other than a perception that Congress
9
lacked the power to extend the Sherman Act to state activities.' 6
To Justice Stewart, the defendant in Cantor engaged in two activities:
first, it proposed a tariff and, second, after state approval, it obeyed
97
the tariff's terms. The first activity was immune under the Noerr,

190. Id. at 612, 96 S. Ct. at 3128 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
191. 1 have argued that all action undertaken or effectively authorized by a governmental entity should be immune from antitrust attack, but that action should be preempted
under the Commerce Clause unless a significant proportion of its harmful effects is borne
by citizens of the state. See supra notes 10-11, 88-89 and accompanying text.
192. 428 U.S. at 632, 96 S. Ct. at 3137 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 605, 96 S.
Ct. at 3124 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
193. See id. at 635-36, 96 S.Ct. at 3137-39 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
194. See id. at 637, 96 S.Ct. at 3139-40 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).

195. Id., 96 S.Ct. at 3139-40 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
196.
197.

Id. at 605, 96 S.Ct. at 3124-25 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Moter Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 81

S. Ct. 523 (1961) (an agreement to seek anticompetitive legislation is not actionable under
the antitrust laws).
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9s
Justice Stewart's
doctrine and the second under Parker and Goldfarb.1
construction of the state action doctrine, then, is that private activity
investigated and approved by the state is immune, regardless of the state
policy supporting the action. This is the proper approach.'" The one
potential difficulty with Justice Stewart's position, however, is the source
from which he inferred a state intent to authorize the light-bulb program.
Recall that Justice Stevens seemed incredulous that the program was
anything but Edison's idea. 2°° Justice Stewart, however, in describing
the regulatory process, commented that the "Public Service Commission
' 20
investigates the proposed tariff and either approves it or rejects it. '
He also stated that Michigan's policy is not neutral with respect to
20 2
whether a utility should have a light-bulb program.
From what source Justice Stewart infers an affirmative state policy
is not clear. Perhaps he found the agency's conduct with respect to the
abandonment of the light-bulb program for large commercial customers
compelling evidence that the agency had investigated, considered, and
authorized the program. That conclusion would be a fair reading of
the record. Or perhaps he believed that if a utility is required by law
to specify in tariffs filed with an agency the service it proposes, the
agency is empowered to approve or modify the proposal, and the utility
is thereafter required to conform to the tariffs, the fact that an agency
does not reject the specific activity described proves the state's intent
to authorize that conduct. In that situation, which probably comes closest
to describing Cantor, the challenged activity would have been the likely
consequence of the state's action and therefore immunity would be
proper. But perhaps Justice Stewart believed that for state action purposes, it is enough that an agency is given jurisdiction over a practice,
has the power to investigate it, has the authority to prohibit it, and
does not in fact forbid it, regardless of whether the challenged conduct
is specifically presented to the agency for approval or the agency actually
considers the challenged conduct. His opinion contains some support
for this last interpretation. In explaining why Michigan's light-bulb pro-

198. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 624, 96 S. Ct. at 3133 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
199. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. I have suggested that the proper
test in practice is whether the state has acted in such a way that the conduct constituting
the restraint challenged was a likely consequence. See supra notes 8, 165 and accompanying
text. Justice Stewart would not require that these actions be taken by the state legislature
(Cantor, 428 U.S. at 638 n.26, 96 S. Ct. at 3140 n.26), and neither would I. But in the
absence of a clear and explicit expression of intent by the legislature or the appropriate
state agency, I would require a strong circumstantial showing of state intent, perhaps a
stronger showing than Justice Stewart would require.
200. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
201. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 624, 96 S. Ct. at 3133 (Stewart, J.,dissenting) (emphasis
added).
202. Id.at 626 n.ll, 638 n.26, 96 S. Ct. at 3134 n.11, 3140 n.26.
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gram was not neutral, Justice Stewart pointed only to the fact that the
Michigan statutes vest the Public Service Commission "with complete
power and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state." 203 If
Justice Stewart intended to assert that agency power alone, though
unexercised, is sufficient to demonstrate the state's intent to authorize
specific anticompetitive conduct, even if that conduct represents a very
small proportion of the regulated firm's activities, and there is no legal
obligation on the utility to notify the agency of the specific conduct
challenged and no indication that the agency actually became aware of
it, he went too far. The restraint would not be a likely consequence of
that official behavior.
There is no doubt that for Justice Stewart, a state agency can
constitute the "state" for state action purposes. To him, the light-bulb
program represented state policy because the legislature had conferred
power on the Public Service Commission to regulate utilities, and the
Commission had investigated and approved the program.2 But it is not
completely clear whether the majority of the Court in Cantor would
have held that a state agency can constitute the state. Justice Stewart
understood Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens to reject the possibility that an agency may represent the state, and to require instead
a legislative articulation of state policy. 2° In fact, Chief Justice Burger
appears to have been more concerned with emphasizing the lack of
affirmative articulation of a state policy by any state representative than
with distinguishing between a legislative and an administrative expression. 2°6 Similarly, the issue to Justice Stevens was whether the light-bulb
program represented the policy of the state or of the utility, not whether
it represented the policy of the Michigan legislature or of the Public
Service Commission. But there are hints in Justice Stevens's opinion
that he would have deemed the agency competent to express state policy.
He stated that "[n]either the Michigan Legislature, nor the Commission"
had specifically investigated the program and that there was "no statute,
Commission rule, or policy" that prevented the abandonment of the
program. 02 7 Later, in explaining that state action cases typically involve
a blend of public and private decisionmaking,. he referred to the public
component of the light-bulb program as the Commission's participation,

203. Id.at 638 n.26, 96 S.Ct. at 3140 n.26.
204. The Court in Parker had held that the legislature may constitute the state (see
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text) and in Goldfarb had implied that the state
supreme court may embody the state. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
205. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 626 n.11, 638 n.26, 96 S. Ct. at 3134, n.11, 3140 n.26
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
206. See id.at 604-05, 96 S.Ct. at 3125 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
207. Id.at 584-85, 96 S.Ct. at 3114-15 (emphasis added).
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and concluded that the option to have the program was primarily the
utility's, not the Commission 's. 208
The correct interpretation of Cantor on this issue is that a state
policy can be effectively established by a state agency. In Goldfarb, of
course, the state bar, even though an official state agency, was unable
to express a state policy in favor of attorney price fixing in order to
immunize the practice. 2°9 But the state bar comprised members with a
direct economic interest in the subject of their regulation. By contrast,
Michigan Public Service Commission members were forbidden to have
a pecuniary interest in any public utility subject to Commission jurisdiction. 210 In my terminology, the Michigan agency was legitimate, the
Virginia State Bar was illegitimate. 21 1 Where a legitimate state. agency
has jurisdiction over a matter, as the Michigan Public Service Commission had,2' 12 it can articulate a policy sufficient for state action
immunity. 2 3 Precluding articulation by an agency, and requiring legislative articulation instead, would seriously frustrate the tremendous efficiency of conducting state affairs through administrative agencies, which
21 4
in large part explains their growth and popularity.
E.

Bates v. State Bar of Arizona

The Court next considered the state. action doctrine in 1977. In
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,2' 15 the Arizona Supreme Court had adopted
a rule that required members of the bar to comply with duties and
obligations prescribed by the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility ("CPR"), as amended by the court. 2 6 One disciplinary rule contained in the CPR and adopted by the court prohibited
lawyers from advertising. 217 Two Arizona lawyers advertised their services

208. Id. at 593-94, 96 S. Ct. at 3119.
209. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
213. The best interpretation of Goldfarb and Cantor is that only a legitimate state
agency can immunize a practice. A preferable rule would be that any agency can effectively
authorize a restraint. See infra notes 459-60 and accompanying text.
214. See Cantor, 428 U.S. at 638 n.26, 96 S. Ct. at 3140 n.26 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("If a state legislature can ensure antitrust exemption only by eschewing such broad
delegation of regulatory authority and incorporating regulatory details into statutory .law,
then there is a very great risk that the State will be prevented from regulating effictively.").
215. 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
216. Id. at 360 n.12, 97 S. Ct. at 2697 n.12.
217. Id. at 355, 97 S. Ct. at 2694. In relevant part, the rule provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the
city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall
he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
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in a newspaper, and the state bar's Board of Governors recommended
a disciplinary suspension. 2 1 The lawyers sought review of the action in
the Arizona Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the disciplinary
rule violated the Sherman Act. 21 9 The court rejected the claim on the
basis of the state action doctrine, and on review of that decision, the
20
Supreme Court affirmed.
The application of the state action doctrine was simple enough. The
state supreme court had clearly expressed a policy prohibiting advertising. 22' The state itself, therefore, committed an act that had a high
probability of producing an anticompetitive effect. In other words, the
Court itself had engaged in the restraint challenged. In Goldfarb, the
court had not done so. In both Bates and Goldfarb, the state supreme
court had adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility. 222 But the
CPR explicitly prohibited advertising; it did not mandate adherence to
price schedules. 22 Further, the Virginia Supreme Court had expressly
2
cautioned that lawyers should not be controlled by fee schedules.
Cantor could have been and, in pqrt was distinguished on the same
basis. 22 In Cantor, a majority of the Court did not believe that the
light-bulb program was truly the state's policy. 226 In Bates, the policy
of the state was unmistakable.
The Court also echoed the Cantor majority's concern with the
content of state policy, distinguishing that case on the additional ground
that the justification for regulating light-bulbs was insufficient in the
face of a conflict with the antitrust laws, whereas the state's interest in
Bates was adequate.2 7 The Court was somewhat ambiguous on this
point, noting first that "the regulation of the activities of the bar is at
the core of the State's power to protect the public. ' 228 Of course,
regulation of the activities of a public utility also is recognized as a
traditional function of the state. 229 What the Cantor majority, as well

218. Id. at 354, 356, 97 S.Ct. at 2694, 2695.
219. Id.at 356, 97 S.Ct. at 2695.
220. Id.at 357, 363, 97 S.Ct. at 2695, 2698.
221. See id.at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 2697.
222. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
223. See 433 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 2697.
224. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
225. In Bates, the Court asserted three distinctions between that case and Cantor. One
concerned the clarity of the state policy. The Court said, "Finally, the light-bulb program
in Cantor was instigated by the utility with only the acquiescence of the state regulatory
commission .... The situation now before us is entirely different. The disciplinary rules
reflect a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior."
Id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. at 2698.
226. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
227. Bates, 433 U.S. at 361, 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
228. Id., 97 S.Ct. at 2697.
229. See generally W. Jones, Regulated Industries 1-69 (ed 2d. 1976).
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as Justice Blackmun, required was an adequate rationale for the particular anticompetitive practice challenged, not for regulation of a service
or industry in general. As applied to Bates, that meant a justification
deemed acceptable by the Court for a ban on attorney advertising. The
Court seemed to recognize this fact, but apparently found the justification for the ban, through the sheer duration of the practice, selfevident and obviously substantial. Without elaboration, the Court said,
"More specifically, controls over solicitation and advertising by attorneys
' ' 230
have long been subject to the State's oversight.
The Court also distinguished Cantor on the ground that the defendant there was a private party. 23 I Bates did not involve an antitrust
complaint at all, but a petition for review of attorney disciplinary action
recommended by the state bar in which the petitioners claimed that the
suspension would be improper because the rule on which it would be
based violated the Sherman Act. Technically, the petitioners were objecting to the suspension recommended by the state bar, and as Goldfarb
had held, a state bar stands in the position of a private party when
regulating attorney conduct. 2 2 But in Bates, the Court stated, "Here,
the appellants' claims are against the State. The Arizona Supreme Court
is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate
trier of fact and law in the enforcement process.' '233
The question in Bates was whether the ban on advertising was
intended by the Arizona Supreme Court, and certainly it was. The court
adopted the rule that expressly forbade advertising. Undoubtedly the
bar committee's recommendation for disciplinary action was a likely
consequence of the court's promulgation of that rule. The Supreme
Court, however, also referred to the fact that the Arizona court was
"the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process." Whether
the Court would have found this fact alone sufficient for immunity had
the Arizona court not affirmatively articulated the restraint as state
policy in the rule or the enforcement process is problematic. Forexample,
if the ban on advertising had been established by the Arizona Bar, the
bar had recommended a suspension for its violation, and the court,
without elaboration, had imposed the suspension, would the Court have

230. Bates, 433 U.S. at 362, 97 S. Ct. at 2698 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded,
"Federal interference with a State's traditional regulation of a profession is entirely unlike
the intrusion the Court sanctioned in Cantor." Id., 97 S. Ct. at 2698. Again, this suggests
that the rationale for state regulation of professions is more compelling than the rationale
for regulation of utilities. This misstates the concern in Cantor. The question posed by
Cantor is whether the state's interest in banning attorney advertising is critically more
substantial than in establishing a light-bulb program.
231. Id. at.361, 97 S. Ct. at 2697-98.
232. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
233. Bates, 433 U.S. at 361, 97 S. Ct. at 2697.
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deemed the restraint immunized state action?23 4 If by referring to the
Arizona Supreme Court as the "real party in interest" the Court merely
meant to say that that court had intended the restraint, then its reference
was simply a straightforward application of the principle developed in
prior cases. If, however, the Court meant to suggest that the state can
be the "real party in interest" and thereby immunize a restraint even
when the state had not intended the anticompetitive activity, then the
Court was announcing a novel principle. This ambiguity surfaced several
years later.235
The doubt about the source of the supreme court's power to embody
the state for state action purposes left open in Goldfarb was resolved
by Bates.2 6 In stating that the supreme court was "the ultimate body
wielding the State's power over the practice of law," the Court cited
the Arizona Constitution and an Arizona Supreme Court case, which
had held that the supreme court has inherent power, stemming from
the constitution, to regulate law practice, apart from any power the
state legislature might confer. 23 7 Thus, for state action purposes, the
supreme court embodies the state because, according to the state constitution, it is an independent branch of government, not because it is
authorized by the legislature to speak for the state.
Finally, the Court noted that the supreme court rules reflected a
"clear articulation of the State's policy" and that the rules were "subject
to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme
Court-in enforcement proceedings. ' 238 The Court concluded, "Our concern that federal policy is being unnecessarily and inappropriately subordinated to state policy is reduced in such a situation; we deem it
significant that the state policy is so clearly and affirmatively expressed

234. In that situation, the adoption of the ban and the recommendation of the
suspension ought not be immune under the state action doctrine, because those acts were
in no degree caused by any state act. They might still acquire immunity, however, under
the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine, or might not constitute an antitrust offense. And of course,
the state court would be immune from liability for ordering the suspension. See infra
notes 371-79 and accompanying text.
235. See Hoover v. Ronwin, discussed infra at notes 342-84 and accompanying text.
The reference to the state as "the real party in interest" creates a way to immunize
private partie o implicitly without resort to direct state authorization. If a private party is
sued for an antitrust offense, and there is neither a clear state policy in favor of the
restraint nor state supervision, one could hold the private party immune by characterizing
the state as the "real party in interest" and dismissing the complaint against the proper
defendant on the ground that the state itself cannot violate the antitrust laws. In essence,
this is what the Court did in Ronwin.
236. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
237. Bates, 433 U.S. at 360, 97 S. Ct. at 2697. The Court cited In re Bailey, 30 Ariz.
407, 248 P. 29 (1926).
238. Bates, 433 U.S. at 362, 97 S. Ct. at 2698.
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and the the State's supervision is so active. "239 This is the first case in
which the Supreme Court explicitly stated that active state supervision
of a restraint is relevant to a determination of state action immunity.
Unfortunately, the Court's reasons are cryptic, at best. The fear the
Court expresses is the needless subordination of federal policy to that
of the state. But the Court refers both to the existence of a clear state
policy and active supervision as reducing the danger. It is not obvious
why a restraint clearly and affirmatively expressed as state policy but
not supervised would amount to an unnecessary and inappropriate subordination of federal policy. Moreover, if there were such a restraint,
the Court does not say that immunity would be unavailable. The Court
simply noted that supervision is "significant." Thus, though Bates contains the first explicit reference to state supervision as a relevant factor
in state action immunity, the Court did not explain the extent of the
factor's importance or the reason for it.
F.

City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.

In City of Lafayette v. LouisianaPower & Light Co. ,240 cities brought
an antitrust suit against several investor-owned electric utilities alleging
that the utilities had engaged in various practices designed to impede
the cities in their attempt to provide service through municipally-owned
electric systems to customers located beyond city limits.2' One of the
defendants filed an antitrust counterclaim against the cities, alleging that
the cities had engaged in various practices intended to injure the competitive position of the utility. 242 The district court dismissed the counterclaim on the basis of the state action doctrine, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, and the Supreme Court, by a margin of five to four, affirmed.Y3 The Court held that municipalities are not exempt from the
antitrust laws simply by virtue of their status as governmental entities.
The topic of antitrust immunity for municipalities implicates some
concerns that are common to all state action cases and some that are
peculiar to politically-accountable governmental bodies. For that reason,
it is a topic best considered separately, and I have offered elsewhere
an analysis directed to municipal immunity.2 For present purposes,
however, a few points emanating from City of Lafayette relevant to
state action immunity in general ought to be mentioned.
The Court did not hold that the cities were incapable of being
immunized under the state action doctrine. Rather, the Court held that

239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.,
435
Id.
Id.

97 S. Ct. at 2698 (emphasis added).
U.S. 389, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
at 391-392, 392 n.5, 98 S. Ct. at 1125-26, 1126 n.5.
at 392 n.6, 98 S. Ct. at 1126 n.6.

243. Id.at 392-94, 98 S.Ct. 1125-27.
244. See Lopatka, supra note 5.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

cities are not immune simply because they are governmental entities, or
because they are necessarily the agents of the state and their actions
therefore automatically are the state's actions. The plurality stated that
the Parker doctrine exempts "anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an
act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions,
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." ' 1 To the extent the plurality implies that the
state action doctrine immunizes only the conduct of the state itself or
its subdivisions, the statement conflicts with the Court's apparent intentions in Parker, Goldfarb, and Bates.
In Parker, it appeared that had the plaintiff sued raisin growers for
price-fixing, they would have been immune.Y In Goldfarb, it seemed
that the county bar, a voluntary association of lawyers, and the state
bar, deemed a private party for state action purposes, would have been
held immune had their conduct been compelled by the state supreme
court.247 And had Bates procedurally involved an antitrust complaint
against the state bar, there is little doubt that the bar would have been
held immune.2 Thus, to the extent the plurality suggested that private
parties cannot enjoy state action immunity, the suggestion was misleading
and was explicitly rejected several years later.2 9 Moreover, the plurality
purported to limit a state in adopting a policy that will enjoy immunity
to one designed "to displace competition with regulation or monopoly
public service." There is no warrant for so limiting the range of policy
objectives a state may pursue free of the threat of antitrust liability,
and no prior case had expressly imposed such a limitation.
The plurality then considered the direction a state must provide a
city in order to confer immunity. It stated that a city will be immunized
if its activity is "contemplated" and authorized by the state:
While a subordinate governmental unit's claim to Parker immunity is not as readily established as the same claim by a state
government sued as such, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that an adequate state mandate for anticompetitive activities of
cities and other subordinate governmental units exists when it
is found "from the authority given a governmental entity to
operate in a particular area, that the legislature contemplated
' 250
the kind of action complained of.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
text.
250.
added).

City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413, 98 S.Ct. at 1137 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 220-33 and accompanying text.
See SMCRC, 105 S.Ct. at 1726, discussed infra at notes 424-62 and accompanying
City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415, 98 S.Ct. at 1138 (citation omitted) (emphasis

ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

19861

The Court remanded for consideration of the extent of the state's
authorization.
The state's contemplation and authorization of a restraint is a useful
allusion, but its application should not be restricted to subordinate
governmental entities. Instead, it should be a sufficient requirement for
determining whether any anticompetitive activity is immunized by state
action. A state may act in such a way that a private anticompetitive
act is a likely consequence even if it does not contemplate the private
act, and so state contemplation should not be a necessary condition of
immunity. 25' If a state does contemplate and authorize an activity, however, that activity surely is a likely consequence. Further, though the

Court may not have intended to limit the relevance of contemplation
and authorization to subordinate governmental entities, the Court explicitly seemed to do just that.252
Justice Stewart in dissent would have held that cities are automatically immune under the state action doctrine. 2 3 There are two rationales
for this position, each of which can be detected in Justice Stewart's
opinion. First, a city is a politically-accountable governmental body, as

is a state, and Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to
any such governmental unit. 2 4 Second, a city is an instrumentality, or

necessary agent of the state, and as such its actions necessarily constitute
actions of the state without any further state authorization. 525 Under
the first rationale, a city enjoys an independent immunity flowing from
its nature as a governmental entity. Under the second, a city's immunity
derives from the immunity granted to states. In either case, the result
25
is the same.

6

251. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
252. In a later case, the Court implied that the contemplation and authorization
standard for assessing the clarity of a state policy adopted in City of Lafayette does
apply to private defendants. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
253. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426, 98 S. Ct. at 1144 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
254. See id. at 426-30, 98 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 429, 98 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
256. 1 would adopt the independent immunity rationale for reasons made clear in
Lopatka, supra note 5, at 75-76. In general, I believe that Justice Stewart's opinions in
the state action area have been most lucid and perceptive. His retirement from the Court
and his subsequent passing have been felt in this area, as in other areas of the law. I
do disairee with some of his dicta in City of Lafayette, however. He would have required
that private action be compelled by the state in order to enjoy immunity. City of Lafayette,
435 U.S. at 431-32, 98 S. Ct. at 1146. As the Court has recently realized (see infra notes
398, 404-06, 440-44 and accompanying text), requiring state compulsion goes too far.
What the Court ought to recognize is that a state's intent to engage in or authorize
anticompetitive activity is sufficient for immunity. The Court's current construction of
the clear state policy requirement, however, comes close to this proposition. See infra
notes 411-14 and accompanying text.
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Chief Justice Burger would have held that the distinction relevant
to state action immunity for conduct of a city or a state is that between
proprietary and governmental activities.25 7 Governmental activities are
immune. Proprietary activities, however, if they are undertaken by a
municipality, can be immunized, but only if they are required by the

state and are necessary to make the regulatory act work.25 Of course,
the Chief Justice purports to maintain the same distinction between
proprietary and governmental activities for the conduct of states themselves as well as for the actions of cities. Presumably the state compulsion
requirement would necessitate a state legislative command to engage in
state anticompetitive proprietary activities. A distinction between governmental and proprietary activities for state action purposes would be
unwise. Such a distinction has proven vexatious in the tort area and
elevates form over substance. 2 9 A governmental entity may attempt to
achieve the same end and produce exactly the same economic effects
through governmental or proprietary actions. This asserted distinction
26
has not reemerged in later cases. 0
One final dispute between the dissent and the plurality relevant
generally to the state action doctrine should be noted. Justice Stewart
argued that the Court had never previously held that a governmental
body could violate the antitrust laws, explaining Goldfarb on the ground
that the state bar, though a state agency, assumed the status of a private
party because of the nature of its membership and subject of its regulation. 261 Instead of simply responding that the Court had never held
that a governmental body could not violate the antitrust laws, the
plurality, in a footnote, rejected Justice Stewart's interpretation of Goldfarb. The plurality said, "We think it obvious that the fact that the
ancillary effect of the State Bar's policy, or even the conscious desire
on its part, may have been to benefit the lawyers it regulated cannot
transmute the State Bar's official actions into those of a private organization. 2 62 This statement is unfortunate, because if a distinction
cannot be made between legitimate and illegitimate agencies, a legitimate
state agency will not be able to immunize private anticompetitive conduct

257. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 418, 422, 98 S. Ct. at 1139, 1141 (Burger,
C.J., concurring); id. at 432, 98 S. Ct. at 1146 (Stewart, 3., dissenting).
258. Id. at 425-26, 98 S. Ct. at 1142-43 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
259. See Lopatka, supra note 5, at 77-78; City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 432, 98 S.
Ct. at 1146-47 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
260. Chief Justice Burger's attempt to require that state authorized proprietary conduct
be necessary to make the regulatory act work was explicitly rejected by the Court in
SMCRC, 105 S.Ct. at 1727 n.21, discussed infra at notes 424-62 and accompanying text.
261. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 431, 98 S.Ct. at 1146 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
262. Id.at 411 n.41, 98 S.Ct. at 1136 n.41.
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by expressing a policy in favor of it.263 Rather, a constitutional branch
of state government will have to express state policy, and the efficiency

of operating government through administrative agencies will be impaired. Fortunately, the statement was dicta, completely unnecessary to
264
the result in the case, and represented the opinion of only four Justices.
G.

New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.

In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,26S California
had enacted the Automobile Franchise Act, which provided that if an

automobile manufacturer wanted to establish a new dealership or relocate
an existing dealership in the market area of an existing dealer, the
2
incumbent could file a protest with the New Motor Vehicle Board. 66
The Board was then required to notify the manufacturer that a protest

had been filed, schedule a hearing, and inform it that it was prohibited
267

from opening the outlet at least until the conclusion of the hearing.
The hearing had to be convened within 60 days of the protest, but
could be held at any earlier time if the Board found that the public
interest so required.2 6 At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board could
permanently prohibit the establishment or relocation of the franchise
for "good cause," a determination that required an assessment of the

263. A better principle would be that any state agency can immunize a restraint (see
infra notes 459-60 and accompanying text), but at least if Goldfarb is interpreted in the
way suggested by Justice Stewart, some state agencies will be able to confer immunity.
264. Another issue raised in City of Lafayette concerned the imposition of damages
on municipalities. The plurality expressly reserved the question of remedies, 435 U.S. at
402, 98 S. Ct. at 1131, Justice Stewart viewed the prospect of damages as one reason
for municipal immunity, id. at 440-41, 98 S. Ct. at 1150-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and
Justice Blackmun asserted that the issue deserved more attention than the plurality had
devoted to it. Id. at 442-43, 98 S. Ct. at 1151-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The issue
resurfaced in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20,
102 S. Ct. at 843-44 n.20 (the Court does not confront the issue of damages); id. at 65
n.2, 102 S. Ct. at 848 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It will take a considerable feat
of judicial gymnastics to conclude that municipalities are not subject to treble damages ... ."). Congress eliminated the problem by providing that no antitrust damage may
be recovered from a local government, or from a private party based on an official act
directed by local government. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984).
265. 439 U.S. 96, 99 S. Ct. 403 (1978).
266. Id. at 98 n.l, 99 S. Ct. at 406 n.l. The New Motor Vehicle Board consisted of
nine appointive members, four of whom were new motor vehicle dealers and five of
whom could not be. Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 3001 (Supp. 1985).
267. Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. at 98 n.l, 99 S. Ct. at 406 n.l.
268. Id. at 103, 110, 99 S. Ct. at 408-09, 412.
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new outlet's effect on the existing franchise and the public. 269 The purpose
of the statute was to prevent manufacturers, perceived to have superior
bargaining power, from abusing their dealers.2 7 0 A manufacturer and

would-be franchisees claimed that the statute denied Due Process and
conflicted with the Sherman Act.27' A three-judge district court held
that the statute denied Due Process, but did not pass upon the antitrust
claim. 272 The Supreme Court reversed on the constitutional issue and
held that the program fell within the state action exemption. 273
The plaintiffs challenged two aspects of the program. First, the
statute allowed a dealer unilaterally to prevent a manufacturer from
opening a new outlet prior to the time a hearing was concluded by the
Board.2 74 Thus, the dealer's unilateral act of filing a protest prevented
the manufacturer from opening the dealership until the Board conducted
a good cause hearing, which could be convened as long as 60 days after
the protest was filed and could last for 30 days. 275 In effect, the dealer
could forestall entry for up to 90 days without a determination of good
cause by the Board. The shortest answer to this claim was that any
anticompetitive effect of a 90-day delay was de minimis, especially since
the opening of an enterprise as substantial as a car dealership was
involved. Further, the Court pointed out that the Board had the authority
to order an immediate hearing on the protest so that the "duration of
interim restraint [was] subject to ongoing regulatory supervision. '276 In

269. Id. at 98 n.l, 99 S. Ct. at 406 n.l. As to "good cause," the statute provided
the following:
In determining whether good cause has been established for not entering into
or relocating an additional franchise for the same line-make, the board shall
take into consideration the existing circumstances, including but not limited to:
(1) Permanency' of the investment.
(2) Effect on the retail motor vehicle business and the consuming public in
the relevant market area.
(3) Whether it is injurious to the public welfare for an additional franchise
to be established.
(4) Whether the franchisees of the same line-make in that relevant market
area are providing adequate competition and convenient consumer care for the
motor vehicles of the line-make in the market area which shall include the
adequacy of motor vehicle sales and service facilities, equipment, supply of
vehicle parts, and qualified service personnel.
(5) Whether the establishment of an additional franchise would increase
competition and therefore be in the public interest.
Cal. Veh. Code Ann. §§ 3062, 3063 (West Supp. 1978).
270. Id. at 100-02, 101 n.6, 99 S. Ct. at 407-08, 408 n.6.
271. Id. at 104, 99 S. Ct. at 409.
272. Id. at 99-100, 99 S. Ct. at 406-07.
273. Id. at 104, 109, 99 S. Ct. at 409, 412.
274. Id. at 110, 99 S. Ct. at 412.
275. Id. at 103 n.9, 99 S. Ct. at 409 n.9.
276. Id. at 110, 99 S.Ct. at 412.
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other words, the dealer had very little unilateral power to impede entry.
The plaintiff's more substantial claim was that the statute allowed
the Board and protesting dealers to prohibit entry indefinitely if good
cause were found. The correct response to this claim was that the restraint
was a likely consequence of the state's legislative enactment. In this
case, the legislature passed a law allowing the Board, on protest of an
incumbent dealer, to prohibit new entry. Supervision should not have
been required, but it was present albeit in the form of an agency
composed in part of interested members. The Court's actual response
2 77
to this claim was rather curt, though not inconsistent with this analysis.
The most interesting aspect of Orrin Fox is that, given the analysis
espoused by Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger in
Cantor, the Court reached the result it did. Those Justices took the
position that state action will be immunized only if the Court deems
the state's policy sufficiently worthy to prevail over the federal policy
embodied in the Sherman Act.1 7 Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger,
though ambiguously, might have been requiring a purpose to regulate a
natural monopoly. 279 Justice Blackmun required a state purpose to protect
public health or safety, or to correct market failure. 210 Selling automobiles
is certainly not a natural monopoly. The market may not be perfectly
competitive, but if it is sufficiently flawed to justify, in the Court's
mind, governmental intervention, then every market is so flawed. And
if the public health or safety demands protection from the proliferation
of car dealerships, then the increase in athletic shoe outlets is ominous,
and the multiplication of ice cream shops is positively perilous. It is
unlikely that the Court in Orrin Fox would have admitted that it no
longer believed that the content of state policy was relevant to state
action immunity.28s But either the Court had in fact reached that conclusion, or the inquiry into state policy had become so superficial that
virtually any state objective would have been deemed adequate. Of
course, the reason for state action never should have been relevant to
immunity, so this apparent change in the Court's attitude was welcome.
An explicit repudiation of the Cantor position should have been embraced.

277. See id. at 110-11, 99 S. Ct. at 412.
278. See supra notes 170-85 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
281. Perhaps tellingly, the Court went to substantial lengths to explain why the federal
and various state governments had enacted "legislation to protect retail car dealers from
perceived abusive and oppressive acts by the manufacturers." Orrin Fox, 439 U.S. at
100-02, 99 S. Ct. at 407-08. The Court seemed almost defensive about immunizing this
kind of program. If a state's policy must be deemed worthy by a court, the Court had
good reason for its uneasiness. The rationale for dealer protection amounts to nothing
more than big firms can hurt little firms.
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H. California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.
California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc. ,282 considered by the Court two years after City of Lafayette and
Orrin Fox, involved California statutes that created a system of vertical
price fixing in the sale of wine at wholesale. The statutes required all
wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers to file fair trade contracts
or price schedules with the state. 23 If a wine producer had not set resale
prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers had to post a price
schedule for that producer's brands.2M A single contract or schedule for
each brand set the price for all wholesale transactions in that brand
within a trading area. 2s3 A wine wholesaler charging less than the stipulated prices was subject to fine, license revocation, and private damage
suits. 2 6 The state had no direct control over the prices established and
did not review the reasonableness of the prices set. 287 The state charged
a wine wholesaler with violating the statute, and the wholesa".er sought
an injunction from the California Court of Appeals against the state's
pricing program. 28 The court granted the relief, holding that the scheme
was invalid under the Sherman Act and that application of the Sherman
Act to prevent this state-created system of wine pricing was not prohibited by the Twenty-first Amendment. 2 9 The Supreme Court affirmed. 219
The Court surveyed Parker, Goldfarb, Cantor, Bates, and Orrin
Fox and concluded: "These decisions establish two standards for antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint must
be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy';
1
second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself.' '2,
The Court held that the wine pricing program satisfied the first standard:
"The legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to

282. 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937 (1980).
283. Id. at 99, 100 S. Ct. at 940.
284. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 940.
285. Id., 100 S.Ct. at 940.
286. Id. at 100, 100 S. Ct. 940.
287. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 940.
288. Id., 100 S. Ct. at 940.
289. Id. at 100-01, 100 S.Ct. at 940-41.
290. Id. at 102, 100 S.Ct. at 941.
291. Id. at 105, 100 S. Ct. at 943. The Court quoted the language of Justice Brennan
in City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410, 98 S.Ct. at 1135. It is interesting that the Court
did not specify a third requirement-that the clear state policy serve an objective deemed
sufficiently important to prevail over the Sherman Act. As in Orrin Fox, the Court might
have been retreating from this Cantor-basednotion, or it might have thought the adequacy
of a policy to restrict liquor sales too obvious to warrant remark.
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permit resale price maintenance. ' 29 However, the Court held, the program did not satisfy the second criterion:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices

nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does
it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not
monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.2 93
The Court should never have stated that a clear and affirmative
state policy and active state supervision are independent requirements

for immunity. No prior case had so held. The closest the Court had
come previously to so holding was in Bates, where the Court deemed
it "significant that the state policy [was] so clearly and affirmatively
expressed and that the States's supervision [was] so active." 2 ' The Court
there, however, simply commented that the criteria were relevant, not
that they were mandatory. Where the Court went wrong in Midcal was
to confuse the ultimate fact at issue in state action immunity cases with
subsidiary facts tending to prove the ultimate fact.
If the basis of state action immunity is federalism, a concern with
conflicts between policies pursued by states and those pursued by the
federal government, then the issue is whether the state intended to engage
in or authorize conduct that would violate federal law. 295 The specific
inquiry concerns the intent of the state. If the state does not intend to

engage in or authorize conduct that constitutes the restraint, there is

292. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, 100 S. Ct. at 943. Indeed, California had done more
than permit resale price maintenance; the state had required it.
293. Id. at 105-06, 100 S.Ct. at 943.
294. Bates, 433 U.S. at 362, 97 S. Ct. at 2698 (emphasis added).
295. Because intent is normally inferred from conduct, the inquiry can be rephrased
as follows: Did the state act in such a way that the conduct constituting the restraint
challenged was a likely consequence? If the state itself undertakes action that constitutes
a restraint, which does not involve anticompetitive conduct of private parties, nothing
more should be required for immunity. For example, if the state requires a license to
operate as a marine pilot, and limits the number of licenses granted so that the market
price for pilotage services produces an economic profit, no conduct of licensees can be
called anticompetitive, and the state itself should be immune. See supra note 17. The
state's restraint here could be termed self-executing. For state action purposes, the question
remains the intent of the state. In this case, the fact that the state itself undertook the
anticompetitive activity does not necessarily mean that the state intended to produce the
anticompetitive effects of its conduct. But the issue posed by federalism is whether the
state intended to authorize or engage in the anticompetitive conduct. Further, it is axiomatic
that persons can be presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of their
acts. The presumption should apply to states as well. Indeed, because allowing an inquiry
during federal trial into a state's knowledge of and concern for the effects of its actions
would increase the direct public and private costs of litigation as well as smack of
unwarranted interventionism, the presumption should be irrebuttable.
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no reason to presume that the state intended to pursue a policy potentially
at odds with the federal policy, and, therefore, no reason to immunize
the conduct in the name of federalism. Conversely, if the state does
intend to undertake or authorize the activity, federalism is implicated
whether the state demands or allows the conduct, whether the idea for
the policy originates in state government or the private sector, whether
the state thinks the policy is magnificent or just pretty good, whether
it would be willing to abandon the policy in exchange for a $1,000
federal contribution to its highway fund or would rather secede from
the union than alter its program.
If a state's intent were easily determined, there would be no need
for any subsidiary question. But the intent of governmental bodies is
not easy to discern, and even imperfect devices like legislative histories
are notoriously deficient among the states. Therefore, other facts, easier
to establish than the state's intent, may be used to prove the state's
intent. If the existence of a subsidiary fact determines intent, that is,
if the court establishes a rule that when the fact is found intent is
proven and when it is not found intent is disproven, the evidentiary
test becomes conclusive. Any such test can be justified as a requisite
to prove intent only if the benefit it produces exceeds its costs. The
benefit of an evidentiary test is the elimination or reduction of the cost
produced by erroneously determining the ultimate fact at issue.
Specifically, there are two types of error a court can make in
determining state intent. The probabilities of making each type of error
are independent, as are the costs associated with each error. 29 Type A
error results when a court erroneously concludes that a state intended
a restraint that it in fact did not intend. The loss associated with this
type of error is the injury to consumer welfare produced by the mistakenly immunized restraint, discounted by the probability that the court
would have found the restraint to be an antitrust violation on the merits.
This is the type of error with which the Court implicitly has been most
concerned. Type B error results when a court erroneously concludes that
a state did not intend a restraint that it in fact did intend. The loss
associated with this type of error is the impairment of the policy the
state wanted to pursue, discounted by the probability that the court

296. Thus, a given test may decrease the probability that an unintended restraint will
be erroneously immunized while increasing the probability that an intended restraint will
be erroneously deemed subject to the antitrust laws. Ideally, an evidentiary test will
decrease the probability of both types of error, though potentially in differing amounts.
Further, there is no reason to assume that the loss associated with an erroneous immunization is related to the loss associated with an erroneous failure to immunize. It is
safe to assume that the Supreme Court views an erroneous immunization as substantially
more dangerous than a mistaken failure to immunize. This probably has to do with a
federal court's bias in favor of federal policies.
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would have upheld the restraint against antitrust attack on the merits.
Thus, the expected cost of error without the test equals the probability
of type A error if the test is not used multiplied by its associated cost
(the expected cost of type A error) plus the probability of type B error
if the test is not used multiplied by its associated cost (the expected
cost of type B error). Any rule established to determine intent serves
both as an analysis of past conduct and a signal to influence future
behavior. The test should work to decrease the probability of error and,
at the limit, to eliminate it entirely. The test is justified if the reduction
in the expected cost of error produced by the test exceeds the cost of
compliance, defined as any cost that would not have been incurred
except to satisfy the evidentiary test. In symbols, the test is justified if:
A Pa La + Pb Lb > C
Where: Pa Probability that a court will erroneously find intent.
La Discounted loss caused by erroneously immunizing the
restraint.
Pb Probability that a court will erroneously find no intent.
Lb Discounted loss caused by erroneously withholding immunity.
297
C Cost to the state of complying with the evidentiary test.
It is obvious that as the cost of compliance drops, the reduction in the
expected cost of error that will justify the test decreases as well. Thus,
if the cost of complying with an evidentiary test is very low, even a
very small decrease in the expected cost of error will justify the test.
If a test is not justified, but is imposed nevertheless, some form of
loss will result. Suppose a state intends to immunize a restraint and the
requirement has been established. The state will compare the cost of
compliance with the certain discounted loss caused by the erroneous
withholding of immunity (type B error). It will know that by failing to
satisfy the test, immunity will be withheld. Thus, the probability of type
B error approaches 100%. Further, there is no probability of type A
error, since for present purposes, it can be assumed that it imposes no
cost on a state to fail to comply with the evidentiary test. Put another
way, if the state does nothing, it will not satisfy the test. By hypothesis,
the court will not grant immunity and type A error, therefore, cannot
occur. The state will fulfill the requirement if the loss caused by the

297. This analysis assumes that the imposition of an evidentiary test would reduce the
probability of error. Theoretically, it could increase the probability instead. For this reason,
the change in probability of error (A P) should be defined as the probability of error
without the test minus the probability or error with the test (Po - Pt). If the test
increases the probability of either type or both types of error, the net change in the
expected cost of error may be a negative number. No positive cost of compliance could
justify an increase in the expected cost of error.
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absence of immunity exceeds the cost of compliance. In symbols, the
state will comply if:
Lb > C
Whether or not the reduction in the total expected cost of error
exceeds the cost of compliance, the state may or may not comply with
any test adopted. If the reduction in total expected cost of error is less
than the cost of compliance, however, but the test is adopted anyway,
and the state complies, the economic loss occasioned by the test will
equal the difference between the reduction in total expected error cost
and the cost of compliance (C - A Pa La + A Pb Lb). If the state
does not comply, the economic loss will equal the actual loss occasioned
by the erroneous failure to find immunity (Lb).
A numerical example might help clarify this, but by no means do
I intend to suggest that numerical values can easily be determined for
these variables. Conversely, however, I do not believe that precise numerical values need be assigned for this analysis to yield fruitful conclusions. Suppose a state wants to immunize a restraint and the steps
necessary to satisfy an evidentiary test of intent cost $300. Without the
test, the probability of the court erroneously finding intent is 5%, and
the loss that would be caused is $10,000; the probability of the court
erroneously withholding intent is 10%, and the loss that would be
imposed is $1,000. Finally, compliance with the test will reduce the
probability of error to zero.
Thus:
A Pa La + A Pb Lb > C
(.05 - 0) 10,000 + (.10 - 0) 1,000 > 300
(.05) 10,000 + (.10) 1,000 > 300
500 + 100 > 300
600 > 300
The test is warranted because the reduction in the total expected cost
of error produced by the test ($600) exceeds the cost of compliance
($300). Further, the state will comply with the test because the cost of
compliance ($300) is less than the actual cost that would be imposed
by the withholding of immunity, Lb ($1,000).
Now suppose that the reduction in expected cost of error remains
the same, but the cost of compliance increases, such that Pa = 5wo;
La = $10,000; Pb = 10%; Lb $1,000; but C = $800. Because the
cost of compliance ($800) exceeds the reduction in total expected cost
of error ($600), the test should not be adopted. If it is adopted, the
state will comply, since the cost of compliance is less than the certain
cost of the erroneous withholding of immunity, Lb ($1,000). The economic loss caused by imposing the test is $200 (cost of compliance
minus the reduction in total expected cost of error).298 Suppose that:
298.

It is tempting to assume that the benefit to the state of not adopting the test is
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Pa = 5010; La = $10,000; Pa = 10%; but Lb
= $500; and
C
$800. Again, the test should not be imposed because the cost of
compliance ($800) exceeds the reduction in total expected cost of error
($550). But in this case, if it is adopted, the state will not comply,
since the cost of compliance ($800) is greater than the certain cost of
type B error ($500).299
Finally, assume that: Pa = 501; La= $10,000; but Pb = 5001;
Lb = $200; and C = $300. Here, the test is justified ($600 > $300),
but the state will not comply, because the cost of compliance ($300)
exceeds the certain cost of type B error ($200). The result is efficient,
however, because the loss that would be borne without the test exceeds
the loss imposed by the impairment of the policy the state wanted to
pursue.
This analysis could be refined in various ways, but it is adequate
for present purposes. 3°° One question it poses that will be discussed at

$700. But this assumption is incorrect. With the test, the state incurs a cost of $800.
Without the test, the state will take all those measures of demonstrating intent such that
the sum of the costs of those measures plus the remaining expected cost of type B error
is minimized. Notice that as each additional measure is taken, the probability of error
decreases. The upper limit on this amount is the expected cost of type B error when cost
is incurred specifically to demonstrate intent, Pb Lb. Here, Pb Lb = $100. Thus, by
not adopting the test, the state will save no less than $700, but could save more.
299. These illustrations indicate that if no evidentiary test is adopted, the state will
incur a cost equal to the sum of the costs of measures demonstrating intent plus the
expected cost of the remaining error, up to a maximum of the expected cost of type B
error given no costs incurred to demonstrate intent (Pb Lb). The benefit to the state of
not adopting the test is the difference between this amount and the lesser of the cost of
compliance (C) and the loss associated with certain type B error (Lb). This result, however,
overstates the benefit of rejecting the test because it is based on the assumption that the
state intends the restraint. A state may intend not to authorize a restraint. With the test,
the state incurs no cost of compliance and no expected cost of error. Without the test,
the state will have to incur some cost. The maximum amount of that cost will be the
probability of type A error multiplied by the proportion of the loss associated with type
A error that the state will bear: Pa(X La), where X equals the percentage of type A loss
suffered by the state. Notice that type A loss involves needless injury to consumer welfare,
and some of this injury will be suffered out of state. The state will take those steps of
indicating that it does not intend the restraint such that the sum of the costs of those
measures plus the remaining expected cost of type A error is minimized. However small
the cost imposed on a state that intends not to authorize a restraint by virtue of the
absence of the evidentiary test, it is a cost not borne by the state if the test is adopted,
and this cost must be subtracted form the gross benefit in expressing affirmative intent
to measure the net benefit to the state. If the test is not justified on the basis of social
cost, the net benefit to the state of not having the test will certainly be positive. If the
test is justified, the state might still be better off without the test if the number of state
action controversies is skewed toward instances in which the state does intend the restraint,
or the state's interest in demonstrating the absence of intent is typically small.
300. For instance, this model assumes only two actors - the state and consumers
generally, whose interests are protected by the federal court enforcing the antitrust laws.
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some length later is the class to which the analysis should be applied.3 0'
Because the issue concerns the adoption of an evidentiary test, the
analysis cannot be case specific and should be used to assess the desirability of each proposed evidentiary test. But each proposed test could
be compared with some assumed average of all antitrust cases involving
state action. In other words, the cost of a test would be compared with
average probabilities of error and associated losses for all state action
cases. However, the analysis could be applied to sub-classes of state
action cases, and depending upon the results, any given evidentiary test
would be adopted or rejected. For instance, the loss associated with
type A error could be estimated separately for cases involving Sherman
Act § 1, § 2, and Clayton Act § 7 violations. It could be estimated
separately for price-fixing, tying arrangement, and boycott cases. It could
be estimated separately for private and public defendants.
In general, the potential loss occasioned by type A error might vary
based on the violation alleged or the identity of the defendant. For any
sub-class selected, a given evidentiary test may or may not be justified,
and would or would not be adopted. To generalize again, applying the
analysis to sub-classes of state action cases will be warranted only to
the extent that sub-classes are easily identifiable. If the analysis is used
to establish an evidentiary test in one sub-class and not another, but it
is unclear to which sub-class the defendant belongs, the costs and benefits
of compliance will be uncertain. The Court so far has not varied the
evidentiary tests it has adopted on the basis of the restraint alleged,
but it has recently varied the application of a test on the basis of the
identity of the defendant. 0 2
A requirement for immunity that a challenged restraint be clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, if ever justifiable,
might be supportable on this basis. One could argue that if the state
has clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy in favor of
the restraint, there is little probability that the state did not intend to
authorize the conduct. Further, the cost of fulfilling the requirement is
minimal. This argument, however, misses the point and contains a
questionable assumption. The issue is not the probability of error with
the test, but the increase in accuracy produced by the test relative to
the risk of error absent the test. These are the differences, weighted by
the associated losses, that must be compared to the cost of compliance.
Without raising the existence of a clear state policy to the level of a

If private parties are authorized to engage in a restraint and are potentially liable for
antitrust violations, they become a third actor. Part of the cost of complying with an
evidentiary test will be borne by them directly, rather than by the state, but their interest
in complying is different from that of the state.
301. See infra notes 404-10 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 399-408 and accompanying text.
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requirement, it would still most certainly be probative of the state's
intent. Indeed, if a clear and affirmatively expressed state policy does
exist, it should be conclusive proof that the state intended the restraint.3 3
But the converse should not be true - if there is no clearly articulated
state policy, it should not be conclusive proof that the state did not
intend the activity. 3°0 The question is whether the probability of an
erroneous determination of intent without using the clear state policy
standard as determinative, but using any clear state policy as well as
all other evidence of intent as indicative, is significantly less than the
probability of error given the test. What answer an empirical study
would give is uncertain, but intuitively, it seems that the test would
yield a slight marginal increase in accuracy.
Against this slight increase in accuracy must be balanced the cost
of the requirement. Though this might appear minimal, that appearance
is deceptive. For one thing, determining what activities might be deemed
anticompetitive, thereby requiring a clear state policy, poses costly information problems, given uncertainty in the substantive contours of
antitrust law. For another, articulating a clear state policy must entail
some cost, otherwise states would not authorize anticompetitive activity
in any other way. Balanced against the potentially minimal cost of
compliance, however, would be the virtual absence of any increase in
the accuracy of the intent determination. Even if the loss associated
with error were assumed to be very high, a positive cost of compliance
would exceed a zero marginal gain in the expected cost of error.310

303. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
304. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. The efficiency advantage to the state
of making the existence of a clear state policy conclusive of intent, relative to considering
the policy merely to be evidence of intent, is the remaining expected cost of type B error
given the policy as evidence. If a state clearly expresses and affirmatively articulates a
policy in favor of a restraint, there is little chance that its intent will be misconstrued.
But there is some chance.
305. The standard that private conduct that is the likely consequence of the way in
which a state acts is an evidentiary test as well, because inferring state intent from state
actions poses some risks of underinclusion and overinclusion. See supra, notes 165-69 and
accompanying text. In other words, the operative standard proposed in this article, that
private conduct is immune if it is the likely consequence of the way in which the state
acts, is not a perfect measure of state intent. This standard, however, unlike the clear
state policy test, is justified. What the standard implies is that the state must assume the
cost of acting in a way that it would not otherwise act to eliminate the probability of
being misunderstood. This cost, however, will probably be miniscule. On the average, it
will certainly be less than the cost of articulating an affirmative policy, because the state
could always satisfy the likely consequence standard by expressing an affirmative policy,
but in some circumstances, it could satisfy the standard by less costly behavior as well.
On the other side of the equation, there is no other practical way to discern intent than
through actions. Therefore, the likely consequence standard will provide a substantial
increase in the accuracy of determining intent and, therefore, produce a large benefit in
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Of course, this discussion suggests only that in some cases, the cost
of complying with the clear state policy test is not justified by the
reduction in the expected cost of error. The discussion does not prove
that for all state action cases, or for an identifiable sub-class, the test
is unwarranted. The test may be justified, but that conclusion is by no
means self-evident. Further, it bears repeating that none of this discussion is intended to disparage the importance of a clear state policy
in determining a state's intent. Ordinarily, a clearly articulated policy
will be the strongest evidence of intent, and a state will know that if
it chooses not to employ this method of demonstrating intent, it will
run a greater risk of being misunderstood. The proponent of immunity,
with the burden of proving intent, may fail. But the case for wholly
taking this choice away from the state is weak.
However weak the case for requiring a clearly articulated state policy,
the argument for requiring active state supervision is immeasurably weaker.
If a state is actually supervising a restraint, the inference that the state
intends to authorize what it is observing and permitting to continue is
reasonable. 3° Thus, the existence of active supervision may be probative
of intent. The question, however, is whether the marginal benefit of a
supervision requirement in decreasing the expected cost of error exceeds
the cost of compliance, especially, but not only if, the existence of a
clear state policy is made a separate requirement. On the benefit side,
it would seem that active supervision would have almost no effect on
the expected cost of error if a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy authorizes the activity, or the state has otherwise
acted to make the activity a likely consequence. In other words, if a
state has clearly and affirmatively expressed its policy or otherwise made
its policy known, the probability of erroneously determining intent is
close to nonexistent. If that probability is near zero, no other indicator
of intent could lower it significantly.

lowering the expected costs of error. This benefit is far greater than the slight benefit,
if any, that would be produced by the clear policy requirement. In sum, the cost of
complying with the likely consequence standard is lower than the cost of complying with
the clear policy requirement, and the benefit produced by it is greater.
This analysis assumes that clearly articulating and affirmatively expressing a policy
requires something more than merely acting in such a way that the private conduct is a
likely consequence, as the formulation of the clear policy criterion seems to suggest. The
Court, however, has recently indicated that the clear policy standard may have a meaning
close to, if not identical with, the likely consequence standard. See infra notes 411-14
and accompanying text. If the tests are synonymous, of course, the clear policy standard
would be fully justified.
306. Of course, the fact that a firm is subject to ongoing regulatory oversight does
not necessarily mean that the state is observing and permitting any particular activity
challenged.
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The Court has never really explained what purpose it believes the
active supervision requirement serves, except that the Court has finally
recognized that the requirement "serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged
conduct pursuant to state policy." 3°0 In fact, active supervision does
have some marginal benefit, relative to a clear state policy alone, in
reducing the probability of erroneously determining intent, but only if
intent is understood broadly. Intent must be defined to include not only
the state's initial intent to authorize the challenged conduct, but also
its continuing intent to authorize the restraint as it is carried out and
felt in practice. A clear state policy is an almost infallible indicator that
the state initially intended to authorize the restraint, but its relevance
to the state's continuing intent with respect to the restraint as it is
carried out is only indirect. 3°0 Active supervision serves two additional,
specific purposes. First, the state could change its intent because, at the

time of initial authorization, it did not anticipate or fully comprehend
the effects that the authorized conduct would have. Second, the actors
authorized to engage in anticompetitive activities may exceed the bounds
of the authorization. The restraint as authorized would not be the
restraint as practiced. In both cases, active state supervision would
facilitate corrective action, either by the state rescinding authorization
and thereby expressing a new intent or by prosecuting the unauthorized
conduct. Either action would reduce the potential cost of immunity. Of
course, corrective action could be taken even if there were no supervision.

307. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. at 1720, discussed infra at
notes 385-423 and accompanying text. In SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985), the Court
attempted to explain the value of the supervision requirement by quoting the Areeda and
Turner treatise: "[The] active supervision requirement ensures that a state's actions will
immunize the anticompetitive conduct of private parties only when the 'state has demonstrated its commitment to a program, through its exercise of regulatory oversight.' See
I P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law § 213a, p. 73 (1978)." Id. at 1729 n.23 (emphasis
added). Though the Areeda and Turner treatise is truly extraordinary, I have always been
puzzled by this statement. If by "commitment to a program," the authors mean merely
intent to authorize a program, then we are talking about the same thing-active supervision
is evidence of intent, and the analysis in the text applies. If, however, they mean some
heightened level of state dedication to a program, then there is no basis for the underlying
requirement that active supervision allegedly demonstrates. Federalism is not implicated
only when states have a particularly strong taste for the policy that conflicts with federal
law. It is implicated whenever a state adopts a conflicting policy, however passionate or
tepid its attachment to the program. And no one has suggested that the Congress of
1890 expected the existence of an implied state action exemption to turn on the degree
of affection the state has for its policy.
308. There is a reasonable inference that the state understands the effects of its actions.
The fact that a state expresses a clear policy in favor of particular conduct is indirect
evidence that it intends to authorize the conduct as it actually is undertaken and experienced.
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If a state that incorrectly estimated the consequences of its authorization
would be moved to rescind its authorization given better information,
the political process should work to provide that information and encourage remedial action. If an authorized actor exceeds the scope of
authorization, that information would eventually be disseminated, and
the state, as prosecutor, or injured private parties could be expected to
seek remedial action through the judicial process. The benefit of state
supervision is simply that corrective action might be taken more quickly
than without that supervision.
This benefit appears minimal and may be more theoretical than real.
A tremendous cost is balanced against this marginal decrease in the
expected cost of error. The Court has never fully explained what is
necessary to satisfy the active state supervision standard. One way to
justify the requirement would be to construe it very loosely, so that
any superficial oversight would suffice. But it appears that, by active
supervision, the Court means something akin to public utility regulation.1 9 The literature over the last twenty-five years has demonstrated
that the direct costs of regulation are immense. 10° Further, regulation
imposes indirect costs, perhaps even greater than its direct costs by
weakening the traditional defenses of the consumer.3"
It is incredible that the remote benefit of state supervision, as
apparently understood by the Court, could exceed its staggering cost,
whether supervision were required alone, in addition to a clear state
policy, or in addition to some other requirement. The proper analysis
is that state supervision should never be required, but potentially could
be probative of intent. Supervision, however, is not nearly as probative
of intent as is a clear state policy. A clear state policy in favor of a
restraint obviously discloses at least the state's initial intent toward the

309. For instance, in Midcal, the Court wrote, "The state neither establishes prices
nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of
fair trade contracts. The state does not monitor market conditions or engage in any
'pointed reexamination' of the program." 445 U.S. at 105-06, 100 S. Ct. at 943. This
passage fairly describes many of the functions of utility commissions. It may also suggest
that the Court perceives the benefit of active supervision as demonstrating the state's
continuing intent to authorize the restraint as it exists in practice, but this may be wishful
thinking.
For a description of the authority typically possessed by state regulatory commissions,
see W. Jones, supra note 229, at 39-44; 1 A. Priest, Principles of Public Utility Regulations
31-33 (1969).
310. See, e.g., J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics,
Technology, and Policy 74-82 (1960); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 31; Posner, Theories
of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. Management Sci. 335 (1974); Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. Management Sci. 3 (1971); Stigler & Friedland,
What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1962).
311. See, e.g., Cohen & Stigler, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect Consumers? 6-17
(Regulation 1971).
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activity; a state generally regulating the activities of an actor may not
even be aware that the actor is engaging in the specific conduct challenged
as a restraint. For this reason, the existence of active supervision, unlike
the existence of a clear state policy, should not be conclusive of affirmative intent, and any court confronted with the claim that supervision
demonstrates intent should study the assertion discerningly.
I.

Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder

In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,1 2 the Court
returned to the issue of state action immunity for municipalities. Colorado is a constitutional "home rule" state; the state constitution grants
cities the power to exercise "the full right of self-government in both
local and municipal matters."3 ' In 1964, Boulder granted the predecessor
of Community Communications Co. ("CCC") a non-exclusive, 20-year
permit to provide cable television service within the city limits. 31 4 The
company instituted service to one area of Boulder, representing 2070 of
the population, which was geographically unable to obtain broadcast
signals.3" 5 By the late 1970's, cable technology had advanced tremendously so that many additional services were feasible. 1 6 CCC notified
the city in May, 1979, that it intended to expand its area of service to
other geographic regions within the city.3" 7 At the same time, a competing
cable company expressed an interest in obtaining a non-exclusive permit.3"' Fearing that CCC's expansion would preclude other firms, which
could potentially offer better service, from entering the market, Boulder
enacted an emergency ordinance prohibiting CCC from expanding into
new areas of the city for a period of three months. 1 9 During that period,
the city intended to draft a new cable ordinance and invite new cable
firms to enter the Boulder market. 31 °
CCC sought a preliminary injunction from the district court preventing implementation of the moratorium ordinance, claiming that the
city, by imposing the restriction, would violate § I of the Sherman
Act. 32' The district court granted the injunction, holding that state action

312.
313.
314.

455 U.S. 40, 102 S. Ct.
Id. at 43, 102 S. Ct, at
Id. at 44, 102 S. Ct. at
315. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 837.
316. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 837.
317. Id.at 45, .102 S. Ct. at
318. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 837.

835 (1982).
836-37.
837.

837.

319.

Id. at 45 n.6, 45-46, 102 S. Ct. at 837-38 n.6, 837-38.

320.

Id. at 46, 102 S. Ct. at 838.

321.

Id. at 46-47, 102 S. Ct. at 838.
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immunity was wholly inapplicable.122 The Tenth Circuit reversed, but
the Supreme Court, in a five to three decision, reversed, in turn, agreeing
with the district court's conclusion.3 23
The result in City of Boulder
was certainly presaged by the Court's decision in City of Lafayette. For
state action purposes, the only potentially significant difference between
the two cases was that Colorado, unlike Louisiana, was a constitutional
home rule state. It was possible, therefore, that because the explicit
grant of governmental powers to Boulder constituted a sufficiently greater
delegation of authority than that bestowed on Lafayette, Boulder's actions automatically enjoyed state action immunity. 324 The Court rejected
the possibility.
City of Boulder is in part significant because it appears to place
municipalities on a lower state action plateau than legitimate state agencies. Recall that in Cantor, had the Michigan Public Service Commission
clearly expressed and affirmatively articulated a policy in favor of the
light-bulb program, the activity might have been immunized. 325 The
disinterested agency, acting within the scope of its delegated authority,
would be empowered to speak for the state. By contrast, the City of
Boulder, acting within the scope of its delegated power, was not deemed
qualified to articulate a state policy. If this distinction is justifiable,
perhaps the reason is that a municipality possesses greater independence
from the legislative and executive branches of state government than
other kinds of state agencies. Because the city is more removed from
the branches of state government than are other state agencies, its policies
are less obviously those of the state.
The City of Boulder should have been treated exactly like a state
for state action purposes, so that it should have been able to acquire
immunity simply by engaging in the challenged conduct. If a city is to
be treated like a private party, however, then the Court was undoubtedly
correct in finding that the state had not acted in such a way that the
32 6
particular anticompetitive conduct challenged was a likely consequence.

322. Id. at 47, 102 S. Ct. at 838-39. The plaintiff also claimed that the city and the
competing cable company that had expressed an interest in obtaining a permit were engaged
in a conspiracy "to restrict competition by substituting" the competing company for CCC.
Id. at 47 n.9, 102 S. Ct. at 838 n.9. The district court held that the evidence was
insufficient to establish a probability that CCC would prevail on this claim. Id., 102 S.
Ct. at 838 n.9. Thus, this issue was not considered on appeal.
323. Id. at 47-48, 102 S. Ct. at 839.
324. For purposes of the opinion, the Court assumed that the enactment of the
moratorium ordinance fell within Boulder's home rule powers. Id. at 53 n.16, 102 S. Ct.
at 841 n.16.
325. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
326. For purposes of the opinion, of course, the Court had to assume that the ordinance
constituted an antitrust violation. It is ironic, however, that the Court used City of
Boulder, a case in which the city's conduct was patently pro-competitive, to further
elucidate its conservative approach to municipal immunity.
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The Court's rationale, though, is important. The Court said that a
plurality in City of Lafayette had required that a municipality's challenged conduct be pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy.32 7 That standard, according to the Court, was
adopted by a majority in Orrin W. Fox and Midcal.12 It therefore
applies in City of Boulder, where the court held it had not been satisfied. 29 This analysis suggests that the clear state policy test applies in
exactly the same way to cities as it does to other parties claiming
immunity, for neither Orrin W. Fox nor Midcal involved municipal
conduct. It also suggests that the rationale for the standard accepted in
City of Lafayette, that a clear policy demonstrate that the state contemplated the restraint challenged, underlies the requirement as applied
to private parties as well as cities, contrary to the intimation in City
of Lafayette that state contemplation is a sufficient requirement for
immunity only in municipality cases.330
By the time City of Boulder was decided, Justice Stewart, who had
been a strong dissenting voice in Cantor and City of Lafayette, had
retired from the Court. 3 ' The banner of the dissent was taken up by
Justice Rehnquist, who authored his first state action opinion. Justice
Rehnquist began by distinguishing between preemption and exemption:
preemption applies when the enactments of two different sovereigns
conflict, whereas exemption applies when the enactments of a single
sovereign conflict.33 2 State action issues, according to Justice Rehnquist,
involve preemption, not exemption.33 3 What purpose is served by drawing
this distinction is not obvious. True, the presumption in exemption cases
may be in favor of the antitrust laws, whereas in state action cases, at
least the Court professes that the presumption will tip toward the conflicting state law. 334 But both doctrines turn fundamentally on Congressional intent. In exemption cases, the Court must determine whether
Congress intended to expressly or impliedly authorize or command conduct that would otherwise violate a statute. If so, the conduct is exempt
from the strictures of the statute. In state action cases, the Court must

327. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51, 102 S. Ct. at 840.
328. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 841. The Court pointed out that a majority of the Court in
Midcal had adopted a second requirement as well-active state supervision. Id. at 51
n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.14. The Court said that because Boulder had not satisfied the
clear state policy test, it did not have to decide the issue of whether a city must also
satisfy the active supervision test. Id., 102 S. Ct. at 841 n.14.
329. Id. at 52, 102 S. Ct. at 841.

330.

See supra note 252 and accompanying text.

331.
332.
333.
334.

See 453 U.S. VII, 101 S. Ct. 14 (1981).
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 61, 102 S. Ct. at 845-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 62, 102 S. Ct. at 846.
See id. at 61-62, 102 S. Ct. at 846. See also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying
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determine whether Congress intended the antitrust laws to apply to
conduct authorized, commanded, or undertaken by a state. It seems

accurate to describe an instance of state action immunity as one in
which Congress impliedly intended to exempt the conduct from the

antitrust laws.
The exemption/preemption distinction does serve one useful purpose,
but even this purpose should not be overstated. If an anticompetitive

state law or municipal ordinance is preempted, presumably the governmental body does not violate the federal law that preempts it; the law
or ordinance simply loses efficacy. 3" A state or municipality cannot
violate the antitrust laws by its enactments, and therefore, the issue of

remedies disappears.33 6 This analysis may be helpful for alleged antitrust
violations by governmental bodies. It does not, however, resolve the

issue of remedies for private parties whose claims of state action immunity are rejected. It the state law from which they seek protection
against antitrust attack is deemed preempted, they no longer are shielded

and presumably could violate the antitrust laws.
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that municipal ordinances should be treated
like state statutes for state action purposes, and that preemption, rather
than exemption, analysis should be applied to both.337 The question
becomes one of when these official enactments should be preempted.
Justice Rehnquist answered that the enactment should be preempted
unless it satisfies the Midcal criteria: "the ordinance survives if it is
enacted pursuant to an affirmative policy on the part of the city to

restrain competition and if the city actively supervises and implements
'
this policy." 338
The deficiencies in the Midcal criteria have already been
33 9
discussed.
There is another difficulty with Justice Rehnquist's answer,
though. The Midcal criteria, however deficient, make logical sense when

335. See id. at 64, 68, 102 S. Ct. at 847-48, 849-50. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring
opinion in which he specifically disputed the dissent on this issue. It appears that he
missed Justice Rehnquist's point. Justice Stevens read the dissent
as arguing that the
majority had determined that Boulder had violated the antitrust laws. Id. at 58, 102 S.
Ct. at 844. (Stevens, J., concurring). In fact, he pointed out, the Court did not decide
whether a violation had been committed, and the decision ultimately might be in the
city's favor. Id. at 59-60, 102 S. Ct. at 844-45. Justice Rehnquist's point, however, was
that an antitrust violation by a governmental entity in enacting law should be impossible;
that a city might be held not to have violated the antitrust laws on the merits in any
given case is not enough.
336. The possibility of imposing damage liability on municipalities was still present
and troubling when City of Boulder was decided. See id. at 56 n.20, 102 S. Ct. at 84344 n.20; id. at 65 n.2, 102 S. Ct. at 848 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Local
Government Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), prohibiting the
imposition of damage liability on cities, was not enacted until 1984.
337. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69-70, 102 S. Ct. at 850-51.
338. Id. at 69, 102 S. Ct. at 850.
339. See supra notes 294-311 and accompanying text.
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applied to anticompetitive conduct of private parties who claim authorization from a state or local government. 40 The private conduct can
be undertaken pursuant to a clear state policy and can be supervised
by the state. They make little sense when the activities of the governmental body itself are alone challenged under the antitrust laws. For
instance, if the moratorium ordinance in City of Boulder constituted a
restraint, it would be unusual to require the city to expressly state a
policy in favor of what it obviously was doing, and would be bizarre
to require the city to supervise itself while it was doing it.
Perhaps
by referring to the supervision requirement as one satisfied when the
city supervises "and implements" a policy-an addition to the standard
as expressed in Midcal-Justice Rehnquist meant to suggest that a governmental body could satisfy the supervision test by undertaking the
anticompetitive activity itself. And perhaps he would find the clear state
policy test automatically satisfied when the conduct challenged is that
of the governmental entity. But this matter is largely one of speculation.
In fact, no matter who the defendant is, the issue for state action
immunity should be whether the governmental body intended to engage
in or permit the conduct challenged as a restraint. When the restraint
is a self-executing act of the government so that, for instance, the
restraint is a requirement that marine pilots have licenses or a prohibition
on expansion by a cable television company, the conclusion is inescapable
that the governmental body intended the restraint.14'
J.

Hoover v. Ronwin

In Hoover v. Ronwin,3 42 decided two years after City of Boulder,
the Arizona Supreme Court established a committee of attorneys to
examine and recommend applicants for admission to the state bar.3 43
The court's rules specified subjects on which applicants were to be
examined and required the committee to file with the court prior to the
examination the formula it intended to use in grading the examination. '
The committee ultimately was directed to submit a list of candidates
recommended for admission, but "only the court had authority to admit
or deny admission." ' 3' A rejected applicant was entitled to petition the
court for and to receive individualized review. 34

340. Justice Rehnquist did recognize that the Midcal criteria do apply to private parties
claiming authorization from state or local governments. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 69
n.5, 102 S. Ct. at 850 n.5.
341. See supra note 17.
342. 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984).
343. Id.at 1991.
344. Id.at 1992.
345. Id.
346. Id.at 1992-93.
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Ronwin failed the bar examination, was not recommended for admission by the committee, and was not admitted." 7 He filed a petition
with the state supreme court to review the manner in which the committee
conducted and graded the examination. That petition, and two subsequent petitions for rehearing, were denied.3 48 Ronwin then brought an
antitrust suit against members of the committee, alleging that they "had
set the grading scale on the ... examination with reference to the
number of new attorneys they thought desirable, rather than with ref3 49
erence to some 'suitable' level of competence.
The district court granted a motion to dismiss in part on the ground
that the defendants' conduct was protected by the state action doctrine,
and the Ninth Circuit reversed.350 In a four to three decision, with
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor not participating,"' the Supreme Court
reversed again, holding that the challenged restraint, even though alleged
to be the conduct of the bar committee, was really the action of the
state supreme court and was, therefore, immune under the state action
doctrine."'
The Court explained that when conduct constituting a restraint is
that of the state itself, the conduct is automatically immune.5 The
requirements of clear articulation and active supervision are inapplicable;
those requirements apply only when the conduct constituting the challenged restraint is that of private parties, or state representatives, who
claim immunity on the basis of some action of the state.35 4 The question
in Ronwin, then, was whether the restraint challenged consisted of actions
taken by the state supreme court." Of course, the plaintiff did not sue

347. Id. at 1993.
348. Id. He then filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,
which was denied. Id.
349. Id. at 1994.
350. Id.
351. Id.at 2003.
352. Id. at 1995, 1998.
353. Id.at 1995-96, 1998, 2001.
354. Id.at 1995-96.
355. The Court pointed out that Parker held that the legislature acts for the state,
and that Bates held that "a state supreme court, when acting in a legislative capacity,
occupies the same position as that of a state legislature." Id. at 1995. The Court emphasized
its reading of Bates by observing, "Therefore, a decision of a state supreme court, acting
legislatively rather than judicially, is exempt from Sherman Act liability as state action."
Id. Curiously, the Court appears to imply that a judicial action of a state supreme court
would not be exempt from antitrust attack. What basis there is in the concept of federalism
for distinguishing between the judicial and legislative actions of a state court is difficult
to fathom. It would seem that the judicial actions of the judicial branch of government
obviously would constitute state action for antitrust purposes, and that the significance
of Bates is that the legislative actions of the judiciary may also constitute state conduct.
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the Arizona supreme court; he sued members of the bar committee,
and Goldfarb had clearly held that a bar committee occupies the position
of a private party in state action analysis.35 6 But the Court found that
"the conduct that Ronwin challenge[d] was in reality that of the Arizona
Supreme Court."1357 The Court found Bates controlling and concluded:
"As in Bates 'the real party in interest"' was the state court. 5 The
Court was ambiguous about exactly what conduct on the part of the
state court constituted the challenged restraint. The Court referred to
various actions by the state court as relevant or determinative. The
Arizona court: 1) approved the particular grading formula used by the
committee;35 9 2) retained sole authority to determine who should be
admitted to the practice of law; 36° 3) knew and approved the number
of applicants admitted; 36' 4) decided to deny Ronwin admission to the
bar;3 62 5) retained strict supervisory powers over the committee and
ultimate full authority over its actions;3 63 and 6) provided individual
review for aggrieved applicants. 364 The state court's conduct can most
simply be viewed as comprising three distinct actions-the court approved the grading formula used by the committee; it admitted applicants
and, at least tacitly, rejected applicants; and it provided review of adverse
determinations. The Court's reasoning is simply not clear as to whether
any one of these actions, a particular combination, or all three were
necessary to its finding that the challenged restraint was conduct of the
Justice Stevens dissented. He admitted that "if the
state court.
challenged conduct were that of the court, it would be immune under
Parker.''363 He concluded, however, that the challenged conduct was
"the decision to place an artificial limit on the number of lawyers,"
and that decision was made by the committee, not by the state supreme
court. 36 He appeared to argue that an action of a private party becomes
the conduct of the state only when the sovereign requires the private

This is not, however, what the Court implies.
The Court also expressly reserved "the issue whether the Governor of a State stands
in the same-position as the state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state
action doctrine." Id. at 1995 n.17. The question is discussed infra at notes 499-502 and
accompanying text.
356. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
357. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1998.
358. Id. at 1999.
359. Id. at 1998.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 1999 n.28.
362. Id. at 2000 n.30.
363. Id. at 1997.
364. Id. at 1998.
365. Id. at 2006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
366. Id.
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act, citing Goldfarb and Bates. 67 Justice Stevens pointed out that the
court's approval of the grading formula implied no assent to the committee's conduct because the information provided to the court did not
disclose that the committee would score the examination to admit a
predetermined number of applicants, as Ronwin alleged. 36 The provision
for judicial review of adverse determinations was immaterial, according
to Justice Stevens, because the Arizona cases demonstrated that only
aggrieved applicants who had passed the bar examination but were denied
admission received an individualized review and independent decision by
the state supreme court. The court made no independent decision on
review of a petition by an applicant, like Ronwin, who failed the
examination. 6 9 The only conduct remaining deemed relevant by the
majority was the court's action in actually admitting or denying admission to applicants. Justice Stevens, however, found "nothing in the
record to indicate that the court ever made" a decision to deny Ronwin's
application for admission.3 70 Apparently, Justice Stevens believed that
the action constituting the restraint was the decision to restrict the
number of applicants admitted based on competitive considerations, and
the state court never made that decision. Of course, the majority's
response was that the committee never made that decision either, because
it did not have the power to admit applicants. At most, the committee
could have decided to restrict the number of applicants recommended
to the court for admission.
Ronwin is a troubling case, and the majority and dissenting opinions
were less than inspired. The majority adopts an analysis that might be
called the antitrust analog of the tort doctrine of proximate cause. Where
several actions are causes-in-fact of an anticompetitive effect, the Court
will select the proximate cause from among them and attribute the
restraint to that actor for state action purposes. 7 ' If the proximate actor

367. Id. at 2006-07. Later in his dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the requirement
of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy favoring the restraint. Id.
at 2009. Justice Stevens apparently would find the clear state policy requirement satisfied
only when the state requires the challenged conduct, contrary to the Court's decision in
SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. 1721, 1728 (1985). Justice Stevens made it clear that this was his
position in SMCRC, id. at 1735-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting). SMCRC is discussed infra
at notes 424-62 and accompanying text.
368. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 2010 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 2008 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 2008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
371. Perhaps the best general explanation of the proximate cause doctrine is contained
in W. Prosser &W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 263-321 (5th ed. 1984). Professors Prosser
and Keaton define a "cause in fact" as any action, omission, or condition which so far
contributed to a result that the result would not have occured without it. Id. at 264-65.
Courts often refer to this as "but for" causation. Id. at 265-66. The "proximate cause"
is the legally responsible cause in fact. The choice of the proximate cause is a product
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is the state, immunity follows ineluctably. If the proximate actor is a
private party, state action immunity is granted only if the requirements
of a clearly articulated state policy and active supervision are fulfilled.
Thus, in Ronwin, assuming the plaintiff's allegations were true, candidates would not have been denied admission for anticompetitive reasons
unless the bar committee based its recommendations on competitive
impact and the state court followed those recommendations in granting
and denying applications. Both the actions of the bar committee and
the supreme court were causes in fact of the restricted entry into the
bar, but the Court deemed the Arizona court to be the legally responsible
actor.
The problem'with Ronwin is not so much the result, but the way in
which the court reaches the result. The analysis it uses misdirects the focus
of inquiry in state action cases, complicates the issues needlessly, and
creates the potential for incorrect decisions. For state action immunity,
the conduct constituting the restraint must be a likely consequence of
the state action. The court ascribes to illegitimate agencies the status of
a private party, and when conduct of a private party is challenged,
therefore, there must be some causal connection running from the state
conduct to the private act. Clearly in Ronwin, there is no such connection. None of the authority delegated to the committee created a
significant probability that the committee would use its power to limit
entry based on competitive concerns. The case is analogous to Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 72 where companies claimed immunity
for an anticompetitive merger based on a state's corporation laws that
authorized stock acquisitions. In both cases, the state conferred broad
authority to engage in a class of activities, only a small percentage of
which would potentially violate antitrust laws. That kind of delegation
does not make it likely that the delegatee will engage in activities within
the tainted sub-class. 7 Of course, if the distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate agencies is abandoned, so that any agency is legally
capable of expressing an intent in favor of a restraint, then the bar

of "those more or less undefined considerations which limit liability even where the fact
of causation is clearly established." Id. at 273. It is a decision "associated with policy
- with our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands, or of
[administrative possibility and convenience]." Id. at 264.
For a recent economic analysis of causation in tort law, see Landes & Posner, Causation
in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. Legal Stud. 109 (1983).
372. 193 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436 (1904). See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying
text.
373. The case is also analogous to City of Boulder, where the state delegated to the
city extensive home-rule powers, and the city engaged in an anticompetitive activity
contained within the broad powers conferred. Granting home-rule power did not significantly increase the probability that the city would enact an anticompetitive ordinance.
See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.

1014

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

committee should have been immune in Ronwin not because the restraint
was really effected by the court, but because the committee, as the
embodiment of Arizona, clearly intended the restraint.
That the bar committee should not have been immunized under the
Court's prevailing state action doctrine, however, does not mean that
the committee's motion to dismiss should have been denied. The com74
mittee might have been immune under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine,
or more fundamentally, the committee's actions may not have constituted
an antitrust violation. The committee's conduct did increase the probability of an entry restriction. But not every act that, in combination
with other acts, produces an anticompetitive effect constitutes an antitrust
offense. Suppose, for instance, economist Smith remarks at a backyard
barbecue to his neighbor Jones, the president of Ajax Widget Company,
that if the three largest widget companies reduced their production by
15%, each would reap staggering profits. Because of the comment, Jones
thereafter solicits the agreement of his two competitors to limit output.
Certainly Smith would not have violated the antitrust laws even though
the production restriction would not have occurred but for Smith's
remark. Smith's comment increased the probability of an anticompetitive
effect, but by an infinitesimal amount, measured at the time the comment
was made. Though conduct can be said to "cause" an anticompetitive
effect whenever it increases the probability of the effect occurring, it
will not be deemed a sufficient cause to incur antitrust liability unless
the increase rises above some threshold.
The Court's analysis in Ronwin can be reconciled with this approach,
but only uncomfortably. In Ronwin, the plaintiff challenged the conduct
of the committee members. The Court employed a proximate cause
analysis to conclude that the real defendant was the state court, and
that the state is immune under Parker. The negative implication of the
Court's decision is that the committee's conduct, judged by itself, did
not violate the antitrust laws. The Court, however, should have made
this implication explicit and the focus of its decision. The proximate
cause, or "real party in interest", methodology obscures the target of
an antitrust challenge. The Court provides little guidance for determining
which is the "real party in interest", or proximate cause, when the
actions of several parties combine to produce an anticompetitive effect.
The "real" defendant should be whomever the plaintiff chooses to sue.

374. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S. Ct.
1585 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 81 S. Ct. 523 (1961). Generally, this doctrine provides that private attempts to secure
anticompetitive governmental actions, at least if the government is acting in a policymaking rather than ministerial capacity, are immune from antitrust liability. For a general
discussion of the doctrine, see I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, §§ 201-06. See
also supra notes 14 and 70.
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If it is the state, the case should be dismissed on the ground of state
action immunity, and as the Court correctly realizes, immunity should
attach "regardless of the State's motives in taking the action." 3" But
if the plaintiff sues a private party, that party's conduct should be
examined independently. If the conduct blended with the action of the
state to produce an anticompetitive effect, and the private conduct,
judged ex ante, increased the probability of the effect insignificantly,
the suit should be dismissed on the ground that the conduct challenged
does not constitute an antitrust violation rather than on the basis of
state action immunity. This result would hold unless the private party
acted with intent to bring about the anticompetitive effect, in which
case a prima facie violation would be established regardless of the
3 76
probability of producing the effect.
In Ronwin, the plaintiff's allegations indicated that the committee's
conduct substantially increased the probability of an anticompetitive
effect and was undertaken with the intent to produce that effect. Either
aspect ought to have been enough to withstand a challenge to the
sufficiency of the complaint on the merits. Even if the Court thought
otherwise, however, it should have focused on the conduct of the committee, and determined whether that conduct constituted a potential
antitrust violation; instead, the Court focused on the anticompetitive
effect, and determined which party would be held legally responsible
for that effect.
It should be noted that in state action cases, two kinds of causation
issues are involved. The first is whether any conduct of the state caused
or increased significantly the probability of conduct of the private party,
and this issue relates directly to state action immunity. If there is no
such causation, the private party cannot enjoy state action immunity.
The second issue is whether the conduct of the private party caused or
was intended to cause an anticompetitive effect. This question is not
directly pertinent to state action immunity, but rather to the merits of
the antitrust complaint. It may have particular importance in state action
cases, however, because the participation of the state in producing the
anticompetitive effect may peculiarly reduce the probability that private
conduct will have the forbidden result.
If the private conduct was not caused by the state act, but did
cause or was intended to cause an anticompetitive effect, the conduct
is not protected by the state action doctrine and does constitute a prima
facie antitrust violation. The actor may still be immune from antitrust
liability, however, under the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.377 The contours

375.
376.
377.

Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1999 n.28, 2001.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14, 70 and 374.
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of Noerr-Pennington immunity are intricate and will not be examined
here. It is clear, however, that. private conduct that prompts state conduct
which, in turn, produces an anticompetitive effect, even if the private
conduct is undertaken specifically to produce that effect, may nevertheless be immune from antitrust attack under this doctrine. If Ronwin's
complaint against the bar committee members should have been dismissed, this was probably the basis on which dismissal should have been
granted.3 78 In fact, the defendants raised the defense, but the Court
declined to consider it: "Our holding that petitioners' conduct is exempt
from liability under the Sherman Act precludes the need to address
petitioners' contention that they are immune from liability under the
'3 79
Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
One final aspect of Ronwin should be noted. All seven members
of the Court agreed that the actions of the sovereign itself are automatically immune under the state action doctrine. The majority stated
that a state's actions are exempt "regardless of the State's motives" 38°
or of whether "the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its
'
subordinate officers." 381
The dissent stated that when "the State itself
governs entry into a profession, . . . even if [its action] is specifically
designed to control output and to regulate prices, [the action] does not
violate the antitrust laws." 3 2 The dissent also flatly stated: "[Ilf the
challenged conduct were that of the court, it would be immune under
Parker." 3 This, of course, directly conflicts with the positions taken
in Cantor by Justices Stevens and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger,
all of whom participated in Ronwin. Recall that in Cantor, the Court

378. By no means is it certain that the defendants were entitled to Noerr-Pennington
immunity. The question is a difficult one that deserves separate treatment. If a party
misuses government processes to obtain an anticompetitive gomernment action, immunity
is lost. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 92 S.
Ct. 609 (1972) (a conspiracy to use government processes in such a way as to deny
competitors access to those processes and thereby achieve an anticompetitive end is not
protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). I have argued elsewhere that Noerr-Pennington immunity requires that the private party propose the anticompetitive policy to a
government body that has the power to implement or prevent the implementation of the
policy and has an interest in assessing the anticompetitive effects. See Lopatka, supra
note 6, at 630-35. If a private party manages to use government processes to secure action
that achieves an anticompetitive end, but the government actor is unaware of the reason
for its action, an appealing argument can be made that the party misused government
process.
379. Ronwin, 104 S.Ct. at 1998 n.25.
380. Id. at 2001. See also id. at 1999 n.28.
381. Id. at 1998. See also id. at 1995 ("When a state legislature adopts legislation,
its actions constitute those of the State ...and ipso facto are exempt from the operation
of the antitrust laws.") (citation to Parker omitted).
382. Id. at 2004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 2006 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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required an inquiry into the content of state policy and would have
granted immunity to what is unquestionably a state action only if the
policy is deemed sufficiently meritorious. 3 ' Whether Ronwin represents
a shift toward the contrary view espoused by Justice Stewart in Cantor,
or merely inadvertence, remains to be seen.
The Court's opinion in Ronwin was provocative, but probably produced more confusion than illumination. Perhaps because of this, the
Court accepted certiorari on two state action cases the following year
and decided both on the same day. For the most part, the cases served
as vehicles to refine the doctrine and make explicit certain principles
that had been implied. But the opinions also made independent contributions to some important aspects of state action analysis.
K.

Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire

In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,8s a Wisconsin municipality
refused to supply unincorporated townships with sewage treatment services, but offered to supply services to landowners located within those
areas if they agreed to be annexed by the city and to use the city's
sewage collection and transportation services. 8 6 Four townships brought
an antitrust suit for injunctive relief against the city, alleging monopolization and a tying arrangement.387 A Wisconsin statute authorizes
cities to construct sewerage systems and to 'describe with reasonable
particularity the district to be [served]."'388 Another statute provides that
a city operating a public utility:
may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated
areas. Such ordinance shall delineate the area within which service will be provided and the municipal utility shall have no
obligation to serve beyond the area so delineated.38 9
A third statute permits the state's Department of Natural Resources to
require that a city's sewerage system be constructed so that other areas
can connect to the system and to order that such connections be made.319
It provides, however, that a Department order for the connection of
unincorporated territory to a city system shall be void if the territory
refuses to become annexed to the city.3 9' In a related state antitrust
case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had inferred from these statutes a

384. See supra notes 170-87 and accompanying text.
385. 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985).
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 1715-16.
Id.at 1715.
Id.at 1718.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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legislative intent to allow a city to require annexation as a condition of
providing sewage treatment services.3 92 The state court concluded that
the legislature had "viewed annexation by the city of a surrounding
unincorporated area as a reasonable quid pro quo that a city could
require before extending sewer services to the area." 3 93
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground of state
action immunity, holding that there was a clear state policy in favor
of the city's conduct and that the conduct was adequately supervised
by the state.3 94 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the result, also finding a
clear state policy, but held that active state supervision is not a requirement for immunity where a local government is "performing a
traditional municipal function."3 95 The Supreme Court affirmed.3 " The
Court's three major holdings can be easily summarized: 1) the clearly
articulated state policy test, at least as applied to municipalities, is
satisfied if the anticompetitive conduct challenged was a "foreseeable"
result of the state's pronouncements;3 97 2) at least as applied to cities,
immunity does not require that the state compel the anticompetitive
conduct;3 98 and 3) active state supervision is not necessary for cities to
obtain immunity, at least when their actions are governmental. 399 The
Court's analysis, however, is more instructive than its decision.
The Court here acknowledges that the purpose of requiring active
state supervision, or of requiring state compulsion, would be to prove
the state's intent. The Court said, "As with respect to the compulsion
argument . . ., the requirement of active state supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring that the actor
is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy."400 No
doubt the Court would have agreed that the requirement of a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy serves exactly the
same function. The recognition that requirements such as supervision,
compulsion, and a clear state policy are essentially evidentiary tests is

392. Id. at 1719 n.8, citing Town of Hallie v. City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d
533, 314 N.W.2d 321 (1982).
393.
394.

City of Chippewa Falls, 105 Wis. 2d at 540-41, 314 N.W.2d at 325.
Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1716.

395.

Id.

396. Id.
397. Id.at 1718.
398. Id.at 1720.

399. Id. at 1721. The Supreme Court did not emphasize the relevance of the type of
municipal action at issue, but the Court of Appeals explicitly referred to the "traditional"
nature of the municipal action involved, Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d
376, 384 (7th Cir. 1983), and it is not clear whether the Supreme Court would make a
similar distinction.
400.

Id. at 1720.
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the first step in embracing the analysis proposed in this article.401 The
Court could clarify its position further by explaining what it meant by
"engaging in the challenged [conduct] pursuant to . . . state policy.' "4 2
That, according to the Court, is the ultimate fact the potential evidentiary
tests tend to prove. The phrase could be fairly interpreted to mean a
state intent to permit or to engage in the challenged conduct, which is
the issue this article posits is determinative403
The Court reasoned that neither a compulsion nor an active supervision requirement will be applied to cities because the amount of
harm that would result if immunity were granted erroneously will be
4
less than if immunity were mistakenly found for a private actor.'
The Court stated: "We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary,
that the municipality acts in the public interest. A private party, on the
other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own
behalf."' 45 In a footnote, the Court continued:
Among other things, municipal conduct is invariably more
likely to be exposed to public scrutiny than is private conduct.
Municipalities in some states are subject to "sunshine" laws or
other mandatory disclosure regulations, and municipal officers,
unlike corporate heads, are checked to some degree through the
electoral process. Such a position in the public eye may provide
some greater protection against antitrust abuses than exists for
private parties.406
In essence, the Court employed the analysis set out previously in this
article, that an evidentiary requirement is not warranted unless the
reduction in the expected costs of errors produced by the test exceeds
the cost of compliance, A Pa La + A Pa Lb > C. 0 7 It applied the
formula to a class of antitrust defendants and concluded that, for that
class, the loss associated with finding immunity where the state intended
to confer none, La, was lower than for other defendants. Because the
left side of the equation decreased, only the costs of complying with
fewer evidentiary tests could be justified.08

401. See supra notes 7-9, 295 and accompanying text.
402. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1717.
403. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
404. The Court correctly recognized that compulsion would be probative of state intent,
indeed, that it "may be the best evidence of state policy," but concluded that it would
not be required to prove intent. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1720. The Court undoubtedly
viewed the significance of state supervision in a similar way.
405. Id. at 1720.
406. Id. at 1720 n.9.
407. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
408. The Court's willingness to discard the supervision requirement as applied to cities
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Although the Court's application of the analysis is sound as far as
it goes, it is important to recognize its limitations. The Court could
have strengthened the rationale for its result by pointing out that the

cost of compliance (C) with a requirement of supervision or compulsion
may be higher when the actor is a city than when it is a private party.
For instance, a state may be more experienced in supervising private

parties than in supervising municipalities, with institutions designed to
oversee private activities already in place, so that requiring supervision

of municipalities would impose a marginal cost of inexperience upon
the state. With respect to supervision and compulsion, demanding either
requirement for municipal immunity would impose a unique cost on the
city by abridging the autonomy of a politically-accountable entity. The
Court recognized this cost as it relates to the content of the clear state

policy requirement, but did not explicitly acknowledge its relevance to
an analysis of the other two requirements as well.A
The Court's analysis suggests that the value of the left side of the

equation proposed, i.e., the reduction in the expected cost of error, is
lower for municipal defendants than for private defendants. The Court's
discussion, however, does not address the issue of whether the value of
the left side of the equation exceeds the value of the right side of the

equation for private defendants. In other words, the Court has made

suggests that it might be willing to apply the formula offered to other classes of defendants
and likewise discard the requirement as to them. No other relevant classes of defendants
are readily apparent, however. Perhaps Town of Hallie indicates that the Court would
be willing to consider the justification for the supervision requirement as applied to
different categories of antitrust violations. This issue is considered infra at notes 506-13
and accompanying text.
The Court's perceptive argument as to why cities are inherently less likely to engage
in activities injurious to consumer welfare not only tends to show that erroneous immunization of their actions would be less harmful than erroneous immunization of private
conduct; it also goes a long way toward demonstrating that cities ought to be independently
and automatically immune from antitrust liability. The Court resisted this conclusion in
City of Lafayette and City of Boulder. The Court might do well to reconsider its position
in light of its own recent insight.
Though there is an analytical justification for withholding the active supervision requirement from municipalities, the Court's decision might have to do with non-doctrinal
factors. The City of Lafayette and City of Boulder decisions, exposing cities to antitrust
liability, drew outrage from some quarters of the country, particularly municipal governments. See Lopatka, supra note 5, at 23-24. Those unhappy with the decisions were
largely responsible for persuading Congress to eliminate antitrust damage liability in the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984). The
Court was undoubtedly aware of this widespread displeasure, and eliminating any need
for state supervision was one way at least partially to placate the objectors.
409. Id. at 1719. An argument could have been made that the probability of type A
error (Pa) is less when cities are involved than when private parties are involved, but the
argument is weak and the Court wisely did not assert it. See Lopatka, supra note 5, at
51.
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a good case for the proposition that the requirements of supervision
and compulsion are less justifiable when applied to municipal conduct
than when applied to private conduct, but not for the proposition that
the requirements are justified when applied to private parties. The issues
are distinct. Indeed, in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v.
United States, the Court held that compulsion is not required for immunity of private defendants. 4 0 An equally insightful reexamination of
the supervision requirement would be most welcome.
The Court's exposition of the clear state policy requirement comes
close to adopting the analysis advocated in this article. 41' I have argued
that the ultimate issue in state action cases is whether the state intended
to engage in or permit the conduct that constitutes the restraint challenged, and that the only test for proving intent should be whether the
state acts in such a way that the conduct constituting the restraint
challenged was a likely consequence. The Court here ostensibly maintains
the requirement of a clear state policy, which I have argued ought to
be discarded, 4 2 but it holds the requirement satisfied when the challenged
413
anticompetitive conduct is the foreseeable result of a state's legislation.
The Court correctly recognizes that immunity should not depend on
whether the state foresaw the effects of anticompetitive conduct, but
only on whether it intended to authorize the conduct itself. 4 4 It is a
short step indeed from inferring intent because anticompetitive conduct
is the foreseeable result of legislative pronouncements to inferring intent
because such conduct is the foreseeable result of any state action or
inaction. If the clear state policy test is defined to mean that the state
has acted in such a way that the conduct constituting the restraint was
a likely consequence, then it coalesces with the test proposed in this
article and ought to be retained as the sole evidentiary requirement.
The application of this principle in Town of Hallie was straightforward. No statutes explicitly recited that a town could withhold sewage
treatment services from individuals who refused to become annexed. But
as the Court recognized, the statutes disclosed a definite legislative intent

410. See SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1729.
411. See supra notes 7-9, 295-311 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
413. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1718.
414. The Court stated:
[T]he statutes clearly contemplate that a city may engage in anticompetitive
conduct ....
It is not necessary ... for the state legislature to have stated
explicitly that it expected the City to engage in conduct that would have anticompetitive effects. . . . We think it is clear that anticompetitive effects logically
would result from this broad authority to regulate.
Id. at 1718. In essence, the Court held that states are presumed to intend the logical effects
of the conduct they authorize. As long as the conduct that constitutes the restraint is a
foreseeable result of the state's actions, immunity will be granted.
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to allow precisely that conduct. Thus, the city's actions were the likely
consequence of the legislative enactment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court's
similar interpretation of the statutes was even more significant than the
Court allowed. The Court correctly stated that the state court's opinion
could not decide the question of federal antitrust immunity.4 1 5 The Court
said, however, that the opinion was "instructive on the question of the
state legislature's intent in enacting the statutes. ' 41 6 A state supreme
court's interpretation of the state legislature's intent would seem to be
more than "instructive," but virtually determinative.
Because Town of Hallie concerned municipal antitrust immunity, it
is possible that the Court's analysis of the clear state policy test applies
only to cities, and that a more restrictive construction of the requirement
will apply to private defendants. This deduction would be an unfortunate
4 7
one, and one which the majority of the Court did not appear to intend. 1
Certainly the public or private character of the defendant was relevant
in the Court's analyses of compulsion and supervision.4 18 One might
extrapolate from those anilyses that because a city is likely to do less
harm than private parties, a less stringent and less costly clear state
policy requirement is warranted when applied to municipalities. The
Court, however, did not expressly rely upon the status of the defendant
in explaining the clear state policy requirement, though it did rely upon
that factor in discussing compulsion and supervision. Further, in support
of its clear state policy analysis, the Court cited Orrin W. Fox, a case
that did not involve a municipality, explaining that in that case, there
was "no express intent to displace the antitrust laws, but [the] statute
provided regulatory structure that inherently 'displace[d] unfettered business freedom."' 4 9 Moreover, the Court's analysis of clear state policy
is universally applicable regardless of the defendant's identity. Finally,
it is unlikely that the Court intended to generate the confusion that
would attend the establishment of a single evidentiary test, the meaning
of which would vary depending on the status of the actor. In Town of
Hallie and Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference, the Court rejected:
the compulsion requirement as applied to all defendants.4 20 In Town of
Hallie, the Court held that the supervision requirement does not apply

415. Id. at 1719 n.8.
416. Id. (emphasis added).
417. See supra note 399.
418. That the Court chose to reject the compulsion requirement through an analysis.
that depended upon the governmental character of the defendant seems strange in lightof the fact that it rejected the requirement as applied to private defendants in another
case decided on the same. day. See SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1728. For a possible explanation,
see infra notes 443-44 and accompanying text.
419. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1718.
420. See id. at 1720; SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at. 1729..
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to cities, but said that it does apply to private parties. 42' Thus, the
Court has imposed or withheld certain requirements on all defendants
or classes of defendants, but it has not varied the meaning of any test
between classes.

422

A final aspect of Town of Hallie should be noted. Similar to the
analysis in Ronwin, a case not cited by the Court, the Court's rationale
does not imply that the content of state policy is relevant to immunity. 423
No doubt a seemingly virtuous objective could have been proffered for
the state's policy, but the Court indicated no interest in finding one.
L.

Southern Motor CarriersRate Conference v. United States

In SMCRC, 424 decided by the Supreme Court on the same day it
decided Town of Hallie, four states had established public service commissions to regulate the intrastate transportation of commodities by
motor common carriers. 425 Three states, North Carolina, Georgia, and
Tennessee, enacted statutes that permit but do not require common
carriers to agree upon rates that they will collectively submit for approval
to the respective regulatory agencies. 426 The fourth state, Mississippi,
enacted no such statute, but its regulatory commission promulgated a
rule that permits collective rate-making. 427 In all four states, no rate
becomes effective unless the agency either takes no action within a
specified time period on a proposed rate submitted to it or affirmatively

421. See Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1720 n.10.
422. The Court's opinion in SMCRC further supports the contention that the Court
intended the clear state policy requirements to apply to private parties and cities
in the
same way. The Court there cited City of Lafayette, a municipal immunity case, for the
proposition that a "private party acting pursuant to an anticompetitive regulatory program
need not 'point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization' for its challenged conduct."
SMCRC, 105 S.Ct. at 1730-31 (emphasis added). Recall that at the time City of Lafayette
was decided, there was some reason to doubt that the Court's explanation of the clear
state policy criterion in that case applied to private parties. See supra note 250-52 and
accompanying text.
It isclear, however, that Justices Stevens and White in Town of Hallie and SMCRC
did intend to distinguish between the clear state policy requirement as itapplies to cities
and as itapplies to private parties. See id.at 1732 n.2 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); infra
notes 443-44 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 380-84 and accompanying text. It ispeculiar that none of the
opinions written in Town of Hallie and SMCRC cited Roniwin for any proposition, even
though Ronwin was the Supreme Court's latest
state action case at that time and had
been decided less
than a year earlier. It isalmost as ifthe Justices shook their heads at
what they had done and agreed silently never to mention their misdeed.
424. SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. 1721.
425. Id. at 1723.
426. Id.at 1724, 1730.
427. Id.
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approves the proposal.4 28 Collective ratemaking assertedly improves the
efficiency of the rate regulation process by reducing the number of rate
increase proposals filed, thereby allowing agencies to consider the proposals more carefully.4 29 It also allegedly tends to produce uniformity
in rates, a condition deemed desirable by two of the states. 430 Motor
carriers operating in the four states involved formed two rate bureaus
to formulate and submit joint rate proposals to the regulatory agencies. 43'
The United States brought an antitrust complaint against the rate
bureaus.4 32 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
government, rejecting a state action defense.'43 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Midcal test was not applicable to private defendants, and that if it were applicable, the clear state policy requirement
is satisfied only when the challenged anticompetitive conduct is compelled
by the state. 43 4 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the activities
43
of the rate bureaus in all four states were immune. "
A good portion of the Court's opinion was devoted to making
explicit certain aspects of state action dogma that had become generally
accepted without express confirmation. Thus, the Court put to rest
whatever doubt lingered after Cantor that state action can indeed immunize the conduct of private parties.4 36 The Court also confirmed the
common belief that the test for immunity of private parties is the one
set out in Midcal-there must be a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy in favor of the challenged conduct and active
supervision.4 31 In so doing, the Court explicitly rejected Justice Stevens's
contention in dissent that state action immunity is appropriate only when
the exemption is necessary to make the regulatory act work.438 That
test, the Court explained, is appropriate when there is a conflict between
the antitrust laws and a federal statute, because in that case, if the
Court misinterprets legislative intent and withholds immunity, Congress
can correct the mistake by enacting an express exemption.4 3 9 If the Court
misinterprets the intent of a state, however, the state, because of the
Supremacy Clause, cannot easily remedy the error.

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.

Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.

1723-24.
1724.
1724 n.5.
1723.
1725.

1731.
1726-27.
1727-28.
1727 n.21.
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The Court also held that state compulsion is not required for immunity of private parties." 0 Technically, it held that compulsion is not
necessary to satisfy the clear state policy prong of the Midcal test,
though it recognized that compulsion may be "the best evidence that
the State has a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policy to
displace competition."' Again, the Court's decision merely confirmed
what had become the better view of the compulsion issue," 2 though this

3
was the issue on which Justice Stevens voiced his most vigorous dissent."4

The Court reached its decision through an analysis that differed from

the rationale it used in Town of Hallie to conclude that cities are not
subject to the compulsion requirement. Perhaps the Court employed

different rationales in order to win unanimity on the Court for its
decision in Town of Hallie. Justices Stevens and White were prepared
to spare cities from the compulsion requirement, but not to spare private
parties.4"

The correct reason for not imposing a compulsion requirement is
that federalism, the basis of state action immunity, is implicated regardless of whether the state compels conflicting behavior or permits it.
The Court recognized this reason, noting that a compulsion requirement
would reduce "the range of regulatory alternatives available to the
State," presumably by precluding those policies that merely permit anticompetitive conduct. 45 The Court also pointed out that the requirement

440. Id. at 1729.
441. Id.
442. See, e.g., I P. Areeda & D. Turner, supra note 3, at § 215b2.
443. SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1734-36 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
444. Id. at 1732 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by White, J.). An implication of
the dissent's position is that these Justices would define the clear state policy requirement
differently for municipal and private defendants, contrary to the argument presented in
this article. See supra notes 417-20 and accompanying text. These Justices require both
municipalities and private parties to act pursuant to a clear state policy, but only when
the actor is a private party does the standard necessitate state compulsion.
445. Id. at 1729. The Court suggested a reason why a state might prefer a permissive
rather than mandatory policy. Either mandatory or permissive joint ratemaking, for
example, would tend to allow the state and the carriers to realize the efficiencies of the
practice. But only a permissive policy would allow that economy to be tempered by price
competition, in that only under a permissive policy could a carrier submit an individual
rate proposal. See id. at 1728. In effect, the court reasoned that the state may have an
interest, in allowing firms to cheat on any cartel it sanctions. This observation seems
indisputable, though its significance for state action purposes is simply to demonstrate
that a state may affirmatively prefer a permissive policy, and federalism is implicated if
that preference is denied. The Court should not be understood to be asserting that
appreciably less price-fixing will result if permissive policies are immunized than if only
mandatory policies are protected. Nevertheless, the Court's illustration does suggest that
somewhat less price-fixing might result, and to that extent, the Court's observation bolsters
its contention that requiring state compulsion would disserve the purpose of the antitrust
laws. See infra note 446 and accompanying text.
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might produce a larger sphere of activities exempted from antitrust
scrutiny, whereas the test is intended to restrict the size of the exemption,
by encouraging states to demand anticompetitive conduct when they
would have preferred merely to have allowed it.40
The most significant addition to state action doctrine provided by
SMCRC is the Court's treatment of the identity of the state. In three
states, the permissive policy in favor of collective ratemaking was affirmatively expressed by the legislature, but in Mississippi, it was articulated by the public service commission, acting pursuant to authority
delegated by the legislature to regulate common carriers.- 7 Recall that
in Cantor, the light-bulb program might have been held immune had
it been intended by the regulatory commission; the plurality appeared
to believe that the program was solely the idea of the utility.44 By
contrast, in Goldfarb, attorney price-fixing was intended by the state
bar association, an official state agency, yet the practice was held not
to be exempt." 9 The article suggested that these cases should be reconciled
on the basis of the nature of the agencies involved. A legitimate agency,
one whose members are financially disinterested in the subject of their
regulation, such as the Michigan Public Service Commission, can embody
the state for immunity purposes, whereas an illegitimate agency, such
as the Virginia State Bar, cannot.4 50 Based on this distinction, the Mississippi Public Service Commission was a legitimate state agency, it was
qualified to represent the state, and its expression of a policy in favor
of collective ratemaking should have satisfied the clear state policy
45
criterion. '
The Court found the agency's action sufficient for immunity, but
it did not use this analysis. The rationale the Court did employ is
irreconcilable with its prior decisions. The Court said that the Mississippi
commission, acting alone, "could not immunize private anticompetitive
conduct. '452 But if "the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace

446. Id. Justice Stevens called this analysis "seriously flawed," arguing that it improperly assumes states would respond to a compulsion requirement by demanding the*
previously permitted conduct, and that if states did respond by compelling the activity,
the analysis incorrectly assumes that Congress would not act to preempt the state laws.
Id. at 1738 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the Court's assumptions seem entirely plausible,
and Justice Stevens's prediction of Congressional response seems speculative.
447. Id. at 1730.
448. See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
451. See Miss. Code Ann. § 77-1-1 (1972): "The commissioners shall not operate,
own any stock in, or be in the employment of any railroad, common or contract carrier
by motor vehicle, telephone company, gas or electric utility ocmpany, or any other public
utility that shall come under their jurisdiction or supervision."
452. SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1730.
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competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure," and the
regulatory agency then authorizes the restraint, the clear state policy test
is satisfied.4 53 The Court distinguished Cantor on the ground that there,
"the anticompetitive acts of a private utility were held unprotected
no intention to displace
because the Michigan Legislature had4 indicated
4
market.
relevant
the
in
competition
The problem with this analysis is that it purports to distinguish
between the specificity with which the Mississippi legislature authorized
the regulatory commission to permit collective ratemaking, and the specificity with which the Michigan legislature authorized the agency to
permit a light-bulb program. The distinction is so fine as to be invisible.
In both cases, the legislature conferred broad authority on its agency
to regulate the operations of utilities, and in both, the specific conduct
at issue fell within the agency's power. It is nonsense to claim that joint
ratemaking was more closely related to the mission of the agency than
was the distribution of light-bulbs, and to require that a distinction be
made on that basis will prove utterly futile. The only intelligible criterion
with which to judge whether an agency is capable of authorizing specific
conduct is whether that authorization falls within the scope of the
agency's delegated power. Thus, if a utilities commission prohibits grocery stores from selling peaches, the policy would not constitute that
of the state. In both SMCRC and Cantor,however, the respective policies
fell within the agencies' statutory jurisdiction and, therefore, did represent state intent. The better way to have distinguished Cantor is that
the Michigan Public Service Commission did not clearly express an intent
in favor of the light-bulb program; in SMCRC, the Mississippi agency's
intent to authorize collective ratemaking was unmistakable. The Court's
own comments undercut the distinction it proposed. The Court cogently
explained the reason for state agencies:
If more detail than a clear intent to displace competition
were required of the legislature, States would find it difficult
to implement through regulatory agencies their anticompetitive
policies. Agencies are created because they are able to deal with
problems unforeseeable to, or outside the competence of, the
legislature. Requiring express authorization for every action that
an agency might find necessary to effectuate state policy would
4 55
diminish, if not destroy, its usefulness.
Similarly, requiring a legislature to enumerate the particular kinds of
activities, such as light-bulb distribution, within a larger category of

453.
454.
455.

Id. at 1731.
Id.
Id.
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conduct, such as utility service, that an agency is empowered to regulate,
or requiring a legislature to do anything more than to delegate broad
authority to act in a general area, would "diminish, if not destroy, [the
agency's] usefulness."
Whether a distinction should be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate agencies is a separate question. The state bar in Goldfarb
was given authority over the fee-setting activity of attorneys, yet its
policy in favor of price-fixing was not sufficient to immunize that
conduct. The Court in SMCRC did not use the legitimate/illegitimate
distinction to explain Goldfarb. Instead, it said simply, "In Goldfarb,
the Court held that Parker immunity was unavailable only because the
State as sovereign did not intend to do away with competition among
lawyers. ' ' 4 6 Perhaps the Court was suggesting a different and rather
clever distinction. The Virginia Supreme Court had explicitly cautioned
that "no lawyer should permit himself to be controlled [by a fee schedule]
4' 57
or to follow it as his sole guide in determining the amount of his fee.
Perhaps, then, the Goldfarb principle is that whether a state agency is
legitimate or illegitimate, a policy it expresses, even though within the
scope of its authority, will not constitute state policy if the policy
conflicts with express pronouncements of the relevant branch of government. The trouble with this interpretation is that the opinion in
Goldfarb contains no hint that the Court had this idea in mind. This
interpretation implies that had the Virginia court not expressly condemned price fixing, the state bar's policy would have effectively immunized the conduct. Yet there is little doubt that the Court would
have rejected the claim of immunity even if the state court had not
4 58
expressed its disfavor.
Even though the legitimate/illegitimate distinction is the proper way
to explain Goldfarb, it should be abandoned. A policy pertaining to an
area within the scope of an agency's jurisdiction that authorizes a
restraint should immunize the conduct regardless of the agency's makeup. The intuition behind a legitimacy requirement is that an illegitimate
agency is apt to foster anticompetitive policies that serve the financial

456. Id. (emphasis in original).
457. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
458. Even in the absence of the explicit prohibition, price fixing would not have been
"compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign." See supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
Another interpretation of Goldfarb is possible. Perhaps the Court in SMCRC was
distinguishing between regulatory agencies and other types of agencies. A non-regulatory
agency, like a state bar, is incapable of expressing state intent to authorize specific activity
even if it is granted power to oversee that same activity. A regulatory commission, however,
can effectively authorize activity that is closely related to the mission of the agency. A
distinction between regulatory and non-regulatory agencies, however, is untenable in theory
and unworkable in practice.
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interests of its members at the expense of the public. However true this
statement may be, it is primarily an internal matter for the state to
resolve. If the state chooses to empower an agency with an incentive
to disserve the public, its own citizens will suffer, and any remedy ought
to be left to the political process. Of course, if the injury to consumer
welfare caused by such an agency falls overwhelmingly on non-state
45 9
residents, the action should be preempted under the Commerce Clause.
But such a policy should be preempted whether the promulgating agency
is legitimate or illegitimate, and for that matter, even if the policy is
established by a constitutional branch of state government. The fact
that any particular agency is more or less likely to harm consumers
ought not determine whether its policies are categorically immune from
antitrust challenge. At most, the illegitimate nature of an agency should
simply serve to warn a federal judge that, for purposes of Commerce
Clause preemption, the agency's policy ought to be scrutinized for
injurious impact. Eliminating the legitimacy requirement would not only
be theoretically sound, but would produce practical benefits as well. A
court would be spared the task of inquiring into the composition of an
agency and the troublesome issue of categorizing an agency composed
in part of interested members and in part of disinterested members.46
One implication of the Court's analysis of an agency's status, and
one the Court perhaps did not realize, constitutes a final, novel contribution to state action dogma. The Midcal test requires a clearly
articulated state policy and active state supervision. In SMCRC, the
Court said that unless "the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace
competition in a particular field with a regulatory structure," an agency's
policy, even if within the scope of its power, does not represent state
policy.'6 1 Therefore, according to the Court, even if the light-bulb policy
in Cantor had been clearly intended by the Michigan Public Service
Commission, it would not have satisfied the clear state policy test.
However, the Court appeared to say that regulatory oversight by an
agency with broad jurisdiction over an industry would fulfill the active
supervision requirement, even if the legislature had not "clearly sanctioned" the challenged conduct.4 2 For instance, the Michigan agency
did satisfy this criterion. Thus, the "state", for purposes of active
supervision, is not the "state", for purposes of articulating a policy.
Neither Midcal nor any other case intimates this distinction. The analysis

459. See supra notes 10-11. 88-89 and accompanying text.
460. See, e.g., supra note 21 and accompanying text.
461. SMCRC, 105 S. Ct. at 1731.
462. The Court said that oversight by the public service commission in SMCRC satisfied
the active supervision requirement; only thereafter did it explain that the clear state policy
test required that "collective ratemaking [has been] clearly sanctioned by the legislatures
of the four states" involved. Id. at 1730 (emphasis added).
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of state agencies proposed above in the article would eliminate the
discrepancy. An agency acting within the scope of its authority would
be able to supervise conduct and articulate policy. Even if a legitimacy
requirement were maintained, a legitimate agency would be able to satisfy
both prongs of the Midcal test, and an illegitimate agency would be
able to satisfy neither prong.
M.

Fisher v. City of Berkeley

In Fisher v. City of Berkeley 46' the Court reached an unexceptional
result through a perplexing analysis. In 1972, Berkeley adopted an initiative amendment to the city's charter providing for residential rent
control. 4 The amendment established a maximum base rent and allowed
adjustments in maximum rents to be made only by an elected rent
control board after a hearing on petitions submitted by individual landlords
or tenants." 5 The state constitution at that time required ratification of
city charter amendments by the legislature, and the rent control amendment was presented to and approved by both houses of the California
legislature." In 1976, the California Supreme Court invalidated the
amendment on federal constitutional grounds.4 6 7 It held that by permitting adjustments of maximum rents only through cumbersome, individual hearings, the law was certain to have a confiscatory effect on
those landlords whose costs had surpassed their rent ceilings while they
awaited hearings on their rent increase petitions.4 8
Thereafter, in June of 1980, the electorate of Berkeley enacted a
rent control ordinance presumably to replace the rent control charter
amendment struck down by the California Supreme Court." 9 The California constitution did not require this ordinance to be submitted to
the legislature for ratification. The ordinance recited that it was intended
"to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases ... in order to
help maintain the diversity of the Berkeley community," and that it
was designed, in part, to "advance the housing policies of the City with
regard to low and fixed income persons, minorities, students, handicapped, and the aged. ' 47 0 The ordinance excepted certain units, including
all newly constructed buildings. As to the rest, the ordinance established

463.
464.
470-71,
465.
466.
467.
1006-07,
468.
469.
470.

106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 135-37, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465,
550 P.2d 1001, 1006-07 (1976).
See id., 17 Cal. 3d at 138, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 550 P.2d at 1008.
See id., 17 Cal. 3d at 137, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 471, 550 P.2d at 1007.
Id., 17 Cal. 3d at 136, 169-71, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 470-71, 493-95, 550 P.2d at
1029-31.
Id.
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045, 1047, 1052 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 1047
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a base rent ceiling reflecting rents in effect at the end of May 1980. 47
Like the invalidated rent control amendment, the ordinance allowed
landlords to petition a rent stabilization board for individual rent adjustments. 472 But unlike the prior amendment, the ordinance allowed the
473
board to make annual, across-the-board adjustments to the rent ceiling.
The California Supreme Court found this difference, as well as provisions
in the new ordinance that expedited hearings on individual petitions,
Certain
decisive in upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance.474
amici in the state court proceedings attacking the ordinance claimed that
the ordinance was pre-empted by the antitrust laws. 475 Under conventional
state action analysis, the issue presented was relatively simple. As a
municipality, Berkeley could impose a restraint so long as the restraint
represented the clear policy of the state. 476 Because the original rent
control scheme was specifically submitted to and approved by the state
legislature, there appeared to be a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy in favor of the measure. Few arguments were
available to resist this conclusion. Perhaps the legislative ratification was
not a sufficiently affirmative articulation of state policy. This argument
impressed Justice Brennan.4 77 But surely the heart of the clear state
policy requirement is the assurance that the state actually intends the
restraint challenged, and the intent of the California legislature to authorize the rent control scheme specifically presented to it was beyond
doubt.
Assuming the legislative ratification would have immunized the 1972
amendment, the only other way to avoid finding immunity for the 1980
ordinance was to argue that, for some reason, the original ratification
did not carry over to the later municipal action. Four reasons were
possible. Perhaps a municipal restraint must be imposed contemporaneously with its legislative approval, so that the mere passage of time
rendered the initial ratification inoperative. This argument, however,
would represent an unfounded attack on the ability of a legislature to

471. Id.
472. Id. It might be noted that the rent control board under the amendment was
popularly elected (Birkenfeld, 17 Cal. 3d at 138, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 472, 550 P.2d at
1008), whereas the rent stabilization board under the ordinance was appointed (City of
Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1047).
473. Id. See also Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 687-91, 687 n.44, 209
Cal. Rptr. 682, 716-19, 717 n.44, 693 P.2d 261, 296-97, 2% n.44 (1984).
474. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 687-91, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 716-20,
693 P.2d 261, 295-99 (1984).
475. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1047.
476. See supra notes 250-52, 323-24, 396-97 and accompanying text.
477. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1056 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("There are serious
doubts that this purely pro forma approval would qualify the amendment for the Parker
exemption.")
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authorize future conduct and a dangerous intrusion into the realities of
state legislative procedures. The force of legislative pronouncements cannot be assumed to evaporate-over time. A second claim would be that
the California Supreme Court's invalidation of the 1972 amendment in
Birkenfeld somehow cancelled the effectiveness of the legislative authorization. But Birkenfeld, as a judicial decision, could not represent
a shift in the legislature's policy and did not even constitute a state
supreme court determination that the policy was substantively impermissible.4 71 A closely-related argument would be that the state must
authorize the specific restraint imposed, and because the legislature never
considered the rent control ordinance, its approval of the prior amendment establishing a different scheme was insufficient. But this argument
misconstrues the nature of the clear state policy requirement. The restraint must be the "foreseeable" result of the state's pronouncements,
and certainly a legislature's specific ratification of a city's rent control
scheme would extend to a procedurally different but substantively identical plan. Finally, during the interim between enactment of the amendment and passage of the ordinance, the California legislature enacted a
comprehensive planning and zoning law, which provided in part: "Nothing in this article shall be construed to be a grant of authority or a
repeal of any authority which may exist of a local government to impose
rent controls. . . ,479 One might argue that this law revoked the previous
ratification of the amendment. But as Justice Powell explained, this law
4 80
expressly left intact preexisting authority to impose rent control.
When City of Berkeley reached the Supreme Court, two justices
chose to analyze the case under the state action doctrine, though they
reached opposite conclusions. 48 The remaining seven justices, however,
found that it was not a state action case at all. Rather, the majority
held that because the ordinance was not facially inconsistent with the
antitrust laws, it was simply not pre-empted by those laws, and the
Court did not have to "address whether, even if the [rent] controls
were to mandate § 1 violations, they would be exempt under the state-

478. Both Justices Powell and Brennan addressed this argument. Justice Powell concluded that, because Birkenfeld purported only to find the rent control scheme procedurally
inadequate, the substantive policy expression of the legislature remained unaffected. City
of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1053 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Brennan simply asserted
that Birkenfeld invalidated the legislative ratification for state action purposes. Id. at 1056
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
479. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1053 (Powell, J., concurring).
480. Id. One other lurking problem for conventional state action analysis was presented
by the case. The city set the initial rent ceiling, but adjustments were to be made by the
rent stabilization board. To what extent may a municipality delegate price setting authority
to an agency? Should a municipal agency be treated like a state agency?
481. See id. at 1051-53 (Powell, J., concurring), 1053-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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action doctrine from antitrust scrutiny. ' ' 482 In particular, the Court found
that § 1 prohibits concerted action in restraint of trade, and since
Berkeley imposed rent ceilings unilaterally, the city's action did not
conflict with the Sherman Act." 3 The Court's analysis is not only
inconsistent with its treatment of at least one similar case, but misconceives the nature of antitrust offenses.
The state action doctrine constitutes, in effect, a defense to what
otherwise might be an antitrust violation. A complaint might allege that
certain conduct violates the antitrust laws, or that governmental conduct
inconsistent with the antitrust laws is pre-empted by those laws. In either
case, however, there is no need to resort to the state action doctrine
unless the conduct challenged conflicts with the antitrust laws. One
might defeat an antitrust claim, therefore, in either of two ways-by
finding that the conduct challenged does not substantively offend the
antitrust laws, or by holding that, in any event, the conduct is immunized
by the state action doctrine. In the state action cases where the Court
has found immunity, the Court typically seems to have assumed that
the challenged conduct would offend the antitrust laws, but then accepted
the state action defense." No doubt the assumption in many cases was
easy to make, so that the only viable method of avoiding the application
of the antitrust laws was through the state action doctrine. But logically,
a court could choose to consider either part of the two-step analysis
first, and if it reached a result favorable to the defendant with respect
to that first issue, it would not have to address the second issue at all.
Indeed, if a plaintiff's claim of a substantive conflict with the
antitrust laws was easy to reject, while the issues surrounding a state
action defense were complex, interests in judicial economy would argue
for dismissing the complaint on substantive grounds without reaching
the state action defense. So, for example, if a plaintiff claimed that a
city ordinance that prohibited leaf burning conflicted with the antitrust
laws, a court would do well to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the ordinance did not substantively offend the antitrust laws without
even considering the more difficult issues posed by conventional state
action analysis. And, of course, with respect to the substantive antitrust
conflict part of the analysis, whether the defendant is a city or a state
is inconsequential.48 In fact, it would not matter if the defendant were

482. Id.at 1051.
483. Id.at 1049, 1051.

484. E.g., in Parker, the Court said, "We may assume for present purposes that the
California prorate program would violate the Sherman Act .... " but went on to hold
the program immune. 317 U.S. at 350, 63 S. Ct. at 313.
485. The Court in City of Berkeley appears to acknowledge this. City of Berkeley,
106 S. Ct. at 1048.
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a private citizen-if the antitrust laws did not substantively apply to
the conduct challenged, there can be no antitrust cause of action.
The Court in City of Berkeley, therefore, did not necessarily go
wrong in addressing the substantive conflict issue first. The Court did
go wrong, however, in its analysis of the substantive conflict issue.
Besides, in this particular case, the state action issue was easy to resolve,
should have been addressed first, and its resolution would have eliminated
the need to consider the conflict problem.
The Court used the distinction between concerted and unilateral
action to conclude that Berkeley's ordinance did not offend § 1 of the
Sherman Act. But this distinction makes sense in the context of private
restraints of trade only because it separates actions that have the potential
of producing an anticompetitive effect from those actions that typically
have no such capacity. A group of competitors may acquire the power
to injure consumer welfare only by acting in concert. A single firm
acting unilaterally will not be able to injure consumer welfare unless it
possesses monopoly power, in which case whether consumers will be
entitled to protection will depend upon the legality of the monopoly.
Instances in which a single firm, acting alone, is able to acquire, maintain, or extend monopoly power unlawfully are likely to be rare. In the
private context, therefore, the concerted action requirement serves principally to separate business conduct that can have an adverse effect on
efficiency from conduct that cannot. In the public context, however, a
government has the power to produce adverse effects through unilateral
actions. The ability to injure stems not from collective action, but from
the coercive power of the state. Thus, a distinction between concerted
and unilateral action in the setting of governmental conduct does not
aid in identifying actions that injure consumer welfare.
This is not to say that the language of the Sherman Act can be
ignored. Section 1 indeed only prohibits collective action in restraint of
trade. But the proper inference to be drawn from the statute is that
Congress did not intend to proscribe state-imposed restraints of trade
because they represent governmental action, not because they constitute
unilateral conduct. The logic of the Sherman Act implies a model of
private business activity; governmental action is foreign to the universe
envisioned by Congress in the Act.
Though the Court's analysis works toward the right end, it generates
unnecessary problems. First of all, the Court was unwilling to find
concerted action in City of Berkeley, but it has not always been so
timid. It would not have required an intellectual somersault to find a
combination between the city and complying landlords that would satisfy
the standards sometimes espoused by the Court. 486 Additionally, the

486.

For example, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 869 (1968),
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Court's analysis applies only to a claimed violation of § 1; a § 2 offense
does not require concerted action. The Berkeley rent control ordinance
was challenged under § 2 as well as § 1, but the Court sidestepped the

issue. It commented that the appellants had "not pressed the point with
any vigor" and concluded, "As to this claim, we note only that the

inquiry demanded by appellants' allegations goes beyond the scope of
the facial challenge presented here. ' 48 7 Of course, Congress no more
intended § 2 to apply to actions of governments than § 1. But how the

Court will avoid finding a substantive conflict between anticompetitive
governmental action and § 2, when it confronts the merits of the claim,
without the benefit of its formalistic distinction between unilateral and
concerted conduct, remains to be seen.
A more disturbing aspect of the Court's analysis is the anomalous
results it can produce. The Court distinguished between unilateral restraints, such as the Berkeley rent control ordinance, which do not
conflict with the Sherman Act, and "hybrid restraints," which do.4 8
Hybrid restraints are those in which government imposed "mechanisms
merely enforce private marketing decisions"-instances in which "private actors are thus granted 'a degree of private regulatory power. '489
The Court said that Schwegmann 90 and Midca 91 involved hybrid restraints because, though the state in each case required adherence to
specified prices, the prices themselves were set by private parties. 492
Suppose the Berkeley city council concludes that housing facilities in
the community have deteriorated because landlords are unable to generate
sufficient revenue to maintain a level of housing quality deemed desirable
by the council. It believes that if allowed to earn monopoly profits,

petitioner, an independent newspaper carrier, alleged that respondent publisher set maximum resale prices, terminated petitioner's distributorship when petitioner refused to comply, hired a solicitation agent to persuade petitioner's customers to purchase directly from
the publisher, and replaced petitioner with a new distributor. Id. at 147, 88 S. Ct. at
870-71. The Court held that concerted action was established by the agreements between
the publisher, the solicitation agent, and the new distributor. Id. at 150, 88 S. Ct. at
872. The Court also held that "petitioner could have claimed a combination between
respondent (publisher) and himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied" with
the fixed price, a theory whose application to City of Berkeley is apparent. Id. at 150
n.6, 88 S. Ct. at 862 n.6. The protesting landlords in Berkeley unwillingly complied with
the maximum rents allowed by the city. For good measure, the Court held that petitioner
could successfully have claimed a combination between the publisher and other distributors
who acquiesced in the set prices and said that petitioner's allegation of a combination
between the publisher and petitioner's customers was not "a frivolous contention." Id.
487. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1051 n.2.
488. See id. at 1050.
489. Id.
490. See supra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 282-93 and accompanying text.
492. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. at 1050-51.
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landlords would improve their buildings. It therefore passes an ordinance
reciting these findings and purposes and requiring landlords to charge
rents 20% higher than the rents in effect on May 31, 1986. Presumably,
this would constitute unilateral conduct unassailable under the antitrust
laws.4 93 Suppose, however, that instead of setting a baseline date and
percentage increase, the council recites the same findings and purposes,
but orders landlords to confer, agree upon rents, and thereafter adhere
to them. Acting pursuant to the ordinance, landlords increase rents by
20% over those prevailing at the end of May, 1986. Clearly, the Court

would term the latter scheme a hybrid restraint inconsistent with the
antitrust laws. Yet what sense does it make to find a substantive conflict
with the Sherman Act when a governmental entity orders firms to set
monopoly prices and adhere to them, but not when the government

itself sets the very same prices and orders adherence? Surely the substantive conflict with the policies of the antitrust laws is identical,
whatever difference the court may imagine between the two systems for
purposes of state action immunity. 49
The final difficulty with City of Berkeley is that it is inconsistent
with the spirit, if not the letter, of City of Boulder.4 9 A city ordinance
ordering a moratorium on the construction of cable television facilities

would appear to be unilateral conduct and, therefore, not inconsistent
with the antitrust laws. Under the City of Berkeley rationale, the complaint should have been dismissed on that ground. Instead, the Court
analyzed the case under the state action doctrine and, though it technically did not hold that the ordinance conflicted with the antitrust
497
laws, 49 it certainly seemed to believe there was a substantive conflict.

493. Of course, the Court's characterization of the Berkeley rent control scheme as
purely unilateral governmental conduct is problematic. The city established a rent ceiling
based on the rents in effect on a specified date. But those rents were set by the landlords.
The effective rent, therefore, was a function of the city's choice of a base rent date and
the landlord's determination of a particular rent-the rest represented, in the words of
Justice Stevens, a "blend of public and private decisionmaking."
494. The Court's distinction between unilateral and hybrid restraints is also bound to
invite spurious claims of conspiracies between governmental officials and private parties.
In City of Berkeley, the Court said that it had "been given no indication (of] . . . any
conspiracy among landlords or between the landlords and the municipality." 106 S. Ct.
at 1051. But if the Court's rationale had been anticipated, certainly a clever litigant would
have alleged such a conspiracy. For instance, because their rents were unaffected, owners
of newly constructed buildings stood to benefit from the rent control ordinance. An
allegation of a conspiracy between these landlords and the city council would have been
plausible. Just how far a district court may go in investigating the merits of such a
contention before dismissing a complaint on the unilateral action ground is left unclear
by the court's decision.
495. See supra notes 312-41 and accompanying text.
496. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56 n.20, 102 S. Ct. at 843 n.20.
497. There were allegations of a conspiracy between the city council and private firms,
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Under the state action analysis proposed in this article, City of
Berkeley is an easy case. The city, a politically-accountable governmental
entity, clearly intended the challenged restraint, and the restraint should
therefore have been immune. The majority's recognition that an antitrust
claim might be defeated either because of state action immunity or for
lack of a substantive conflict with the antitrust laws may be worthwhile.
There may be a case in which application of the proposed analysis
would be more difficult than assessment of the substantive claim, and
efficiency in litigation resources would dictate resolution of the substantive issue first. But City of Berkeley was not such a case, and even
the hypothetical leaf burning ordinance posed earlier could be resolved
under the proposed state action standard as easily as it could under
substantive scrutiny. If there is such a case, however, the determination
of substantive conflict should not depend on whether the conduct challenged is unilateral or collective. Rather, conduct conflicts with the policy
of the antitrust laws if it injures consumer welfare.
The foregoing criticisms of City of Berkeley should not obscure the
positive contribution that decision makes to the development of state
action principles. The result was patently correct. Even the Court's flawed
analysis will lead to the proper results in many cases in which the Court
might have reached erroneous conclusions under conventional state action
analysis. Every case that involves a unilateral, government-imposed restraint, protected from antitrust attack under the City of Berkeley rationale, will also present a restraint intended by the government and,
therefore, immune under the proposed state action analysis. 498 Further,
the decision represents a new, less intrusive attitude toward challenging
government activity under the antitrust laws than the Court had previously exhibited, in cases like City of Boulder, and that change should
be applauded. In effect, the Court established a novel, albeit limited
method of avoiding antitrust condemnation of government conduct, a
way that would have seemed unfruitful prior to City of Berkeley. In
all, the Court's performance was not unlike a batter struck by a pitched
ball. Given the right circumstances, the result can be as effective as a
hit. But at other times, only a home run will do, and most assuredly,
the Court did not drive one into the stands.

which, if true, would have rendered the ordinance a hybrid restraint under the Court's
analysis. Those allegations, however, were not before the Court. See id. at 47 n.9, 102
S. Ct. at 838 n.9.
498. Of course, the Court's test will not always lead to the same result as the test
proposed here, and it is, for that reason, an inadequate substitute. So-called hybrid
restraints are unprotected by the Court but may be immune under the proposed analysis.
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Summary

At this point in the article, a summary of where the state action
doctrine is and where it ought to be is in order. Under current doctrine,
conduct that would otherwise constitute an antitrust violation will be
immune if it is the action of the state or if it is the effectively authorized
action of private parties. The "state", for purposes of state action,
includes at least the legislature and the state supreme court when acting
in a legislative capacity. It should and probably does include the governor
and the supreme court acting in any constitutionally appropriate capacity. 499 It also includes some state agencies, but the analysis for determining which agencies constitute the state is uncertain. The best
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent is that only legitimate state
agencies acting within the scope of their authority represent the state.
The Court's most recent opinion, however, suggests that an agency
embodies the state if its actions bear some close relationship to authority
delegated by the appropriate branch of government. Ideally, any agency
would embody the state to the extent it acts within the broad scope of
its power.
Effective authorization of private conduct requires a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy in favor of the restraint
and active state supervision of it. For purposes of both expressing policy
and supervising activity, the best interpretation of precedent is that the
state includes the legislature, supreme court, governor, and legitimate
state agencies. Recently, however, the Court suggested that, while all
state agencies can effectively supervise private conduct, state agencies
can articulate policies only to the extent the policies are closely related
to policies expressed by a constitutional branch of government. If the
active supervision requirement is retained, all branches of government
and all state agencies acting within the scope of their authority ought
to be able to express state policy and supervise the restraint. Better yet,
supervision should not be required at all for immunity, but should
merely serve as evidence of state intent.
The clear state policy requirement is satisfied if the private conduct
that constitutes the restraint challenged was the foreseeable result of the
state's pronouncements. The state need not explicitly refer to the challenged activity or the anticompetitive effects of that conduct. The state
need not compel the activity; a permissive state policy is adequate. Nor
does immunity require that the activity be necessary to make the regulatory act work. The best position on the issue is that private conduct
challenged as a restraint is protected if the state intended to allow it,
and that intent is established if the state acted in such a way that the
private conduct was a likely consequence. Active supervision requires

499.

See infra notes 500-03 and accompanying text.
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rather vigorous oversight, something akin to traditional public utility
regulation.
A municipality stands in the position of neither a legitimate state
agency nor a private party. Unlike a legitimate agency, a municipality
must satisfy the clear state policy requirement, and unlike a private
party, it need not satisfy the active supervision requirement. Ideally, a
municipality would be treated exactly like a state-its actions would be
automatically immune from antitrust liability, and private restraints that
it intends to allow would be immune as well.
Where an anticompetitive effect is caused by a combination of state
and private action, the Court may engage in a kind of proximate cause
analysis to determine whether the restraint will be attributed to the state,
and therefore automatically immune, or to the private party, and therefore immune only if effectively authorized. The analysis is imprecise,
but the Court generally focuses on the effect and decides which party
ought to be held legally responsible for the anticompetitive effect. The
better analysis is that if the plaintiff sues a private party, the case should
be dismissed if the challenged conduct of the defendant does not constitute a substantive antitrust violation, was authorized by the state, or
is protected by the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine.
Some of the Supreme Court's older opinions suggest that immunity
will not be granted unless the policy that underlies the state's own
anticompetitive actions or the private actions which the state authorizes
is deemed sufficiently meritorious by the court. More recent cases,
however, indicate that the Supreme Court will not assess the content
of state policy. The Court should abandon altogether any inquiry into
the value of state policy. Anticompetitive action should be immune from
antitrust challenge if a state intended to engage in or permit the activity,
regardless of the state's motive. The action, however, should be preempted
under the Commerce Clause if the effects of the action fall insubstantially on the state's own citizens.
V.

Resolution of Outstanding Issues

Based on the principles summarized above, a few issues that have
been explicitly left open or have actually not been decided by the Court
will be examined briefly. The resolutions of most are easy; the answer
to one is more difficult.
A.

Status of the Governor

In Ronwin, the Court explicitly stated, "This case does not present
the issue whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position
as the state legislature and Supreme Court for purposes of the state
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action doctrine."0 There is little doubt, however, that the governor
does stand in that position. In Bates, the Court held that the Supreme
Court embodied the state to the extent it regulated attorneys because
the state constitution conferred authority on the court to supervise the
bar.50 ' The clear inference is that any constitutional branch of government
represents the state so long as it is exercising its constitutional powers.
Further, state action immunity is grounded in federalism, and that
concept points directly to a state's constitution as the source of the
government's authority and identity. Though the Court in Ronwin alluded to Bates as the origin of its mysterious suggestion that a state
court's judicial, as opposed to legislative actions are not immune, Bates
contained no such limitation, and no analogous limitation should apply
to the actions of a governor. 0 2 The only limitation implied by Bates is
that the branch of government be operating within its constitutionallydefined sphere. 03
B. Supervision of State Agencies
In Town of Hallie, the Court said that, similar to cases involving
municipalities, "[in cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is
likely that active state supervision would also not be required, although
we do not here decide that issue." 5°" In fact, the Court came very close
to deciding that issue in SMCRC. In that case, though the public utility
commissions were not sued, °3 the private defendants were held immunized in part because they were supervised by the agencies. There was
no indication that the agencies themselves were supervised, however, and
it would be remarkable indeed if an unsupervised agency could effectively
supervise private conduct but be subject to antitrust liability itself.
Besides, it is hard to imagine a greater intrusion into the internal affairs
of a state than a federal inquiry into the government's oversight of its
own agencies, and it is not easy to imagine just how a state in practice

500. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. at 1995 n.17.
501. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 215-39 and accompanying text.
503. In Deak-Perera Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1756 (1985), the Ninth Circuit held that the Hawaii
Department of Transportation was immune from antitrust challenge for awarding an
exclusive concession to the plaintiff's competitor. 745 F.2d at 1282. The court correctly
observed that the executive branch of government is entitled to state action immunity.
Id. at 1283. The case, however, involved an executive agency, not the governor himself,
and the court's analysis of the agency's source of immunity is slightly confused. See id.
at 1282-83. In fact, the agency should be immune if it is acting within the scope of the
power delegated to it by whatever branch of government under which it is organized.
504. Town of Hallie, 105 S. Ct. at 1720 n.10.
505. SMCRC,105 S. Ct. at 1725 n.13.
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would go about supervising its agencies. Usually, agencies do the supervising.
C.

Clayton Act §7 Violations

The Court has never held that anticompetitive mergers violative of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 5°6 can be immunized under the state action
doctrine. The Court has considered allegations of Sherman Act §1 and
§2 violations, however, and has never indicated any unease in applying
the doctrine in the context of both of these provisions.10 Further, the
principle of federalism is not affected by which particular federal statute
conflicts with state desires. In sum, state action should be able to
immunize conduct otherwise unlawful under § 7.508
The more difficult question relates to the requirements of immunity.
The answer proposed by this article is simple enough-a merger should
be exempt if the state intended to allow it, and intent is proven if the
state acted in such a way as to make the merger a likely consequence.1 9
If the merger is proposed to a state agency, which explicitly approves
it, immunity obviously should be granted. 10 The answer suggested by

506. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
507. For example, Parker involved a potential § I violation; Town of Hallie involved
a potential § 2 violation.
508. The Second Circuit has held that the state action doctrine applies to § 7 of the
Clayton Act. Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Organization Inc., 54 U.S.L.W.
2601 (2d Cir. May 17, 1986). The Fourth Circuit also apparently reached this conclusion.
In North Carolina ex. rel. Edmisten v. P.I.A. Asheville, Inc., 740 F. 2d 274 (4th Cir.
1984) (en banc), rev'g 722 F.2d 59 (1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1865 (1985), in response
to a federal law, North Carolina enacted legislation that required a firm to obtain a
certificate of need from a state agency prior to making a substantial acquisition of health
care facilities. 740 F.2d at 277-78. The state law specified thirteen criteria to be used by
the agency in evaluating a request for a certificate. Id. at 278. The operator of one of
two private psychiatric hospitals in a region attempted to acquire 50% of the stock of
the other hospital and obtained a certificate of need for the acquisition. Id. at 276. North
Carolina challenged the acquisition, inter alia, under the Clayton Act. Id. The Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the acquisition was not immune under the state action
doctrine for failure to satisfy the active supervision requirement, but implied that a state
action exemption from section 7 of the Clayton Act was possible. Id. at 277, 279.
509. The application of Commerce Clause preemption analysis, however, is slightly
more complex. A merger may make the exercise of market power more likely even though
it does not result in the actual exercise of that power. If a merger only increases the
danger of exercised market power, no anticompetitive effects will be suffered by consumers
at the time of the merger. Yet subsequently, if market power is exercised, harm may be
imposed primarily on out of state consumers. At that time, the only effective remedy
may be structural, but a structural remedy may be impossible in practice. Thus, a merger
intended by the state should be preempted by the Commerce Clause if it is likely to
produce significant injury to allocative efficiency and an insubstantial portion of the harm
is likely to be imposed on the state's citizens.
510. The acquisition in North Carolina ex rel. Edmisten would have been immune
under this analysis. See supra note 508.
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Supreme Court precedent is less clear. The requirement of a clear state
policy and the meaning of that requirement should be unaffected by
the fact that the conduct challenged would violate §7 of the Clayton
Act, rather than the Sherman Act. Though the application of the active
supervision requirement is problematic, the criterion should not be construed to apply.
If active supervision can be justified as a requirement, it is because
it marginally reduces the probability of erroneously inferring the state's
intent to permit a restraint as the conduct is carried out and felt in
practice."' Active supervision allows the state to reevaluate its initial
intent to authorize conduct in light of the actual effects of that conduct
and to be quickly made aware of any transgressions of authority conferred, thereby hastening state action to alter the permission granted.
This unique advantage of supervision can justify supervision as a requirement only if the marginal benefit in expected error cost avoided
exceeds the cost of compliance. When a merger is challenged, the cost
of compliance with a supervision requirement is apt to exceed the benefit
of it by a far greater margin than when the requirement is applied to
other antitrust violations.
A merger may violate §7 if it tends to create a monopoly, even
though it does not result in the acquisition of monopoly power1 2 Thus,
conduct that has no immediate effect on consumer welfare may nevertheless violate the antitrust laws. By contrast, the Supreme Court's state
action cases have involved restraints, such as price-fixing, the exclusion
of competition, and tying arrangements, in which the anticompetitive
effect flows immediately from the challenged conduct. If supervision is
required to immunize mergers, the state may have to oversee in perpetuity
the operation of a merged firm even though the firm never acquires,
much less exercises, market power. It is most unlikely that the state
would change its mind about the scope of its authorization if no anticompetitive effects flow from its permission. Further, the private party's
conduct cannot exceed the bounds of its permission because a merger
authorization does not establish limitations on subsequent conduct. If
the state is not apt to change its mind, and the possibility of a private
party's transgressing its authority is nonexistent, the usefulness of supervision in reducing the probability of erroneously construing the state's
continuing intent disappears.

511. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
512. For example, in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277, 86 S.
Ct. 1478, 1482 (1966), the Court explained: "By using . . . terms in § 7 which look not
merely to the actual present effect of a merger but instead to its effect upon future
competition, Congress sought to preserve competition among many small businesses by
arresting a trend toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to
the point that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies."
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Moreover, if a state does reverse a decision, the benefit to consumers
is likely to be produced by the state acting to rescind its permission
and directing the parties to halt the previously authorized conduct. For
instance, it California authorizes price-fixing by raisin growers, and after
supervising that conduct, realizes that the effects are worse than it had
anticipated, consumers benefit only if the state quickly withdraws its
permission and orders the practice to cease. And the state can be expected
to take that corrective action where the remedy involves merely discontinuing private activity. Where a merger is authorized, however, and
the state subsequently realizes its error, the state is far less likely to
take corrective action because such action would entail costly structural
relief. The state might have to order the dissolution of a working
enterprise. Additionally, the cost of supervising a merged firm may
exceed the cost of supervising other restraints such as price fixing,
because the conduct that must be overseen is likely to be more diffuse,
encompassing the entire operations of the firm. In short, supervision
offers little benefit in the merger context, far too little to justify its
extreme cost.
The Court's decision in Town of Hallie offers some support for
this conclusion. There, the Court applied the kind of analysis suggested
here to a particular class of defendants, i.e. municipalities, and concluded
that the cost of supervision would exceed its benefits." 3 The Court might
be willing to apply the analysis to a particular class of antitrust violation,
anticompetitive mergers, and similarly conclude that the cost of supervision cannot be justified.
VI.

Conclusion

The state action doctrine did not appear one day in polished form,
with intricacies explored andconundrums solved. It evolved and will
continue to evolve. Some of the stages of the process have been predictable, others less so. Today, the areas most in need of refinement
are the confused status of state agencies, the misunderstood nature of
municipalities, and the misguided requirement of supervision. Because

the doctrine is evolving, however, there is hope. The Court's recent
exposition of the clear state policy standard and its recent failure to

substitute its own judgment for the policy decisions of the states are
cause for optimism.
The doctrine of state action is still evolving. The doctrine is certain
to change, and with some luck, it might someday do what it ought to

do-immunize from antitrust challenge all conduct engaged in or authorized by a state.

513. See supra notes 406-08 and accompanying text.

